de·us ex ma·chi·na noun [singular]: an event or entity that unexpectedly and mysteriously operates to provide a solution to an intractable problem; literally, god from a machine
How is it, that following the 1943 Quebec Agreement, Klaus Fuchs, then known by British Intelligence to be a member of the Communist Party (KPD), was assigned to the British Atomic Mission to America in violation of U.S. federal statutes and U.S. military security edicts? [1]
How is it, that on July 14, 1944, Klaus Fuchs was advised by James Chadwick, Scientific Director of the British Mission in America, that his services were then most needed in Britain and he would be returning there, but two weeks later in contravention of Chadwick’s decision, Fuchs was transferred to Los Alamos with less than 24 hours notice? [2]
How is it, that also in July 1944, Soviet agent Kim Philby became head of Britain’s SIS Section IX (Soviet Counterintelligence) and immediately had to deal with “situations of horrible complexity,” which in fact characterizes the decision to send Fuchs to Los Alamos? [3]
How is it, that in September 1945 when GRU code clerk Igor Gouzneko defected in Canada, the personages who immediately traveled to Ottawa were William Stephenson (Chief of BSC), Stewart Menzies (Chief of SIS), Peter Dwyer (SIS officer) and Roger Hollis (Chief of MI5), but not the head of SIS Soviet Counterespionage, Kim Philby, whose position and responsibilities were actually the most relevant to the situation? [4]
How is it, that in March 1946 when the address book entry “Klaus Fuchs of the University of Edinburgh” surfaced in the Gouzenko investigation, this very significant intelligence item was not shared with the FBI representative in Ottawa participating in the investigation, nor brought to the Bureau’s attention at any time later? [5]
How is it, that after Trinity (July 1945), only Klaus Fuchs of the British Mission remained at Los Alamos, to be recalled home in June 1946 following a conference on the Hydrogen bomb, and which recall just happened to occur when FBI Headquarters sent the Halperin address book to the Boston Field Office for investigation of Fuchs’ sister, Kristel Heineman? [6]
How is it, that in early 1949, British cryptanalysts at GCHQ (Bletchley Park) obtained a Venona message from the U.S. Army Security Agency which they were then able to decrypt revealing that while in America Klaus Fuchs had passed atomic information to the KGB, but withheld this fact from the FBI? [7]
How is it, that in April 1949, Klaus Fuchs, having resumed contact with Soviet intelligence in England, suddenly without the least premonition to his KGB control officer (A. Feklisov) abruptly severed all contact, ending espionage relations that had been continuous since 1941? [8]
How is it, that in late August 1949, after investigating Venona decrypts featuring covername “REST,” the FBI requested information on Klaus Fuchs from British intelligence and received a reply dated 9 September 1949 that was false and misleading in every particular? [9]
How is it, that also in August 1949, Soviet mole Kim Philby, then serving as First Secretary of the British Embassy in Turkey, “unexpectedly” received a telegram from SIS headquarters directing his transfer to Washington D.C. as SIS liaison to both the FBI and CIA? [10]
How is it, that Fuchs’ confession to Dr. Michael Perrin made on Monday, 30 January 1950, sent to J. Edgar Hoover at the end of February and then forwarded by Hoover to President Truman on 2 March 1950, is not Fuchs’s full, original confession to Perrin, which confession remains classified to this day? [11]
How is it, that after Fuchs confessed at the end of January 1950 to MI5’s Jim Skardon, the British government prevented the FBI from interviewing Fuchs for over 4 months? [12]
How is it, asked Sir Henry Tizard in September 1949 following Joe 1, “that knowing all that we did in 1945, we are still without the atomic bomb by contrast with Russia who starting from scratch has apparently now surpassed us?” [13]
How is it, that when Fuchs was released from prison, returned to East Germany and then brought to Moscow for interview by the KGB, his last control officer, A. Feklisov, was not permitted to participate in his former agent’s debriefing or even meet him? [14]
How is it, that Fuchs’ espionage contact and courier in Britain, Ursula Kyczynski (“Sonya”), twice interviewed by MI5 and whom Fuchs described accurately in his confession as a “foreign woman with black hair living in Banbury,” was allowed by MI5 to leave the country the day before the start of Fuchs's trial? [15]
How is it, that the British government saw fit to execute spies/traitors Carl Lody, Karl Muller and William Joyce, but in the case of Klaus Fuchs, who betrayed “the most important secret ever by a British citizen” and whom the presiding trial judge accused of “the grossest treachery,” he received a prison sentence of only 14 years, later commuted to 7 years for good behavior? [16]
Theory of the Case
An investigative case may have many initial theories regarding the circumstances of a given event — the who, what, when, where, why, how, etc. However, as more facts and conditions are established, the fewer the available theories. The Klaus Fuchs espionage case exhibits many aberrant intersections with British Intelligence. Several could perhaps be dismissed as happenstance. In the aggregate, however, these abnormalities preclude any rational or benign theory for explaining Fuchs’s espionage against the Manhattan Project. For example, in 1943, the U.S. Government and U.S. Military had specific statutes and exclusions with respect to members of the Communist Party. The British Government was aware of these barriers and knew Klaus Fuchs was a Communist: they had interned him in 1939 when Germany and the Soviet Union signed a mutual non-agression pact (Molotov-Ribbentrop). Nonetheless, Fuchs was added to the British Mission to the American atomic project without disclosure of his cautionary background to any US official. More interesting is the fact that Fuchs was a 'last minute' addition to the British Mission. His visa from the American embassy in London was only issued the day before the Mission sailed on the RMS Andes at the end of November 1943 out of Portsmouth. In 1949 when the FBI investigated Fuchs for espionage and requested information about him from British MI5, the Bureau was advised that Fuchs was a medical physicist assigned to Oak Ridge in 1944. In fact, as the Bureau quickly learned from its own Atomic Energy Commission, Fuchs was a mathematical physicist assigned to Los Alamos in 1944. Presuming good faith on the part of an ally, there is no exculpatory theory that explains these and a host of other British misdeeds. There are too many incongruities, coincidences, stark failures and outright deceits. Enter a deus ex machina hypothesis brought forth from the playbook of Niccolò Machiavelli, The Janus Operation. [17]
The JANUS Operation
Janus, the deus-ex-machina figure/operator in London invoking covert activity with Moscow to the east and Washington to the west. Apropos the below graphic, when it is day in Moscow, it is night in Washington. And with respect to Klaus Fuchs, Washington must be 'kept in the dark' at all costs.
The mastermind of the operation was the “epic partnership” of Winston Churchill and Lord Cherwell. The imperative was a Soviet ultimatum based on Stalin's stance that the 1943 Quebec Agreement with the U.S. violated Britain’s wartime obligations to the USSR under the Molotov-Cripps agreement (July 1941). The “JANUS” spymaster was William Stephenson (“INTREPID”), strategically located in New York where he headed the uber-secret British Security Coordination. BSC was an intelligence bureau nominally part of SIS, but whose mission and direction were the province of the Churchill-Cherwell duo. The cover for BSC was the British Passport Control Office located in the International Building, Rockefeller Center, NY. This was also the location of the British Mission’s Diffusion Group, and where Fuchs worked for six months. Stephenson’s principal deputy was SIS officer Peter Dwyer, codenamed “JANUS.” The underlying principle of action, i.e. gentlemen's agreement, would require Britain to cast a blind eye on selective agent operations of Soviet intelligence. Crucial to success, after Fuchs himself, was the Anglo-Soviet co-instrument, Kim Philby. [18]
Final Acts
Deus ex machina was 'on his game' to the end. As indicated previously, Fuchs’s early contact/courier in England was Ursula Kuczynski (”SONYA”), a German foreign national who lived in Banbury, England. During the war years she had been interviewed twice at her home by MI5. On one such occasion the MI5 interviewer was Jim Skardon (later to be Fuchs' interlocutor). The story jumps forward to Friday, January 27, 1950: On this date Fuchs made a written confession to Skardon at the War Office in London. Three days later, Monday, January 30, Fuchs returned to London and made a full classified confession to Sir Michael Perrin. On Thursday, February 2, Perrin called Fuchs at Harwell and asked him to again return to London. When Fuchs arrived at Perrin’s office he was immediately arrested by Scotland Yard officer Leonard Burt. The following day J. Edgar Hoover was advised of Fuchs’s confession wherein Fuchs admitted “continuous espionage on behalf of the Soviet Government from the end of 1941 to February 1949.” Fuchs’s arrest hit the front page of newspapers in London and Washington on Saturday, February 4, 1950. One of the persons reading the London press was Ursula Kuczynski. She immediately recognized herself in the news accounts as the “foreign woman with black hair living in Banbury” who was Fuchs’s espionage contact. Upon reading this, Kuczynski fled England within 24 hours, just as intended by deus ex machina who leaked/planted the information in the press.
Klaus Fuchs, a British citizen, was arraigned on February 3, 1950, and his treason “exploded in the British press.” A pre-trial hearing was conducted on February 10. Crown prosecutor Christmas Humphries read four charges, stating that all four were based on “a complete confession” by the accused. This confession was the one Fuchs made to Skardon, not his full confession to Perrin. Humphries also named three witnesses to be called, Jim Skardon, Henry Arnold (Security Officer at Harewell) and Michael Perrin. Fuchs was not allowed a jury trial by the government. The trial was set for March 1, 1950, at the Old Bailey. J. Edgar Hoover was incensed when MI5 Director General, Percy Sillitoe, refused to allow the FBI's representative in London to attend Fuchs’ trial. The British relented on this decision, and Lish Whitson, the Bureau’s special emissary for the Fuchs case, was allowed to attend. The trial lasted an hour and a half. Fuchs' demeanor was “expressionless, seemingly nonchalant.” The only witness to testify was Skardon, and the only evidence presented was Fuchs' confession to Skardon—and only part of that. None of the Perrin confession was entered into evidence and Perrin was not called to testify. After the trial Hoover learned that “Fuchs had not revealed to MI5 the names or identities of any of his contacts.” He thus demanded that Bureau agents be allowed to interview Fuchs in prison. This initiative was denied by the British Home Office. Hoover countered that action by bringing the U.S. State Department to bear, and the British government acquiesced a second time. However, deus ex machina was not done. The FBI would be held off for a further two months while Fuchs was thoroughly prepared and rehearsed. FBI agents Clegg and Lamphere first interviewed Fuchs on May 20, 1950, with Skardon present at all times. During Fuchs' FBI interrogation, deus ex machina’s most urgent charge was to hide the facts about how much Fuchs had given the Soviets on the hydrogen bomb.
As regards the United States, the history of Klaus Fuchs is that of a masterful, ultra-compartmented espionage operation by a so-called ally. Behind such an operation is always a hidden purpose and intelligence. Moreover, when successful, grave harm is visited on the foe, to wit: "Confident that his possession of atomic weapons neutralized America's strategic advantage, Stalin was emboldened to unleash war in Korea in 1950." The Price of Treachery: United States battlefield casualties in Korea, 37,000. British war dead, 1,078. [19]
Notes, Sources and References
1. “How is it ... the August 1943 Quebec Agreement ... Military security clearance edicts?”: Hatch Act, 1939; The Alien Registration Act or Smith Act (18 U.S.C. § 2385) , 1940; Two questions on a 1942 questionnaire for employment on a classified U.S. atomic project: "Has the applicant expressed or shown sympathy toward any un-American organization?" "Is there any question of loyalty to the United States?"
Klaus Fuchs, Soviet Spy, First Period, 1941-1943 Fuchs joined the Tube Alloys project in May 1941 and was a contributor to the Maud Report completed in July 1941. That month, Britain and the Soviet union became allies in the war against Germany (Cripps-Molotov Agreement). In Autumn 1941 Fuchs contacted Jurgen Kuczynski, exiled leader of the German Communist Party (KPD) in Britain. He asked Kuczynski for a Soviet contact whom he could apprise of an important project he was working on. Kuczynski was a GRU operative and he arranged a meeting between Fuchs and Simon Davidovich Kremer (“Alexander”), a GRU intelligence officer whose cover was that of Secretary to the Soviet embassy’s Military Attache. For this first meeting, Fuchs brought carbon copies of typed reports he had prepared on the calculations of nuclear fission and uranium diffusion. After the first meeting, Fuchs had doubts about Kremer’s authenticity as a Soviet official and whether his papers would reach the proper authorities. On his next trip to London, Fuchs went to the Soviet Embassy and asked for Kremer, who indeed was there and reassured him. Fuchs met Kremer three times during the next six months. Sometime in 1942 Kremer transferred control of Fuchs to “Sonya,” Kuczynski’s sister Ursula. Sonya was a highly experienced GRU agent who lived in Oxford, convenient to Fuchs’ work in Birmingham. Sonia was Fuchs’s control officer until November 1943 when he sailed on the SS Andes to America as a member of the British Tube Alloys mission.
Comment/Analysis: In 1940 GRU General Walter Krivitsky defected to MI5 and was debriefed over a three week period. Many of the Soviet spies Krivitsky revealed were placed under surveillance. Presumably, Kremer was one of these, as Krivitsky named him as the center of Soviet espionage operations across Europe, to wit: “The one person Krivitsky thought the British should keep their eyes on was Simon Kremer, Fourth Department rezident in London. He was a legal ... hence he could be located. Krivitsky asked to see photographs of the Soviet embassy staff ... and when shown a photo of Kremer made a positive identification.” Given the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 1939 and the resultant anti-Communist policy of the British government (e.g., Fuchs' internment), it must be the case that surveillance on Kremer by British counter-intelligence was established. Furthermore, there is a presumption that nations monitor the embassy entrances of competitor nations, photographing and identifying those who come and go—Klaus Fuchs visited the Soviet Embassy in 1941. There is also a ‘dog that didn’t bark’ aspect to this narrative. In 2009 Britain’s leading historian of intelligence, Professor Christopher Andrew, published Defend the Realm, The Authorized History of MI5 (1,000 pages). There is no mention whatsoever by Andrew of either Simon Kremer or the two Kuczynski’s. This despite the fact that the Fuchs-Kuczynski-Kremer connection is unequivocally established in the existing literature.
How did Fuchs get assigned to the British Mission to America?
(Refs: Death in Washington, Walter C. Krivitsky, 2003, Gary Kern, p.271; Klaus Fuchs, Atomic Spy, Robert Chadwell Williams, 1987, p.60; Klaus Fuchs, The Who Stole the Atom Bomb, Norman Moss, 1987, p.38, 40; The Man Behind the Rosenbergs, Alexander Feklisov, 2001, p.194; Sonya's Report, Ruth Werner (aka Ursula Kuczynsky), p.259, et al; Spy Catcher, Peter Wright, 1987, p.375, et al)
2. “How is it ... on July 14, 1944, Klaus Fuchs .... why or how that occurred?”: Letter From Chadwick to Peierls, re Klaus Fuchs - 14 July 1944, with Commentary by Brian Cathcart (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Med/FuchsLetter.html)
Klaus Fuchs, Soviet Spy, Second Period, December 1943 – June 1946 Klaus Fuchs was a late addition to the British Mission which arrived in Newport News, VA, on December 3, 1943, aboard the SS Andes. The Andes passage lasted 11 days, which means it left England on November 23, 1943. All of the British scientists needed U.S. immigration visas issued by the the London embassy. Fuchs’s visa application was issued/signed on November 22, 1943. As a group, the Mission proceeded to Washington where they received orientation briefings at the Tube Alloys office, and then by General Groves. Personnel were sent to various atomic research locations such as Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, New York and Canada. The Diffusion/Akers Group, headed by Rudolf Peierls went to New York City where their office was co-located in the Rockefeller Center building with the British Passport Control Office (front for the British Security Coordination operation). Fuchs was part of the Diffusion group. His first espionage meeting with his American contact/courier, Harry Gold, was in February 1944. The Diffusion Group’s work was largely completed in June 1944 and Fuchs wound-up being transferred to Los Alamos, New Mexico, on or about 11 August 1944. The decision to transfer Fuchs to Los Alamos—not only to the ultra classified Theoretical Physics Division but to the Implosion Group no less—was and remains enigmatic. Fuchs’s departure from New York was such that he was unable to inform Soviet intelligence via Gold. Contact was reestablished when Fuchs visited his sister, Kristal Heineman, in February 1945. Gold travelled to Boston and met Fuchs at the Heineman household, where he received “a considerable packet of information.” Thereafter, Gold twice traveled to New Mexico to rendezvous with Fuchs, first in June 1945 and then September 1945. At each meeting the last order of business was establishing the date, time and location of the next contact. In his confession to British intelligence in early 1950, Fuchs claimed he met Gold in Santa Fe in Spring 1946. A Fuchs faculty oft mentioned in the literature is his memory, it was near photographic. In his confession to the FBI, Gold was voluble and definitive regarding his contacts with Fuchs. As explained by Gold, at their September 1945 meeting in Santa Fe, Fuchs could not be specific about a date for the next meeting because he thought he might be returning to England in that time frame. His advice to Gold was that he should call his sister in Cambridge in December because he hoped to be visiting there over Christmas. Gold did call Fuchs’ sister and attempt to set up the contact, but was told that Klaus was still in New Mexico. Gold stated to the FBI, “My last meeting with Klaus Fuchs occurred as scheduled in Santa Fe on September 19, 1945.” Why did Fuchs say that he met Gold in Spring 1946 when he certainly did not? The answer undoubtedly relates to the Gouzenko case in Canada. In early 1946 that investigation turned-up an address book belonging to Israel Halperin which contained an entry for Fuchs and his sister, Kristal Heineman. The FBI received a copy of the address book in March 1946. Fuchs’s name cropping up in an espionage investigation represented a significant threat of exposure. After Trinity, July 1945, the British Mission returned to England—except for Klaus Fuchs. As we have seen, Fuchs had ties to British intelligence. In fact in his FBI confession, Gold reported that Fuchs had told him about contacts with MI5 and MI6 representatives at Los Alamos. One such contact involved Fuchs’ father in Germany. And of course, in the present circumstances, he was an absolutely critical Soviet espionage asset. Thus the Spring 1946 contact mentioned by Fuchs was likely an emergency contact effected by the KGB to alert Fuchs to the problem in Canada and to put in place a contingency plan. And with a ‘safe house’ in Santa Fe, a drugstore front, Soviet intelligence had a number of options. More than that, they had an early warning possibility in Kim Philby, then in charge of Soviet counterespionage for MI6 in London and keeping close tabs on the Gouzenko defection case in Ottawa. Philby must have marveled that he had both ends of the deal, and British interests were exactly aligned with Russian interests. Klaus had been asked to remain at Los Alamos for British purposes, which at that point in 1946 were extremely important, the research on a thermonuclear weapon. Fuchs attended a conference on the “Super” at Los Alamos in April 1946, and then another in early June. Not wanting to push their luck with what the FBI might do with the Halperin address book, the British recalled Fuchs, the date set to follow the Super conference in June. On 11 June 1946, FBI Headquarters sent copies of the address book to those field offices with ‘Halperin’ addresses in their areas. The Boston field office was one of those offices. Fuchs departed Los Alamos on 14 June 1946 and went to his sister’s residence in Cambridge for a last visit before returning to England. Two weeks after leaving Los Alamos on 28 June 1946, Fuchs returned to Britain by RAF bomber out of Montreal, Canada. The Heineman address in Halperin’s address book, 55 Carvel Road, Watertown, MA, was dated to 1940 and was 6 years old. The Heinemans had moved with no forwarding address on record. In 1946 they were living in Cambridge. The FBI investigation of Kristal Fuchs Heineman was closed in December 1946, ostensibly without having located/interviewed her or her husband. If events had been otherwise, it might have happened that FBI agents calling at the actual Heineman residence in Cambridge in June 1946, might have been greeted at the door by one “K Fuchs of the University of Edinburgh.”
(Refs: Williams, p.215; Moss, p.46; FBI HQ 65-58805-Ser 1494, 1951 Case Summary)
How did Fuchs get to Los Alamos?
Klaus Fuchs arrived in the U.S. as a member of the so-called British Mission on December 3, 1943, several months after the Quebec Agreement. Members of the mission were scientists working on Britain’s top secret Tube Alloys Project, predecessor and analog to the US Manhattan Project. They were hand-picked by James Chadwick and Michael Perrin in consultation with General Groves and Robert Oppenheimer. In America they were deployed to three main work sites, New York , Oak Ridge and Los Alamos. Perrin and Chadwick established a Tube Alloys project office in Washington, D.C. in order to be in proximity to General Groves, the NDRC and other entities of the U.S. Government. The scientists sent to New York were specialists in the diffusion process/method for enriching uranium and were known as the Akers Mission. Four of its members were Rudolf Peierls, Klaus Fuchs, Tony Skyrme and Christopher Kearton. After publishing some 20 research reports by June 1944, the Diffusion Group’s work was done. Peirels and Skyrme were transferred that month to Los Alamos with General Groves’ approval. Fuchs' destiny is deus-ex-machina in microcosm. The best use of his services was thought to be back in England, as evidenced in a July 1944 letter from Chadwick in Washington to Peierls at Los Alamos. The literature is definitive that no significant scientist went to Los Alamos unless under the requisition of Robert Oppenheimer followed by ratification of the U.S. Army in the name of General Groves. In the case of Fuchs there is no record of either for Fuchs in the existing literature. Similarly, on the British side, all such personnel actions entailed the knowledge and approval of the head of the British Mission, Michael Perrin. In this case, the record shows that Perrin had deep albeit unspecified concerns about assigning Fuchs to Los Alamos. Also bearing on this question is the testimony of Pavel Sudoplatov who wrote that Oppenheimer was originally influenced to have Fuchs added to the British Mission. Thus, upon learning that Fuchs would be returning to England—which Fuchs had reported to his Soviet contact Harry Gold—the KGB would do everything in its power to countermand that decision in favor of Los Alamos. Finally, that Fuchs' transfer to Los Alamos was merely benign happenstance is not bespoke by a British intelligence account to the FBI in 1949 after Fuchs was exposed, any assessment of which account indicates a cover-up.
Sir Michael W. Perrin Michael Perrin had a varied and distinguished career in science and commerce. Especially significant, perhaps above all else, was his role in the development of the atomic bomb. Perrin was born in Canada in 1905 to English parents. He was educated at Oxford (Chemistry) and the University of Toronto (Physics). As a result of the 1941 Maud Committee Report, the British Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) established an atomic energy bureau/program under the codename Tube Alloys. DSIR contracted with Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), Britain’s largest chemical company, to conduct fundamental atomic research and development. Wallace Akers was the director of ICI and Michael Perrin was his assistant, supervising the theoretical science aspect of the project. In October 1941, after a meeting between DSIR and ICI officials to discuss financial, legal and security issues, “ICI lost control of the bomb project, which was reorganized under DSIR. All scientists working on the project became civil servants employed by Tube Alloys.” Akers and Perrin, however, remained in charge. Perrin called on James Chadwick, winner of the 1932 Nobel Prize in Physics for the discovery of neutrons, to recruit and lead the best available team of nuclear physicists. One of Chadwick’s recruits was Rudolf Peierls, a noted professor of Physics at the University of Birmingham. To assist with the intensive mathematics, Peierls added physicist Klaus Fuchs to the project in May 1941. Both Peierls and Fuchs were German political refugees. During World War II and afterwards, Perrin was involved in several top secret intelligence operations. One of the earliest was a tasking from British SIS to DSIR to conduct an assessment of German activity on atomic energy research. Perrin had available two excellent resources for the job, Peierls and Fuchs, both German refugees. Fuchs’ role included “abstracting published German and classified American reports on early bomb work. In April 1942 Fuchs sent Perrin an American classified report (A-117) by Eugene Wigner and Gregory Breit on the size of the sphere of uranium needed for a chain reaction. In spring 1943, “MI6 and Perrin continued to have Fuchs and Peierls evaluate German progress on building a bomb.” In this regard, Perrin was involved in helping Danish nuclear physicist, Niels Bohr, escape from the Nazis. While stationed in America as the senior Tube Alloys representative, Perrin was used by General Groves in the MED’s top-secret ALSOS operation (Special intelligence teams that rounded up enemy scientists in the wake of advancing allied troops.) In 1950, five years after the war ended, Perrin was called upon to take Fuchs’ confession covering espionage against Tube Alloys and the Manhattan Project, to include work at Los Alamos on the thermonuclear weapon. The full Fuchs-Perrin confession remains classified. The official British history of Tube Alloys contains the following statement: "When it was decided that Fuchs should remain in the U.S., Michael Perrin went out of his way to ask security for their latest and most detailed views on Fuchs -- it was a very important matter vis-a-vis the Americans and he wanted to be quite sure 'we do not slip up in any way."
The Chadwick Letter “July 14, 1944, Dear Peierls, I have now had talks with both Kearton and Fuchs about the future of the New York section and in particular about their own positions. As a result, Kearton will approach Keith and Benedict with the object of getting a letter by one or both of them to Groves to say that the services of Fuchs and Skyrme are no longer required. It is possible that this matter was raised by Groves on a visit to New York earlier in the week, but I have had no news from him so far. The position of Skyrme is quite clear. Bethe or Oppenheimer should write to Groves asking for his services in Y [Los Alamos]. Groves has provisionally agreed and there should be little delay over his transfer. Fuchs' future is not so clear. I gave you the gist of a cable from Akers in my letter of July 11. I did not agree with the suggestion made in this cable that Fuchs was not required in England, but I wished to discuss the question with Kearton before I made up my mind. Kearton was very strongly of the opinion that Fuchs was quite necessary in England if work on any kind of diffusion plant is to continue... I have now had a talk with Fuchs himself. He feels that he has a special contribution to make in England, whereas in Y he would be one of a number and can make no really significant difference to the work. I agree completely with these views of Kearton and Fuchs, and I feel sure you also agree at least in principle. I come now to the point of this letter It would put me in a very awkward position if a request for Fuchs' services in Y were to be sent to Groves. If Groves were to agree I also should have to consent, for the consequences of refusing, on the grounds that he was needed in England for work which can have no significance for the war, might be quite serious. It would certainly cause great resentment in some quarters and our relations with the U.S. on this project would be impaired. I should attempt to justify his return as being useful for the New York project, for after his experience here he could interpret their requests and help to direct U.K. work into directions of immediate interest to them. This argument would of course not be valid if a low-separation diffusion plant were to be started in England. I therefore do not want Bethe to ask for Fuchs. Further than that, I want Bethe to say that Fuchs would not be specially useful in Y, if Groves asks if they want him, as he may. This means some tactful work on your part and I hope you will be able to do what is necessary by suggestion rather than direct action. I have prepared the ground here and I think the matter can be arranged. I have stated that Fuchs could be useful in Y but that his special qualifications are not on the nuclear side but on the diffusion plant. Until I know something of what is happening in London I want to keep the New York position as fluid as possible. Yours sincerely, J. Chadwick”
The British Account “With respect to Fuchs’s transfer from New York to Los Alamos, the British have advised that on June 13, 1944, London telegraphed Rudolf E. Peierls, member of the British Mission who arrived in the United States with Fuchs, and who, on June 2, 1944, had been sent from New York to Los Alamos, where he headed the British group there, and asked for advice on whether Fuchs should return to the United Kingdom to work on a project. On June 24, 1944, Peierls replied that while he thought Fuchs should return if the project was being taken seriously, he nevertheless knew that Fuchs would be welcomed at Los Alamos. On July 8, 1944, London telegraphed Peierls, saying that Los Alamos should take precedence over the project in the United Kingdom. On July 20, 1944, and again on July 21, 1944, Christopher F. Kearton, also a member of the British Mission in New York City, wrote to London advising that Fuchs’ position was still uncertain, but that it looked as if he would return to the United Kingdom rather than be transferred to Los Alamos. On August 4, 1944, Washington wrote to Kearton, with a copy to Fuchs, confirming Fuchs’ posting to Los Alamos and instructing that he should catch the plane for Santa Fe, New Mexico, from Chicago on August 10, 1944, inasmuch as Fuchs previously had stated he would be ready to leave by August 9, 1944. On August 8, Kearton wrote that Fuchs would be leaving New York ‘this week.’ On August 11, 1944, Fuchs signed a letter from the New York office of the British Mission.”
(Refs: FBI HQ 65-58805, Serial 1202, p.7, Hoover Summary Brief, February 6, 1950)
Analysis and Comment This is deus ex machina writ small. History does not record who made the decision to send Fuchs to Los Alamos or why. Yet that decision was the proximate cause/action that gave Stalin the atomic bomb. As far as Fuchs was concerned the decision was made in his July 14, 1944, meeting with Chadwick in Washington, DC. Fuchs left that meeting believing that he would be returning to England, and so advised both his sister and his soviet contact (Harry Gold). With respect to the identity of individuals, the British account substitutes the generics, Washington and London. 'Washington' was Chadwick and Michael Perrin. As the Chadwick letter makes clear, the ‘Washington’ view was based on Tube Alloys considerations, i.e. Fuchs’s diffusion expertise was more applicable to projected requirements in Britain. The fact that Fuchs was to be sent to Los Alamos, and Perrin had serious reservations about that, indicates 'Washington' was overruled by 'London'. What potential “slip up” was Perrin referring to when he requested a thorough, ad hoc “security” review of Fuchs? (Which, perforce, could only be done at London headquarters.) What information about Fuchs would American security find objectionable? Perrin certainly knew that Fuchs was a Communist. Perrin most probably knew that Fuchs had contact with Soviet espionage in Britain before coming to America. Given Perrin’s own intelligence portfolio, as well as his relationship with Lord Cherwell, it cannot be discounted that he assumed or knew that Fuchs’ Soviet contacts were continuing in America. It must be a given that the decision to send Fuchs to Los Alamos was made in London. It is not likely to be happenstance that Soviet mole Kim Philby took over SIS’s Section IX, Soviet Counter-espionage, in June-July 1944, precisely when Fuchs' future in America was being decided.
(Refs: Re Philby, Private Life of Kim Philby, Ruffina Philby with Hayde Peake, Philby Chronology, p.401)
3. “How is it ... in July 1944 double agent Kim Philby .... of horrible complexity?": The Private Life of Kim Philby, The Moscow Years, Rufina Philby, with Hayden Peake, 1999, p.253, 413; My Silent War, Kim Philby, 1968, p.157; Mask of Treachery, John Costello, p.437; The Philby Files, Genrikh Borovik, 1994. p. 233-4.
Klaus Fuchs, Soviet Spy, Third Period, December 1946 - April 1949 In one of their meetings in New Mexico Fuchs told Gold that he expected to return to England in October or November 1945. Consequently at the meeting in September (which turned out to be their last) Gold came with instructions for Fuchs on reestablishing contact with Soviet intelligence in London. In August after his return home, Fuchs began working at Harwell, the British atomic research center. The security officer at Harwell, Henry Arnold, learning that Fuchs had been a German national, and only naturalized during the war, instituted a security check on him. MI5 conducted the new background investigation which took 5 months to complete. During this period, Fuchs still worked at Harwell and he quickly became head of the theoretical physics division, the number 3 official at Harwell (the Director and Assistant Director being 1 and 2, respectively). Perhaps understanding he was under a security review Fuchs did not immediately follow the re-contact procedures provided by Gold. Later, he did so, but a Soviet contact did not show up. As he had done in 1941, Fuchs took matters into his own hands and contacted Johanna Klopstech whom he knew to be connected to Jurgen Kuczynski and also a liaison to Soviet intelligence. (Author’s note: This event was actually more involved. A detailed account can be found in The Crown Jewels, West & Tsarev) The message was delivered and an experienced control officer, Alexander Feklisov—who had been responsible for the Rosenbergs, et al, in America—was dispatched to London. New contact arrangements were passed back to Fuchs through Klopstech, and Feklisov and Fuchs made their first meeting on Saturday, September 27, 1947. There would follow five more meetings at three month intervals. Fuchs, however, did not show up for his second meeting with Feklisov in November because Harwell sent sent him to Washington, DC, for an atomic declassification conference. (Fuchs still possessed his U.S. atomic “Q” clearance.) This conference lasted three days, after which Fuchs went to Cornell, Rochester, Schenectady and the Argonne Lab in Chicago to visit atomic facilities and consult on current programs and research. As reported by Feklisov, the scheme proceeded smoothly until the summer of 1948: “The danger became apparent during the summer of 1948. We received a long message from the Center informing us that Fuchs could be placed under surveillance by MI5 at any moment. This memo was written in somewhat alarmist terms that were atypical of the Center. I was ordered not to contact Fuchs if there were any unusual signs.” Two related events occurred in the first half of 1948 that ostensibly required this extreme caution in handling Fuchs. The first was a ‘quantum’ breakthrough in the U.S. Venona program by cryptanalyst Meredith Gardner. The second was the involvement at the start of 1948 of the British GCHQ in the ASA effort to decrypt thousands of Soviet messages “between the Center and its U.S. residencies.” As is known, Soviet intelligence had sources in the Venona SIGINT program in both the United States and Britain. Hence the warning to Feklisov regarding Fuchs. Notwithstanding the 1948 ‘alarm,’ the Fuchs operation continued with great success for almost another year. The first meeting in 1949 was in early February. At this meeting Fuchs assured Feklisov that his plan was “to help the Soviet Union until it is able to test its atomic bomb. Then I want to go home to East Germany.” At this meeting Fuchs mentioned his brother Gerhard who was very sick. Fuchs had never before accepted money for his espionage services, but Feklisov prevailed on him to do so now, he could send the money to Gerhard. Fuchs appreciated the offer and sent his brother a money order. The next meeting took place as scheduled, Saturday, April 2. That was the last time Feklisov ever saw Klaus Fuchs. Fuchs did not come to the next scheduled contact, Saturday, 25 June 1949. The backup for this meeting was Saturday, 2 July. Fuchs was a no show on this date as well, as he would be for every further prescribed fall back meeting. Feklisov continued to honor their contingency scheme until October 1949. It was on October 29, 1949, that British intelligence advised the FBI that they concurred in the Bureau’s finding that Fuchs was Soviet agent REST in the Venona messages. But of course the British knew this in April 1949.
(Refs: Feklisov, p.207-8, 222, 225-6; Williams, p.81, 96-7; Moss, p.110; West & Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 238-41.)
4. "How is it, that in September 1945 when GRU code clerk Igor Gouzneko .... but not the head of SIS Soviet Counterespionage, Kim Philby, whose position was most relevant?": Plateaus of Freedom, Nationality , Culture, and State Security in Canada, 1940-1960, Mark Kristmanson, 2003, Oxford University Press, pps 141-180; My Silent War;
5. “How is it ... in March 1946 when he address book entry ... by RAF bomber out of Montreal?”: FBI HQ 65-58805, Ser. 1494, p. 18, 19, 21; Memorandum, SA EVL to AD JPM, dated February 14, 1950; FBI HQ 65-58805, Serial 1202, p. 9; FBI HQ 65-58805, Serial 7, Ser. 1494, p.30-31; Moss, p. 25; Williams, p. 90-1; FBI HQ 100-65-58805, Serial 7, p.4; Enemies, Tim Weiner, 2012, p.142-3; Defend the Realm, Christopher Andrew, 2011, p.920, n.29 (“Among the evidence seen by [MI5 officer] Roger Hollis was a notebook belonging to Israel Halperin ... which contained a list of names and addresses including that of Klaus Fuchs.”);
6. "How is it, that after Trinity (July 1945) … which month also happened to be when FBI … for investigation of Fuchs’s sister, Kristel Heineman?":
7. “How is it ... in early 1949 British cryptanalysts ... withheld this fact from the FBI?”: Vassiliev’s Notebooks, KGB File 84490 V.3, p.129, A. Vassiliev, Yellow Notebook #1, trans., p.94. (“As a result of checking and investigating the circumstances surrounding the failure of our agent Charles [Fuchs], the following has been established: The American decryption service worked for a long time on one of the telegrams from New York’s MGB station, dating from 1944-45, during Charles’ stay in the USA. Unable to decode this telegram in its entirety, the Americans sent it in 1949 to English counterintelligence, which was able to decode it completely and ascertain that Charles was a Soviet intelligence agent who had passed us important information about work at American and English atomic centers, where he worked.”)
Author Note: This matter is simple. In February 1949, American cryptanalysts at the Army’s ASA (Arlington Hall) rendered a partial/fragmentary decryption of Soviet message No. 850, 15 June 1944. This partial decryption referenced a document on the science of isotope separation, specifically “Efrent (Efferent?) Fluctuation in a Stream [37 groups unrecoverable] (diffu?)sion method.” The decrypt also indicated that this was REST’s field, i.e. “work on his specialty.” Moreover, the ASA decrypt linked the letters “MSN” to the scientific report provided by REST. British authorities would realize virtually immediately that “MSN” referred to their British Mission in America and that, in fact, they had the “Efrent Fluctuation in a Stream” document in their possession. Finally, they were immediately aware that Fuchs, a committed communist, was the author of the document. They not only kept mum about these facts, they wittingly allowed him to continue as a Soviet spy. (Essay FUCASE, Note 37, refers)
8. “How is it ... in April 1949 Klaus Fuchs .... that had been continuous since 1943?”: The Man Behind the Rosenbergs, Alexander Feklisov, 2002, p.223, 226. (“Our next meeting on April 1, 1949, was to be the final one.” ~ “I still remember vividly one meeting with Fuchs in February 1949.”); Vassiliev's Notebooks (“Meeting with Charles 1 April 1949. Last meeting.”), KGB File 84490 V.3, p.129, A. Vassiliev, Yellow Notebook #1, trans., p.94.
9. “How is it ... in August 1949 the ASA sent .... false and misleading in every particular?”: FBI HQ 65- 58805, Ser. 7, Ser. 5, Ser. 33. Five Lies 1. The name provided by British intelligence in September 1949 was that of Fuchs’ father, Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs. Fuchs' correct birth name is Klaus Emil Julius Fuchs, a fact evidently not firmly established by the FBI until after Fuchs's arrest in 1950. 2. Fuchs was born in Russelsheim, Germany, not the "Ruesselhtenm, country unknown" asserted by the British. 3. Fuchs was a mathematical physicist, not a medical physicist. 4. Fuchs was transferred to Los Alamos on August 14, 1944, not Oak Ridge. 5. In 1949, at the start of the FBI investigation, Fuchs was much more than a “senior research worker at Harwell”, he was in fact Head of the Theoretical Division of Britain's atomic weapons program at Harwell, equivalent to Hans Bethe’s position at Los Alamos. Why the British dissembling and deception? Certainly one reason was that Fuchs still held a U.S. atomic Q clearance in 1949 and the British were loath to loose that access.
10. “How is it ... also in August 1949, Kim Philby, .... SIS liaison to both the FBI and CIA?”: The Philby Files, The Secret Life of Master Spy Kim Philby, Genrikh Borovik (with Phillip Knightley), 1994, p. 266.
11. “How is it ... that Fuchs’s confession to Dr. Michael Perrin .... That confession remains classified?”: Williams, Appendixes (p.178); Feklisov, p.235. Author Note: Alexander Feklisov indicated in Man Behind the Rosenbergs that he had read Fuchs’s two confessions, the one to Skardon and the one to Perrin. These confessions are contained in Williams which is a cited reference in Feklisov. Although Professor Williams believed these confessions were “probably identical to the original confessions,” Feklisov, based on his personal knowledge of Fuchs and the case, had his doubts. These confessions, the ones in Williams, are the ones provided to J. Edgar Hoover, who then forwarded them to President Truman. They are held in the Harry S. Truman Library. Certainly, there are discrepancies between Fuchs’ confessions and Feklisov’s memoir version of events. The same is true for the confession Fuchs made to FBI agents Clegg and Lamphere. Finality in this matter can only be achieved if the Skardon and Perrin original documents are made public.
12. “How is it, that after Fuchs confessed ....to interview Fuchs for 4 months?”: The FBI-KGB War, Robert Lamphere, 1995. Fuchs confessed to Perrin on January 30, 1950, and British intelligence notified the FBI on January 31, 1950. The first Fuchs meeting with the FBI’s Clegg and Lamphere was on May 20, 1950.
13. “How does it come about, asked Sir Henry Tizard .... starting from scratch has apparently now surpassed us?": Williams, p.43.
14. “How is it ... that when Fuchs was released from prison .... participate in the former spy’s debriefing?”: The Man Behind the Rosenbergs, Alexander Feklisov, 2002, pps. 252-264.
15. "How is it .... that Fuchs’ espionage contact and courier in Britain, Ursula Kyczynski (“Sonya”) ... the announced start of Fuchs trial?": Sonya’s Report, Ruth Werner, 1991, p. 288. [“When the press mentioned that Klaus had been meeting a foreign woman with black hair in Banbury I expected my arrest any day. ... Klaus’s trial was announced for the end of February, I prepared for my immediate departure in great haste and left England. I believe it was on the 27th, a day before the trial.”]
16. “How is it ... the British government saw fit to execute ... later commuted to 7 years for good behavior?": Defend the Realm, Christoppher Andrew, captioned photos beginning p.456; Williams, p. 129-135.
17. Ja·nus, [jey-nuhs], noun 1. an ancient Roman god of doorways, of beginnings, and of the rising and setting of the sun, usually represented as having one head with two bearded faces back to back, looking in opposite directions. 2. Janus, the duplicitous Roman god who treacherously looked both ways.
18. "Crucial to success ... the Anglo-Soviet co-instrument, Kim Philby.": My Silent War, Kim Philby, 1968, p.???157; The Philby Files, Genrikh Borovik, 1994. p.233-4, 340. Author Note: In his memoir, My Silent War, Kim Philby touched on the fact that it could and did happen that a particular course of action was in the best interests of both of his masters, SIS and the KGB. One situation where this occurred was the Gouzenko defection which put two British subjects in jeopardy, Klaus Fuchs and Allan Nunn May. Without giving names, Philby said he was successful in saving one individual but unsuccessful in the other case. The first ostensibly was Fuchs whose name turned up in the address book of a Soviet agent in Canada. That lead did not result in the required transparent investigation which would have included notification of the FBI. The second individual, Nunn May, was the subject of an investigation in Britain that Philby was unable to completely or safely thwart. It appears, however, that he was able to warn-off Soviet intelligence from a meeting/contact with Nunn May in London that he knew would be under surveillance by MI5. In any case, Nunn May was duly arrested, tried and convicted. Evidently Philby relished the notion of a two-sided operation. To this end, a later biographer, Genrikh Borovik, induced Philby to share another espionage scheme that had double dividends. In this example, Philby as an SIS officer would recruit a disaffected CIA officer. Such an officer would be very unlikely to become a spy for the KGB, but British intelligence, an ‘ally,’ would be a different matter. Why would a CIA officer be susceptible to such an approach? According to Philby, because the person was principled and hated the CIA’s “careerists, liars and scoundrels.” When Borovik enquired if this was more than a hypothetical, Philby demurred. The elegance of such an operation is that its spymaster is in Moscow. This person instructs Philby to find and develop a CIA target, and then persuade his SIS boss on the value and dividends of such a recruitment. To further demonstrate to Borovik the possibility of such an operation, Philby explained a way in which he would establish his bona fides with a prospective CIA recruit: "I would show him the special stamp we use at SIS – ‘guarded'. It meant that a document with that stamp could not be shown to the Americans at any price.” I would tell him that this will be stamped on all the documents I get from him … I would even promise him that no one but me would know about him as a source in SIS.” Although not proffered by Philby as an example or case in point, one can theorize that a receptive target would be a CIA officer who strenuously objected to a plan to assassinate Fidel Castro. With some consideration given to plausible deniability, SIS would be very interested to have such a source and receive valuable inside CIA/US information and planning. But for the KGB it would be ‘pure gold.’ Moreover, in his promise not to reveal the source’s identity to anyone in SIS, Philby undoubtedly was believable because that was his sincere intention. But of course this promise did not extend to his Soviet master. Although presented by Philby as a hypothetical, it is nonetheless provocative considering the Bay of Pigs debacle (were the Cubans alerted?), the reported/rumored CIA plan to assassinate Castro, etc. (See: http://www.washingtondecoded.com/site/2012/08/index.html)
Lord Cherwell Lord Cherwell was Winston Churchill’s closest friend and government advisor. He was born Frederick A. Lindemann in 1886 in Baden-Baden, Germany. His mother was an American citizen of Russian and English heritage; his father was an aristocratic and wealthy German entrepreneur who lived most of his life in Britain. Lindemann attended the University of Berlin where he studied physics. Churchill and Lindemann met in August 1921 when Lindemann was a professor of physics at Oxford Univerrsity. Their relationship was cemented in 1932 when they toured Europe together. Both men observed and became greatly alarmed by Germany’s rearmament. Churchill and Lindemann rose together in their respective spheres, Churchill in politics and Lindemann in science. As a political figure, Churchill began to warn about the speed of Germany’s rearmament and Lindemann provided Churchill with the facts and data to back up his public pronouncements. Lindemann began to rescue a number of Jewish scientists from Nazi persecution by offering them positions at Oxford’s Clarendon Laboratory, which he headed. Upon becoming First Lord of the Admiralty in September 1939, Churchill created a small statistics division, called S Branch, and he made Lindemann its head. This office was to become Churchill's personal think-tank for information on scientific and civilian matters. When Churchill ascended to prime minister in May 1940, Lindemann's department went with him and was expanded to include other experts and assistants. A central aspect of Lindemann’s job was to ensure that war-winning ideas by bright young scientists were swiftly investigated and, when warranted, turned into operational realities. The most important of these was research into the possibility of an atomic bomb, particularly because it was known that Germany was engaged in such a program. Lindemann’s initiative crystallized as the MAUD Committee and resultant report of that name. It was during this period, 1941, that Lindemann was raised to the peerage as Lord Cherwell, the honorary fief of Oxford in the County of Oxford. Cherwell attended meetings of the War Cabinet, accompanied the prime minister to conferences with Roosevelt and Stalin, had access to sensitive intelligence, and met and dined with the Prime Minister regularly. Particularly significant is the fact that Cherwell became the Director of Scientific intelligence within the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). The atomic problem ascended to number one status in 1941: “In July 1941 G.P. Thompson, chairman of the technical committee exploring an atomic bomb, wrote Cherwell that Germany was trying to acquire heavy water, and he urged Cherwell to develop a scientific intelligence program, utilizing someone with knowledge of physics and especially of the personalities and specialties of German physicists, rather than an SIS officer. Cherwell quite naturally turned to the German refugee community for assistance—specifically to Rudolf Peierls and Klaus Fuchs at the University of Birmingham.” Under Cherwell’s direction the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) was established to pursue the practical application of scientific research for military purposes. The atomic project was given the codename Tube Alloys. Cherwell selected the ICI company, headed by Wallace Akers and Michael Perrin, for this work. Klaus Fuchs was fully involved in both the theoretical and intelligence components of Tube Alloys. Moreover, Fuchs had direct personal contact with Cherwell, undoubtedly facilitated by the fact that they both were both native Germans and physicists: “In September 1943, after a meeting with Cherwell on August 8, Fuchs sent him a top secret report explaining ICI’s plans for a heavy water plant using centrifuge and electrolysis methods.” (One can perhaps appreciate that when they met privately it was a welcome opportunity to converse in their native tongue.) A young Oxford graduate by the name of Peter Dwyer was recruited to SIS in 1939. Although not a scientist, Dwyer could hardly have been unknown to Lord Cherwell, for the fact that they were both at Oxford in the 1930’s and Dwyer was the editor of the University newspaper, named The Cherwell. Indeed, by 1942, Dwyer had been picked to join British Security Coordination (BSC), an ad hoc espionage bureau in America created by Churchill. S Branch was disbanded after Churchill lost the postwar election. When he won again in 1951, Cherwell returned as adviser on nuclear warfare, moving into 11 Downing Street where he could visit Churchill through an interconnecting door. Cherwell eventually returned to Oxford to live in his old rooms where in 1957 he died in his sleep. Churchill, 82 and infirm, attended the funeral, paying homage at the gravesite of his most trusted confidant.
(Ref: Internet Essay, Madhusree Mukerjee. Author Mukerjee was raised in India, earned a PhD in physics from the University of Chicago, has served on the board of editors of Scientific American, and currently lives with her husband and son in Germany. Her most recent book, Churchill's Secret War: The British Empire and the Ravaging of India during World War II (2010), describes the political and economic scene in India when the country was simultaneously fighting the Axis and striving for independence from British colonial rule.)
British Security Coordination (BSC) The precise origins of the BSC operation (not ‘organization’ because at base it was an intelligence stratagem before it was an entity) are not established in the literature. Clearly, however, it had to be approved by Churchill before it was established as part of British SIS (Foreign Intelligence). Any reading of BSC history instructs that it was an ad hoc initiative to address very unique and critical circumstances. There is no information in the public realm that is definitive as to who conceived/created BSC, which had a similar yet distinct charter from SIS. Was it William Stephenson, the BSC Director, who understood Britain’s dire straits in 1940 and had the contacts in Whitehall to sow the idea and offer his services? Some literature suggests that Stuart Menzies (“C”), the current head of SIS, created BSC. If so, it was not an astute move by an experienced government bureaucrat as BSC would operate with significant autonomy from SIS, and not just in the Western Hemisphere. More probably than not, the ‘author’ of the BSC enterprise was the Churchill-Lindemann partnership. BSC has all the hallmarks of S-Branch, an organization conceived by Lindemann to directly serve Churchill’s gravest concerns. In the case of BSC, it was Churchill’s pure conviction, goal and strategy “to bring America into the war.” As the matter took shape in the duo’s discussions, Lindemann likely brought forward the person and background of William Stephenson. Lindemann and Stephenson were both RAF pilots and had served together in the same squadron in France during the First World War. And Stephenson’s acumen and extant capabilities were made to order for the BSC mission. Given Lindemann’s advisor role to Churchill and his own SIS portfolio at the time, the foregoing is the most likely narrative of the origin of BSC. In effect, it was a ‘replay’ of the Churchill-Lindemann S-Branch initiative. Both Churchill and Stephenson lobbied President Roosevelt to create an office in the White House whose purpose was the collection and synthesis of information related to the war in Europe. This agency was created by Roosevelt in July 1941 and named Coordinator of Information (COI). Roosevelt chose William Donovan to head the new bureau. As envisioned by Stephenson this new undertaking would be the American counterpart to BSC’s Research and Analysis department (R&A). Moreover this BSC initiative was considered an offensive wartime action to get the U.S. into the war. To this end, the COI initiative “represented a British move from the defensive to the offensive. The climax of that offensive was reached some six months before Pearl Harbor when BSC secured, through the establishment of the organization which eventually came to be known as the Office of Strategic Services, as an assurance of full American participation and collaboration with the British in secret activities directed against the enemy throughout the world.” In June 1942 Roosevelt reorganized COI into two new agencies, the Office of Strategic Services (now the CIA) and the Office of War Information (now the United States Information Agency).
(References: Charles C. Kolb. Review of Stephenson, William S., ed., British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas 1940-1945. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. December, 1999. URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=3623 ; William S. Stephenson, ed. British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas, 1940-1945.)
Peter Dwyer (“JANUS”) Peter Dwyer was born in South London on 17 June 1914. He grew up in a family active in the performance arts, acting, music and opera. His father, however, of Irish extraction, was a government official with the India Office. Dwyer went to Oxford University in 1933 where he studied modern languages. He became fluent in French, Spanish, Italian and German. Extracurricular activities included acting, play writing and journalism. In the latter case, he wrote for the student newspaper, The Cherwell, and would later become its Editor. In addition to the occasional essay, he authored a diary (column) of title, “Samuel Pepys—Undergraduate,” in which he would disclose the personal activities of campus personalities (sometimes cryptically). Such interest in ‘behind the scene’ doings was further evinced in a Cherwell essay containing this aside: “There is perhaps no more pleasant pastime than that of listening to the conversations of other people. There are, of course, those lucky few who can place their ear at the keyhole without any moral qualms … gathering the character and interests of a man from a few chance words … .“ As might be expected, Dwyer had a strong interest in William Shakespeare’s plays. Interestingly, he was captivated by the notion of their cinematic production, going so far as to match known film producers of the time to specific plays. A recurring theme is Shakespeare is the idea of being two-faced or Jauus-like, showing one side of yourself to some people while showing others an opposite side. Such characters are found in Orthello, Julius Caesar and The Merchant of Venice (“Now, by two-headed Janus, Nature hath framed strange fellows in her time ….”). Peter Dwyer graduated from Oxford in 1936. He pursued various theatrical and publishing interests, to include touring Europe to scout new plays and novels for 20th Century Fox. In 1939 Dwyer joined British Foreign Intelligence, SIS (aka MI6). Which party made the approach is not known. It is reported, however, that SIS had a university talent-spotting program, and one biographer has written that while at Oxford Dwyer “was cultivated in MI6’s country house system.” As an SIS operative in 1940 Dwyer worked behind the lines in France. In 1941 he was assigned to the Bermuda station which ran a mail intercept operation between the United States and Europe (from whence sprang the FBI’s “Joe K” Case). In 1942 Dwyer became SIS station chief in Panama. By the end of 1942 he was transferred to British Security Coordination (BSC) in New York with duties in Washington, D.C. From 1942 onward Dwyer was the frequent guest of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), SIS's intelligence counterpart in Ottawa. After the war Dwyer stayed on in Washington, D.C. as SIS’s liaison to American and Canadian security agencies. It was during this period that the 31-year-old Dwyer flew to Ottawa on 9 September 1945 to undertake the lead role in debriefing the Soviet defector, Igor Gouzenko, to wit: “Dwyer remained in the Canadian capital for extended periods through the arrests, detention, and interrogation of espionage suspects. In fact it was Dwyer’s telegram conveying the substance of Gouzenko’s revelations that was received at MI6 headquarters in London by Kim Philby.” In August 1949, SIS London headquarters made a personnel change in their Washington station: Kim Philby, head of station in Turkey for just a year and a half, was transferred to Washington D.C. as Dwyer's replacement. Dwyer explained this transfer to his U.S. counter parts, such as the FBI’s Robert Lamphere, as a move to take a position in Canada in contemplation of retirement. Philby arrived in Washington on October 10, 1949. Dwyer left Washington for Ottawa five months later in March 1950. In Canada he took a government oath of office and joined Canada’s Communications Branch of the National Research Council (CBNRC). The CBNRC was the equivalent of the United States’ National Security Agency (NSA). Dwyer’s application for the position had been signed on November 29, 1949. He was a proven counter-intelligence specialist and an “expert in a field Canada sorely needed to upgrade, namely the security of atomic research.” In this capacity, Dwyer's office was at the Chalk River atomic facility. Peter Dwyer worked for the next 18 years as a very senior Canadian intelligence officer. He never, however, became a Canadian citizen. Peter Dwyer died in Canada in 1971.
(Refs: Plateaus of Freedom, Nationality , Culture, and State Security in Canada, 1940-1960, Mark Kristmanson, 2003, Oxford University Press, pps. 100-110.)
19. "The FBI would be held off ... FBI agents Clegg and Lamphere first interviewed Fuchs on May 20, 1950, ... Skardon present at all times.": The FBI-KGB War, Robert Lamphere with Tom Shachtman, 1986.
"Confident that his possession of atomic weapons ... unleash war in Korea in 1950.": Spies, John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr, Alexander Vassiliev, 2009.