Oppenheimer Centennial
The year 2004 marked the 100-year anniversary of the birth of Julius Robert Oppenheimer. Predictably, given the past body of vacuous JRO authorship, his Centennial occasioned a sympathetic publishing phenomenon—numerous books, studies, reappraisals, etc. Even more predictable, the centerpiece of the retrospective was the security hearing that ended Oppenheimer’s public career. Oppenheimer’s patrons employ innuendo and overt scorn in citing the U.S. Government officials who acted to remove his atomic security clearance. The Centennials are exculpatory, portraying Oppenheimer’s downfall as a grave injustice perpetrated by enemies. The following excerpts reflect the collective groupthink that The Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer was actually about the messengers, not the message. [1]
American Prometheus, Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin: “Thus, during the seven months between April and December 1953, Lewis Strauss—with considerable help from William Borden—accomplished the ‘great deal of preliminary spade work’ that he and J. Edgar Hoover had agreed was necessary before a successful assault could be launched against Oppenheimer.” ... "At the apex of the McCarthyite hysteria, Oppenheimer had become its most prominent victim. President Eisenhower appeared satisfied with the outcome—but unaware of the tactics Strauss had used to obtain it." [2]
Reappraising Oppenheimer, The Puzzles of Interpreting J. Robert Oppenheimer, Barton J. Bernstein: “Even in 1954, with Hoover and AEC ‘prosecutor’ Roger Robb virtually ‘cherry-picking’ for evidence that Robert had been a CP member, they produced nothing in the loyalty-security hearing that was truly damning, or even nearly persuasive, that he might well have been a CP member in earlier years.” [3]
J. R. Oppenheimer and the American Century, David C. Cassidy: “Insecurity Hearings. As the most influential representative of his position on these matters, and as one who had collected powerful personal enemies, J. Robert Oppenheimer stood at the center of the policy divergences and in the crosshairs of those eager to impose their militarized vision of scientific research on the scientific community.” [4]
The Ruin of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Priscilla J. McMillan: “Strauss had another steed in his stable, and that was the obsessive Bill Borden. At the end of April 1953, badly compromised by his handling of the Wheeler affair and a Democrat who stood to lose his job with the new Republican Congress, Borden carried a mysterious “paper” to Strauss and spoke with him briefly. The content of his “paper” is not known but was probably a compilation of Borden’s suspicions about Oppenheimer.” [5]
101 East Palace, Jennet Conant: “The director of Los Alamos, J. Robert Oppenheimer, strongly opposed the more militarist faction, represented by Ernest Lawrence and Edward Teller in the bitterly divided scientific community. In the cruel betrayals and unimaginable reversals that exemplified the Cold War era and Joseph McCarthy’s red-baiting campaign of terror, Oppenheimer, the celebrated “Father of the Atom Bomb,” was stripped of his clearance and barred from government work on the grounds that he represented a risk to national security. [6]
Brotherhood of the Bomb, Gregg Herken: “Not Much More Than a Kangaroo Court. The only ‘bright part in his taking over these new difficult duties [AEC Chairmanship],’ Strauss told the FBI’s Charles Bates, ‘was the fact that the FBI had been most cooperative with him and he felt he could rely on the Director and the Bureau in matters of mutual interest.’ Indeed, later that day, Strauss requested and received Oppenheimer’s security file from Hoover.” [7]
Oppenheimer, Portrait of an Enigma, Jeremy Bernstein: “The Trial. We have now examined some of the ingredients of the witches’ brew out of which the 1954 Oppenheimer security hearings were concocted, namely, his capacity for making enemies of people who could do him harm, and his vulnerability because of his radical past. Two more ingredients need scrutiny …. the rising influenced of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy … and … Oppenheimer’s alleged foot-dragging on the hydrogen bomb.” [8]
J. Robert Oppenheimer, A Life, Abraham Pais with Robert P. Crease: "The FBI continued, even intensified, its surveillance and investigations during the hearing and its immediate aftermath. .... Strauss and the FBI considered pursuing further legal action against Oppenheimer ... but ultimately dropped it. They had solved their Oppenheimer problem.” [9]
The common theme in the foregoing is that Borden, Strauss, Hoover and others were treacherous men who conspired to destroy Robert Oppenheimer for personal and political reasons. Not one of the writers objectively reviewed the full record—old information and new—that Oppenheimer’s actions and inactions were prima facie violations of the statutory requirements for holding an atomic security clearance, namely demonstrated “Loyalty” and “Trustworthiness.”
The centennial JRO literature conveys the notion that Oppenheimer history is settled. Nothing could be further from the truth. The twin goals of this essay are to show that present historiography on Oppenheimer is deeply flawed and to foretell the true account that history must eventually record. Future scrupulous Oppenheimer scholarship will address (1) President Eisenhower’s explicit and determining role in barring Oppenheimer from America’s nuclear program, (2) the fact and ramifications of Oppenheimer’s membership in the American Communist Party and (3) a candid analysis of derogatory information surfacing after the breakup of the Soviet Union. [10]
The demise of the Soviet Union brought forth a major advancement in espionage history: In Russia, under reduced security, KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin was able to defect to the West bringing a trove of documents compiled over decades; the SVR (nee KGB) publicized accounts of past espionage coups; retired Soviet intelligence officers wrote memoirs; western scholars were allowed access to KGB case files. Most importantly, the fall of the USSR ended the Cold War and precipitated the 1995 declassification of the U.S. Venona Program. The Venona decrypts provide significant, if not smoking gun, corroboration that Oppenheimer had contact with Soviet intelligence. This essay will therefore be in two parts, Before Venona and After Venona.
To date, the most authoritative and balanced treatment of the Oppenheimer affair is the third volume of the official history of the Atomic Energy Commission, Atoms for Peace and War, authored by Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl. It was published in 1989 by the University of California Press and is a bibliographic reference in most of the Oppenheimer centennials. [11]
Part I – Before Venona
“Testimony of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover RE Dr. Klaus Fuchs”
The United States Government was rocked in September 1949 when it learned that the Soviet Union had detonated a nuclear weapon (Joe 1). Up to that time, intelligence and scientific estimates indicated that such an event was not likely to occur for several more years. The Soviet success had an immediate impact on the current and contentious debate over the development of a thermonuclear weapon, the Hydrogen bomb or Super. By statute, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was the principal advisor to the President on atomic energy matters. The Atomic Energy Act authorized establishment of a General Advisory Committee (GAC) to provide the Commission with scientific and technical advice. Robert Oppenheimer chaired the GAC since its inception in 1947. Notwithstanding the new reality of Joe 1, the GAC decided that thermonuclear weapons served no present, useful military purpose and recommended against their immediate development. The AEC, with David Lilienthal as Chariman, concurred and, in October 1949, recommended the GAC position to President Truman. The Defense Department, State Department and the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) were proponents of an opposite policy. These agencies supported the position of physicist Edward Teller, who favored meeting the Soviet challenge by accelerating both theoretical and practical work on the H-bomb. After three months of review and consultation, President Truman overruled the AEC and, on January 31, 1950, authorized the immediate development of thermonuclear weapons. [1]
It was also on January 31, 1950, that the British government advised the FBI that Klaus Fuchs had signed a confession “admitting continuous espionage from the end of 1941 to February 1949.” Fuchs, a German, was a naturalized British physicist who had served in the Theoretical Division at Los Alamos and who was then head of the Theoretical Division at Harwell, England, the British nuclear weapons research center. The British notification on Fuchs was not a surprise to the FBI. Unbeknownst to either the public or official Washington, the Bureau had launched an espionage investigation of Fuchs on September 22, 1949 (virtually simultaneous with the Truman announcement on Joe 1). Fuchs was arraigned Friday, February 3, 1950, before a London magistrate and then remanded to Brixton Prison. His arrest was reported that afternoon in the London press, and the story broke in the U.S. on Saturday with a front-page story in the New York Times headlined: "BRITISH JAIL ATOM SCIENTIST AS A SPY AFTER TIP BY FBI - HE KNEW OF HYDROGEN BOMB." The surprise and consternation in Washington was such that J. Edgar Hoover was immediately called to testify before the JCAE on Monday, February 6. Over the weekend, a group of Special Agents from the Espionage Section prepared a Summary Brief for the Director’s use. [2]
Hoover’s testimony started with a review of FBI history with respect to the Manhattan Engineer District (MED). That history began in March 1943 when the Bureau informed the U.S. Army that Steve Nelson, a known Communist Party functionary and Soviet Agent, was in close contact with Robert Oppenheimer. It was subsequent to this, Hoover told the Committee, that the Army advised the Bureau “that General Groves did not want any FBI activity in relation to any portion of the MED or the DSM project, and that [Groves] personally wanted Dr. Oppenheimer left alone and did not want the FBI to pursue the matter any further.” Hoover continued that after the war “when Dr. Oppenheimer left the project the FBI talked with him at length. It obtained information to the effect that a man by the name of Haakon Chevalier, who was a member of the University of California faculty at Berkeley, came to Dr. Oppenheimer [in 1942] and told him that [George] Eltenton was attempting to get information about the Manhattan Project in order to pass it along to the Soviet Union for the benefit of the Soviet scientists.” [3]
Regarding the Fuchs case, the Director made it clear to the JCAE that, although Fuchs had been arrested in England by British counterintelligence, the discovery of Fuchs was based on an FBI investigation initiated the previous summer. The basis of that investigation, the Director testified, was “a tip the Bureau had received from an American informer.” It is now known (since 1994) that the "American informer" was the Army Security Agency (ASA), and the "tip" was actually wartime Soviet message decrypts that showed atomic espionage by an agent with the covernames REST and CHARLES. Hoover’s non-disclosure of the real source of the Fuchs investigation was based on agreement with the ASA, as his summary memorandum spelled out: "You will note that in the attached summary memorandum on this matter there has been very careful paraphrasing of the information which we received from Bureau Source 5. This has been done because of the extremely delicate nature of the information from Bureau Source 5 which is received by us under an agreement that it will not be disseminated outside the Bureau.” Effectively, then, Hoover had no unilateral authority to reveal to other persons or entities the sources and methods now known as the Venona Program. [4]
William Borden and Lewis Strauss
Present in Capitol Room 48-G and listening to Director Hoover was William L. Borden, a young Democratic staffer at the JCAE. Borden, an Air Force bomber pilot during the war and recent Yale Law graduate, was hired at the JCAE by family friend Senator Brien McMahon, sponsor of the 1946 Atomic Energy Act. In 1949, Borden was positively disposed toward Robert Oppenheimer whom he had first met at a GAC meeting in April of that year. Days before Hoover’s February testimony on Fuchs, Oppenheimer himself had been before the JCAE. Borden sent him a cordial and complimentary thank you note following his appearance. [1]
The effect on official Washington of the Klaus Fuchs espionage case, coming only five months after Joe 1, cannot be overemphasized. It is evident that Borden’s judgment of Oppenheimer started to change as a result of Hoover’s testimony. Over the next 3 years Borden’s reservations increased in step with the red flags that continually surfaced on Oppenheimer. With respect to atomic policy, two areas of repeated concern were Oppenheimer’s positions on employment of the U.S. nuclear arsenal (tactical vs. strategic) and the development of the hydrogen bomb. Adding to this were the continuing revelations of Oppenheimer’s myriad Communist associations. These included Kitty Oppenheimer’s Communist Party background and marriage to Joe Dallet, the Party membership of Frank Oppenheimer and Jean Tatlock, the Weinberg trial, the allegations of Paul and Sylvia Crouch, Oppenheimer’s hiring of Communist David Hawkins at Los Alamos, etc.
Lewis Strauss was one of the original AEC commissioners appointed by President Truman. In 1947 Strauss, a Trustee of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton NJ, was conducting a search for a new Institute Director. Early in the year he courted Oppenheimer for the job and Oppenheimer accepted the position. As an AEC Commissioner, Strauss was known for his focus on national security issues. He is credited with championing the long-range airborne detection system that confirmed Joe 1 in September 1949. He was also a persistent advocate for the development of the hydrogen bomb. After Truman committed the United States to the development of thermonuclear weapons in early 1950, Strauss re-evaluated his involments and interests, and decided to return to private life. He resigned his Commissioner seat and left the AEC in April 1950. [2]
By 1952 Borden had become Executive Staff Director for the JCAE. "Both Borden and Strauss were able "in 1951 and 1952 to suspend any personal judgements about Oppenheimer's loyalty, but they continued to worry about his effect on thermonuclear development," i.e. his domination of the GAC. Borden, along with others, thus worked to prevent Oppenheimer’s reappointment to the GAC when his term expired on June 30, 1952. Faced with strong opposition, Oppenheimer decided not to seek another term. However that did not end the issue because Oppenheimer obtained consultant contracts with the AEC itself and several other government boards. In summer 1952, Borden initiated two investigations using JCAE staff, Frank Cotter, a former FBI agent, and John Walker, legal counsel to the Committee. Cotter’s job was to prepare a complete extract of the AEC’s security file on Oppenheimer. This included close examination and further investigation, if necessary, of every bit of evidence in the file. Cotter finished the assignment in November 1952 and produced a working paper that presented an accurate compilation of Oppenheimer’s record.” [3]
John Walker’s assignment was to produce a chronological history of the AEC’s stewardship of the U.S. atomic energy program, with particular attention to the H-bomb project. For technical assistance, he acquired the services of Princeton University physicist John A. Wheeler. An important charge to Wheeler was a damage assessment on what Klaus Fuchs had known and presumably passed to the Russians about the U.S.’s thermonuclear research. In January 1953, a week or so before Dwight Eisenhower’s inauguration, Wheeler was responsible for a monumental security breach. Returning to Washington on a train, he lost a Borden-Walker working paper that containing a detailed summary of the H-bomb program. The FBI was called in to investigate and, because of the seriousness of the loss, Hoover informed the new President. Eisenhower then asked the JCAE for a copy of the lost document. He was completely outraged when he read it. “A subsequent assessment done for the AEC by Bethe, Teller and others concluded that the lost document “clearly revealed the idea of radiation implosion [the trick of the H-bomb] as well as ‘construction elements’ of Mike.” Mike was the first U.S. detonation of a thermonuclear device. [4]
With regard to Robert Oppenheimer, Strauss had traveled the same journey as William Borden—from respect and admiration to deep mistrust. During summer 1952, Strauss, undoubtedly requested by Borden, assisted with the Walker thermonuclear project by providing information from his personal records. Later in December 1952, Strauss sent Borden a lengthy letter in which he summarized his concerns regarding the arms race with Russia. His greatest worry was that Fuchs had been privy not only to Teller’s seminal ideas at Los Alamos in 1946, but also to the breakthrough idea of radiation implosion. Fuchs had been exposed to this research in late 1947 when he attended an AEC declassification conference and then visited several atomic research centers such as Cornell and General Electric in upstate New York. Strauss concluded his letter to Borden with what, to his mind, was the nub of the issue: “I think it would be extremely unwise to assume that we enjoy any lead time in the competition with Russia in the field of thermonuclear weapons.” [5]
The day after his Inauguration, January 21, 1953, President Eisenhower was confronted with profound national security issues regarding atomic energy. Representative Carl T. Durham, the acting Chairman of the JCAE, told Eisenhower about the Borden-Walker thermonuclear history that “raised serious questions about the adequacy of the AEC’s thermonuclear program.” Eisenhower requested more information and on January 29 Durham sent him the Walker study. Then, in the first two weeks of February, the President learned of the Wheeler security breach and was shown a copy of the missing top-secret paper containing the Mike design. [6]
In February, sensing structural disarray and personnel misfeasance at the AEC, Eisenhower phoned Strauss and enticed him to return to government service as Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy. His mission would be to conduct an independent study of the AEC. In March, after AEC Chairman Gordon Dean announced his retirement, Eisenhower proffered the chairman job to Strauss. However, Strauss declined on the grounds that the AEC Chairman was involved in a large number of routine matters that would prevent him from giving full attention to the larger policy issues that he had been called back to address. On March 7, 1953, Eisenhower approved Strauss’ appointment as Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy. [7]
On May 25, Eisenhower and Strauss met in the Oval Office and the President again approached Strauss about the AEC Chairmanship. Strauss was more amenable on this occasion, but he conditioned his acceptance on the understanding that he “could not do the job” if Oppenheimer were connected in any way with the program. This stipulation by Strauss was an obvious reference to the fact that as AEC Chairman he would not renew Oppenheimrer’s consultant contract when it expired at the end of June. To ensure that there would be no misunderstanding or back-stepping on this issue, Strauss advised Ike “ that he was going to approach Robert Cutler [National Security Adviser to the President] and lay the cards on the table concerning Oppenheimer.” The White House announced Lewis Strauss’ appointment to the AEC on June 24. It was quickly confirmed by Congress and he became AEC Chairman on July 1, 1953. [8]
The Borden Letter
When the Republican Party won control of the Senate in the November 1952 election, Borden’s job was forfeit and he began preparing to leave the JCAE. During the transition to the Eisenhower administration he devoted much of his remaining time to the Oppenheimer personnel security case. The Cotter investigation had resulted in a sixty-five page working paper documenting Oppenheimer’s extraordinary influence on America’s atomic program and foreign policy. At the end of April, 1953, Borden provided a copy of the Cotter analysis to Strauss at the White House. It had become Borden’s view that the Oppenheimer case called for a study similar to the Walker thermonuclear chronology, i.e. a comprehensive document that combined everything in the FBI file Summary and everything in the Cotter study, i.e. the AEC’s Oppenheimer securtiy file. Ostensibly, Borden undertook to do this study himself. He had arranged a one year consultant contract to the JCAE and a one year extension of his securtiy clearance. On May 14, 1953, Borden called the Security Officer at the AEC, and asked for the Commission’s security file on Oppenheimer. Borden’s last day at the JCAE was two weeks later, May 31, 1953. Borden left Washington that summer for a family camp in New York. According to historians Hewlett and Holl, except for one telephone conversation on July 16, there is no evidence that Borden and Strauss communicated during the remainder of 1953. [1]
On August 7, 1953, Lewis Strauss again expressed his abiding concern about a Soviet H-bomb to President Eisenhower. The very next day, Soviet Premier Georgi Malenkov announced that the USSR had achieved a thermonuclear detonation and the United States’ monopoly on the H-bomb was broken. The U.S. Air Force subsequently confirmed an extremely powerful fourth Russian nuclear test, referred to as Joe 4. On Friday, August 14, Strauss met with the President to discuss Joe 4 and the Candor initiative. He no doubt reminded the President that 6 months previous, in February, Oppenheimer had publicly given his opinion that the Russians were about four years behind the United States on the H-bomb. The Oppenheimer file checked out by Borden was returned to the AEC on August 18. [2]
The Soviet H-bomb remained a front-page story for weeks. One headline in the New York Times would bring William Borden full circle: “Fuchs Gave Soviet the Secret of Hydrogen Bomb in 1944.” The reality of Joe 4 intensified the controversy on Oppenheimer, already at a peak level. It is evident that the successful Soviet thermonuclear test was the accelerant for what happened next. On November 12, 1953, Lou B. Nichols, a senior FBI official, received a letter addressed to J. Edgar Hoover from William Borden, then living in Pittsburgh. A little over three pages in length, Borden’s letter summarized Oppenheimer’s involvement in national security affairs since WWII, ticked-off some twenty items of evidence indicating Oppenheimer was a security risk and included an accusation that fundamentally changed the trajectory on Oppenheimer:
The centennial JRO literature conveys the notion that Oppenheimer history is settled. Nothing could be further from the truth. The twin goals of this essay are to show that present historiography on Oppenheimer is deeply flawed and to foretell the true account that history must eventually record. Future scrupulous Oppenheimer scholarship will address (1) President Eisenhower’s explicit and determining role in barring Oppenheimer from America’s nuclear program, (2) the fact and ramifications of Oppenheimer’s membership in the American Communist Party and (3) a candid analysis of derogatory information surfacing after the breakup of the Soviet Union. [10]
The demise of the Soviet Union brought forth a major advancement in espionage history: In Russia, under reduced security, KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin was able to defect to the West bringing a trove of documents compiled over decades; the SVR (nee KGB) publicized accounts of past espionage coups; retired Soviet intelligence officers wrote memoirs; western scholars were allowed access to KGB case files. Most importantly, the fall of the USSR ended the Cold War and precipitated the 1995 declassification of the U.S. Venona Program. The Venona decrypts provide significant, if not smoking gun, corroboration that Oppenheimer had contact with Soviet intelligence. This essay will therefore be in two parts, Before Venona and After Venona.
To date, the most authoritative and balanced treatment of the Oppenheimer affair is the third volume of the official history of the Atomic Energy Commission, Atoms for Peace and War, authored by Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl. It was published in 1989 by the University of California Press and is a bibliographic reference in most of the Oppenheimer centennials. [11]
Part I – Before Venona
“Testimony of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover RE Dr. Klaus Fuchs”
The United States Government was rocked in September 1949 when it learned that the Soviet Union had detonated a nuclear weapon (Joe 1). Up to that time, intelligence and scientific estimates indicated that such an event was not likely to occur for several more years. The Soviet success had an immediate impact on the current and contentious debate over the development of a thermonuclear weapon, the Hydrogen bomb or Super. By statute, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was the principal advisor to the President on atomic energy matters. The Atomic Energy Act authorized establishment of a General Advisory Committee (GAC) to provide the Commission with scientific and technical advice. Robert Oppenheimer chaired the GAC since its inception in 1947. Notwithstanding the new reality of Joe 1, the GAC decided that thermonuclear weapons served no present, useful military purpose and recommended against their immediate development. The AEC, with David Lilienthal as Chariman, concurred and, in October 1949, recommended the GAC position to President Truman. The Defense Department, State Department and the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) were proponents of an opposite policy. These agencies supported the position of physicist Edward Teller, who favored meeting the Soviet challenge by accelerating both theoretical and practical work on the H-bomb. After three months of review and consultation, President Truman overruled the AEC and, on January 31, 1950, authorized the immediate development of thermonuclear weapons. [1]
It was also on January 31, 1950, that the British government advised the FBI that Klaus Fuchs had signed a confession “admitting continuous espionage from the end of 1941 to February 1949.” Fuchs, a German, was a naturalized British physicist who had served in the Theoretical Division at Los Alamos and who was then head of the Theoretical Division at Harwell, England, the British nuclear weapons research center. The British notification on Fuchs was not a surprise to the FBI. Unbeknownst to either the public or official Washington, the Bureau had launched an espionage investigation of Fuchs on September 22, 1949 (virtually simultaneous with the Truman announcement on Joe 1). Fuchs was arraigned Friday, February 3, 1950, before a London magistrate and then remanded to Brixton Prison. His arrest was reported that afternoon in the London press, and the story broke in the U.S. on Saturday with a front-page story in the New York Times headlined: "BRITISH JAIL ATOM SCIENTIST AS A SPY AFTER TIP BY FBI - HE KNEW OF HYDROGEN BOMB." The surprise and consternation in Washington was such that J. Edgar Hoover was immediately called to testify before the JCAE on Monday, February 6. Over the weekend, a group of Special Agents from the Espionage Section prepared a Summary Brief for the Director’s use. [2]
Hoover’s testimony started with a review of FBI history with respect to the Manhattan Engineer District (MED). That history began in March 1943 when the Bureau informed the U.S. Army that Steve Nelson, a known Communist Party functionary and Soviet Agent, was in close contact with Robert Oppenheimer. It was subsequent to this, Hoover told the Committee, that the Army advised the Bureau “that General Groves did not want any FBI activity in relation to any portion of the MED or the DSM project, and that [Groves] personally wanted Dr. Oppenheimer left alone and did not want the FBI to pursue the matter any further.” Hoover continued that after the war “when Dr. Oppenheimer left the project the FBI talked with him at length. It obtained information to the effect that a man by the name of Haakon Chevalier, who was a member of the University of California faculty at Berkeley, came to Dr. Oppenheimer [in 1942] and told him that [George] Eltenton was attempting to get information about the Manhattan Project in order to pass it along to the Soviet Union for the benefit of the Soviet scientists.” [3]
Regarding the Fuchs case, the Director made it clear to the JCAE that, although Fuchs had been arrested in England by British counterintelligence, the discovery of Fuchs was based on an FBI investigation initiated the previous summer. The basis of that investigation, the Director testified, was “a tip the Bureau had received from an American informer.” It is now known (since 1994) that the "American informer" was the Army Security Agency (ASA), and the "tip" was actually wartime Soviet message decrypts that showed atomic espionage by an agent with the covernames REST and CHARLES. Hoover’s non-disclosure of the real source of the Fuchs investigation was based on agreement with the ASA, as his summary memorandum spelled out: "You will note that in the attached summary memorandum on this matter there has been very careful paraphrasing of the information which we received from Bureau Source 5. This has been done because of the extremely delicate nature of the information from Bureau Source 5 which is received by us under an agreement that it will not be disseminated outside the Bureau.” Effectively, then, Hoover had no unilateral authority to reveal to other persons or entities the sources and methods now known as the Venona Program. [4]
William Borden and Lewis Strauss
Present in Capitol Room 48-G and listening to Director Hoover was William L. Borden, a young Democratic staffer at the JCAE. Borden, an Air Force bomber pilot during the war and recent Yale Law graduate, was hired at the JCAE by family friend Senator Brien McMahon, sponsor of the 1946 Atomic Energy Act. In 1949, Borden was positively disposed toward Robert Oppenheimer whom he had first met at a GAC meeting in April of that year. Days before Hoover’s February testimony on Fuchs, Oppenheimer himself had been before the JCAE. Borden sent him a cordial and complimentary thank you note following his appearance. [1]
The effect on official Washington of the Klaus Fuchs espionage case, coming only five months after Joe 1, cannot be overemphasized. It is evident that Borden’s judgment of Oppenheimer started to change as a result of Hoover’s testimony. Over the next 3 years Borden’s reservations increased in step with the red flags that continually surfaced on Oppenheimer. With respect to atomic policy, two areas of repeated concern were Oppenheimer’s positions on employment of the U.S. nuclear arsenal (tactical vs. strategic) and the development of the hydrogen bomb. Adding to this were the continuing revelations of Oppenheimer’s myriad Communist associations. These included Kitty Oppenheimer’s Communist Party background and marriage to Joe Dallet, the Party membership of Frank Oppenheimer and Jean Tatlock, the Weinberg trial, the allegations of Paul and Sylvia Crouch, Oppenheimer’s hiring of Communist David Hawkins at Los Alamos, etc.
Lewis Strauss was one of the original AEC commissioners appointed by President Truman. In 1947 Strauss, a Trustee of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton NJ, was conducting a search for a new Institute Director. Early in the year he courted Oppenheimer for the job and Oppenheimer accepted the position. As an AEC Commissioner, Strauss was known for his focus on national security issues. He is credited with championing the long-range airborne detection system that confirmed Joe 1 in September 1949. He was also a persistent advocate for the development of the hydrogen bomb. After Truman committed the United States to the development of thermonuclear weapons in early 1950, Strauss re-evaluated his involments and interests, and decided to return to private life. He resigned his Commissioner seat and left the AEC in April 1950. [2]
By 1952 Borden had become Executive Staff Director for the JCAE. "Both Borden and Strauss were able "in 1951 and 1952 to suspend any personal judgements about Oppenheimer's loyalty, but they continued to worry about his effect on thermonuclear development," i.e. his domination of the GAC. Borden, along with others, thus worked to prevent Oppenheimer’s reappointment to the GAC when his term expired on June 30, 1952. Faced with strong opposition, Oppenheimer decided not to seek another term. However that did not end the issue because Oppenheimer obtained consultant contracts with the AEC itself and several other government boards. In summer 1952, Borden initiated two investigations using JCAE staff, Frank Cotter, a former FBI agent, and John Walker, legal counsel to the Committee. Cotter’s job was to prepare a complete extract of the AEC’s security file on Oppenheimer. This included close examination and further investigation, if necessary, of every bit of evidence in the file. Cotter finished the assignment in November 1952 and produced a working paper that presented an accurate compilation of Oppenheimer’s record.” [3]
John Walker’s assignment was to produce a chronological history of the AEC’s stewardship of the U.S. atomic energy program, with particular attention to the H-bomb project. For technical assistance, he acquired the services of Princeton University physicist John A. Wheeler. An important charge to Wheeler was a damage assessment on what Klaus Fuchs had known and presumably passed to the Russians about the U.S.’s thermonuclear research. In January 1953, a week or so before Dwight Eisenhower’s inauguration, Wheeler was responsible for a monumental security breach. Returning to Washington on a train, he lost a Borden-Walker working paper that containing a detailed summary of the H-bomb program. The FBI was called in to investigate and, because of the seriousness of the loss, Hoover informed the new President. Eisenhower then asked the JCAE for a copy of the lost document. He was completely outraged when he read it. “A subsequent assessment done for the AEC by Bethe, Teller and others concluded that the lost document “clearly revealed the idea of radiation implosion [the trick of the H-bomb] as well as ‘construction elements’ of Mike.” Mike was the first U.S. detonation of a thermonuclear device. [4]
With regard to Robert Oppenheimer, Strauss had traveled the same journey as William Borden—from respect and admiration to deep mistrust. During summer 1952, Strauss, undoubtedly requested by Borden, assisted with the Walker thermonuclear project by providing information from his personal records. Later in December 1952, Strauss sent Borden a lengthy letter in which he summarized his concerns regarding the arms race with Russia. His greatest worry was that Fuchs had been privy not only to Teller’s seminal ideas at Los Alamos in 1946, but also to the breakthrough idea of radiation implosion. Fuchs had been exposed to this research in late 1947 when he attended an AEC declassification conference and then visited several atomic research centers such as Cornell and General Electric in upstate New York. Strauss concluded his letter to Borden with what, to his mind, was the nub of the issue: “I think it would be extremely unwise to assume that we enjoy any lead time in the competition with Russia in the field of thermonuclear weapons.” [5]
The day after his Inauguration, January 21, 1953, President Eisenhower was confronted with profound national security issues regarding atomic energy. Representative Carl T. Durham, the acting Chairman of the JCAE, told Eisenhower about the Borden-Walker thermonuclear history that “raised serious questions about the adequacy of the AEC’s thermonuclear program.” Eisenhower requested more information and on January 29 Durham sent him the Walker study. Then, in the first two weeks of February, the President learned of the Wheeler security breach and was shown a copy of the missing top-secret paper containing the Mike design. [6]
In February, sensing structural disarray and personnel misfeasance at the AEC, Eisenhower phoned Strauss and enticed him to return to government service as Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy. His mission would be to conduct an independent study of the AEC. In March, after AEC Chairman Gordon Dean announced his retirement, Eisenhower proffered the chairman job to Strauss. However, Strauss declined on the grounds that the AEC Chairman was involved in a large number of routine matters that would prevent him from giving full attention to the larger policy issues that he had been called back to address. On March 7, 1953, Eisenhower approved Strauss’ appointment as Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy. [7]
On May 25, Eisenhower and Strauss met in the Oval Office and the President again approached Strauss about the AEC Chairmanship. Strauss was more amenable on this occasion, but he conditioned his acceptance on the understanding that he “could not do the job” if Oppenheimer were connected in any way with the program. This stipulation by Strauss was an obvious reference to the fact that as AEC Chairman he would not renew Oppenheimrer’s consultant contract when it expired at the end of June. To ensure that there would be no misunderstanding or back-stepping on this issue, Strauss advised Ike “ that he was going to approach Robert Cutler [National Security Adviser to the President] and lay the cards on the table concerning Oppenheimer.” The White House announced Lewis Strauss’ appointment to the AEC on June 24. It was quickly confirmed by Congress and he became AEC Chairman on July 1, 1953. [8]
The Borden Letter
When the Republican Party won control of the Senate in the November 1952 election, Borden’s job was forfeit and he began preparing to leave the JCAE. During the transition to the Eisenhower administration he devoted much of his remaining time to the Oppenheimer personnel security case. The Cotter investigation had resulted in a sixty-five page working paper documenting Oppenheimer’s extraordinary influence on America’s atomic program and foreign policy. At the end of April, 1953, Borden provided a copy of the Cotter analysis to Strauss at the White House. It had become Borden’s view that the Oppenheimer case called for a study similar to the Walker thermonuclear chronology, i.e. a comprehensive document that combined everything in the FBI file Summary and everything in the Cotter study, i.e. the AEC’s Oppenheimer securtiy file. Ostensibly, Borden undertook to do this study himself. He had arranged a one year consultant contract to the JCAE and a one year extension of his securtiy clearance. On May 14, 1953, Borden called the Security Officer at the AEC, and asked for the Commission’s security file on Oppenheimer. Borden’s last day at the JCAE was two weeks later, May 31, 1953. Borden left Washington that summer for a family camp in New York. According to historians Hewlett and Holl, except for one telephone conversation on July 16, there is no evidence that Borden and Strauss communicated during the remainder of 1953. [1]
On August 7, 1953, Lewis Strauss again expressed his abiding concern about a Soviet H-bomb to President Eisenhower. The very next day, Soviet Premier Georgi Malenkov announced that the USSR had achieved a thermonuclear detonation and the United States’ monopoly on the H-bomb was broken. The U.S. Air Force subsequently confirmed an extremely powerful fourth Russian nuclear test, referred to as Joe 4. On Friday, August 14, Strauss met with the President to discuss Joe 4 and the Candor initiative. He no doubt reminded the President that 6 months previous, in February, Oppenheimer had publicly given his opinion that the Russians were about four years behind the United States on the H-bomb. The Oppenheimer file checked out by Borden was returned to the AEC on August 18. [2]
The Soviet H-bomb remained a front-page story for weeks. One headline in the New York Times would bring William Borden full circle: “Fuchs Gave Soviet the Secret of Hydrogen Bomb in 1944.” The reality of Joe 4 intensified the controversy on Oppenheimer, already at a peak level. It is evident that the successful Soviet thermonuclear test was the accelerant for what happened next. On November 12, 1953, Lou B. Nichols, a senior FBI official, received a letter addressed to J. Edgar Hoover from William Borden, then living in Pittsburgh. A little over three pages in length, Borden’s letter summarized Oppenheimer’s involvement in national security affairs since WWII, ticked-off some twenty items of evidence indicating Oppenheimer was a security risk and included an accusation that fundamentally changed the trajectory on Oppenheimer:
“The purpose of this letter is to state my own exhaustively considered opinion, based upon years of study of the available classified evidence, that more probably than not J. Robert Oppenheimer is an agent of the Soviet Union.” [3]
The content of the Borden letter was not a revelation—certainly not to J. Edgar Hoover. No one who had read the FBI Summary Report on Oppenheimer could fail to consider the possibility that a relationship existed between Oppenheimer and Soviet intelligence. What was new and radical about Borden’s letter was that, given the background of the author, it was essentially an official document or record. And since it contained no classified information, it could be made public by Borden at any time. For all intents and purposes, Borden, a Democrat, had put the Eisenhower administration on notice that it had better deal with the Oppenheimer security issue once and for all. Borden concluded his letter as follows:
I am profoundly aware of the grave nature of these comments. The matter is detestable to me. Having lived with the Oppenheimer case for years, having studied and restudied all data concerning him that your agency made available to the Atomic Energy Commission through May 1953, having endeavored to factor in a mass of additional data assembled from numerous other sources, and looking back upon the case from a perspective in private life, I feel a duty simply to state to the responsible head of the security agency most concerned the conclusions which I have painfully crystallized and which I believe any fair-minded man thoroughly familiar with the evidence must also be driven to accept.
The writing of this letter, to me a solemn step, is exclusively on my own personal initiative and responsibility.
Very truly yours, William L. Borden
“blank wall”
Borden’s allegations largely followed the FBI Summary Report, Hoover’s staff noted, but his “interpretations and conclusions [were] not factual in every instance.” Notwithstanding this observation, J. Edgar Hoover understood the immediate significance of Borden’s letter: As of November 12, the FBI was 'on the hook' for J. Robert Oppenheimer. Borden had stated that his conclusions were based on “numerous other sources” besides the FBI, so Hoover sent a Special Agent to interview Borden to determine if he had any new, prosecutable evidence. Over the next two weeks, it was concluded (as in the past) that there was not an indictable case against Oppenheimer. [1]
Hoover then took steps to transfer the matter to other government officials who had different statutory responsibilities relative to Oppenheimer. On Friday, November 27, Hoover sent a copy of Borden’s letter along with the Bureau’s investigative Summary to the White House and the heads of 7 other Government departments and agencies. He followed these communications up with phone calls to a number of the principals and documented these conversations with internal memos to the file. One such file memo read in part: “I stated so far as the FBI is concerned, from an investigative point of view, it makes no difference to us if any action is taken against Dr. Oppenheimer. I stated that we had suspected him since the Manhattan Engineer days. I stated that there was no question but that both Oppenheimers were at least having unwise associations with representatives of the Russian Consulate at San Francisco.” [2]
In the evening of December 1, Strauss received a phone call from Charles Wilson, a very alarmed Secretary of Defense. He had received and read the Borden letter and FBI report. The following day, Wilson called Hoover and Attorney General Herbert Brownell, making it known that he wanted Oppenheimer cut off from access to classified defense information. Apparently not satisfied that quick action would be forthcoming, Wilson then called President Eisenhower directly. Eisenhower had not yet learned of the adverse material from the FBI, but became very concerned over what Wilson told him. The next morning, December 3, prior to a meeting of the National Security Council, Eisenhower had a final meeting with the principals involved in the matter. Having now consulted with Attorney General Brownell and National Security Adviser Robert Cutler, who advised “to take immediate action against Oppenheimer,” the President directed that a “blank wall” be erected between Oppenheimer and all classified information pending further investigation. [3]
The President's verbal instructions were followed up that afternoon with a written directive to the Attorney General:
TOP SECRET
December 3, 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Last night a copy of a communication from J. Edgar Hoover, dated November 27, 1953, relative to Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, was brought to my attention.
I have already directed the heads of departments and agencies of the Executive branch of government concerned in this connection, while prompt action is being taken to determine the full impact of the contents of Mr. Hoover’s communication, to place a blank wall between the subject of the communication and all areas of our government operations, whether in research projects of a sensitive nature or otherwise.
While I obviously must not prejudge this matter, I am requesting you at once to obtain the full information in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with respect to this man, to examine the same thoroughly, and, as promptly as possible, to advise me whether further action, prosecutive or otherwise, should be taken by the Federal Government.
DDE
At 3:00 pm on December 3, AEC Chariman Strauss received a copy of Eisenhower’s directive to Brownell. He was one of nine copy addressees to the memo. [4]
When this was happening, Oppenheimer was traveling in Europe and not due back until December 13. After the President’s directive, there was a great deal of discussion on procedures and responsibilities for implementing it. Since Oppenheimer’s employment contract was with the AEC and that agency was the sponsor of his Q clearance, Strauss would be the action officer. Hoover expressed concern that, if Borden’s core allegation was true and Oppenheimer, in Europe, learned of a security move against him, he might defect. Hoover further advised that much of the evidence against Oppenheimer involved confidential sources that could not be revealed or used in a public hearing. Robert Cutler, National Security Advisor, wanted quick action that would record that the President had acted expeditiously and decisively once informed of the Borden letter. In consequence of these considerations, Strauss suspended Oppenheimer’s clearance. He informed two of the AEC Commissioners who were in town of his action but withheld notifying the atomic energy establishment until Oppenheimer returned. [5]
Eisenhower: “security risk”
Historiography on President Dwight D. Eisenhower is positive—definitively so. He was an important president, an active rather than passive one. Atomic energy policy and decisions were paramount during the first year of his presidency. Historians Hewlett and Holl concluded that, “Eisenhower dominated the formulation of nuclear policy in a way that no other President has before or since. …Subordinates such as John Foster Dulles, Lewis Strauss and John McCone did not dominate him. Instead he exerted a powerful influence on them, bringing them around to his point of view or restraining, even frustrating them. He concealed his ‘withering temper’ from the public but not from his aides.” [1]
Not unexpectedly, the Commander of Allied Forces in Europe was a hawk on secrecy and security. He himself admitted as much in a kindly admonition to Lewis Strauss: “If there is one person more concerned about security than you, it is me.’ A convincing example of this comes from the Wheeler security episode:
When this was happening, Oppenheimer was traveling in Europe and not due back until December 13. After the President’s directive, there was a great deal of discussion on procedures and responsibilities for implementing it. Since Oppenheimer’s employment contract was with the AEC and that agency was the sponsor of his Q clearance, Strauss would be the action officer. Hoover expressed concern that, if Borden’s core allegation was true and Oppenheimer, in Europe, learned of a security move against him, he might defect. Hoover further advised that much of the evidence against Oppenheimer involved confidential sources that could not be revealed or used in a public hearing. Robert Cutler, National Security Advisor, wanted quick action that would record that the President had acted expeditiously and decisively once informed of the Borden letter. In consequence of these considerations, Strauss suspended Oppenheimer’s clearance. He informed two of the AEC Commissioners who were in town of his action but withheld notifying the atomic energy establishment until Oppenheimer returned. [5]
Eisenhower: “security risk”
Historiography on President Dwight D. Eisenhower is positive—definitively so. He was an important president, an active rather than passive one. Atomic energy policy and decisions were paramount during the first year of his presidency. Historians Hewlett and Holl concluded that, “Eisenhower dominated the formulation of nuclear policy in a way that no other President has before or since. …Subordinates such as John Foster Dulles, Lewis Strauss and John McCone did not dominate him. Instead he exerted a powerful influence on them, bringing them around to his point of view or restraining, even frustrating them. He concealed his ‘withering temper’ from the public but not from his aides.” [1]
Not unexpectedly, the Commander of Allied Forces in Europe was a hawk on secrecy and security. He himself admitted as much in a kindly admonition to Lewis Strauss: “If there is one person more concerned about security than you, it is me.’ A convincing example of this comes from the Wheeler security episode:
“Eisenhower, appalled by such an incredible security lapse in the waning days of the Truman Administration, seized an opportunity before a scheduled meeting [February 16, 1953] of the AEC Commissioners with the National Security Council to demand an explanation of the incident. Lined up like five school boys before the master’s desk, Smyth later recalled, the Commissioners meekly witnessed an extraordinary display of presidential anger. Murray had never in his life seen anyone more agitated. In the Army, Eisenhower observed, a security offender was dealt with swiftly and surely.” [2]
Eisenhower first met Oppenheimer at the White House in February 1953. Although he listened and absorbed (Operation Candor), he fundamentally mistrusted Oppenheimer whom he regarded as an arrogator and manipulator. Virtually from the outset of his presidency, he moved to marginalize Oppenheimer’s influence on atomic policy. This is evident by his draft of Strauss in March 1953 to be Chariman of the AEC. Strauss respectfully declined, but accepted a second proffer two months later. Eisenhower wanted Strauss because he knew Strauss also was a hawk on security and would not be a shill or rubber stamp for Oppenheimer.
President Eisenhower’s blank wall decision on Oppenheimer was based on the notion of risk. A finding of risk is not based on certainty. Risk is a function of empirical uncertainty. Eisenhower saw no evidence implying disloyalty by Oppenheimer, but he could not ignore prima facie reasonable doubt about security risk. In truth, the security risk case against Oppenheimer was massive. If the doctrine of personnel security, as codified in statutes and implemented by government institutions such as the AEC, did not apply to J. Robert Oppenheimer, it did not apply to anyone. By all accounts it was not a difficult decision for the President and he didn’t mince words about his expectation: “I don’t care how it is done, Eisenhower said, but it must be done immediately. Anyone responsible for leaking it in any way will answer directly to me.” [3]
"character, associations, and loyalty"
As to loyalty
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 transferred control of the U.S. atomic program from the Army to a new civilian agency, the Atomic Energy Commission. With regard to personnel security, the Act specified that the AEC would evaluate FBI reports into the “character, associations, and loyalty “ of all new AEC applicants. President Truman’s Executive Order 9835 of 1947 established the federal employee program that “made sympathetic association with totalitarian, fascist, Communist, and subversive organizations grounds for dismissal for all federal employees.” [1]
Historian Gregg Herken, in his groundbreaking book Brotherhood of the Bomb, presented credible evidence and analysis for the conclusion that “Robert Oppenheimer was a member of a so-called closed unit of the Communist Party's professional section in Berkeley from 1938 to 1942.” An important piece of new evidence was a newsletter or pamphlet titled Report to Our Colleagues that Haakon Chevalier claimed had been both authored and financed by Oppenheimer. Chevalier’s claim, Herken found, was corroborated by two other sources with firsthand knowledge, Gordon Griffiths and Philip Morrison. [2]
Phillip Morrison was one of Oppenheimer’s closest graduate students at Berkeley. In May 1953, Morrison was called to testify before the Subcommittee on Internal Security chaired by William K. Jenner. At this time Morrison admitted that he had been a member of the Communist Party while at Berkeley. [3] The Subcommittee asked Morrison about “lectures” he had reportedly delivered to the Communist Party section on the Berkeley campus. Morrison admitted to “leading discussion groups” based on a book by Lenin called Imperialism. Tenets of Communism declared by Lenin and proselytized by Morrison include the following:
President Eisenhower’s blank wall decision on Oppenheimer was based on the notion of risk. A finding of risk is not based on certainty. Risk is a function of empirical uncertainty. Eisenhower saw no evidence implying disloyalty by Oppenheimer, but he could not ignore prima facie reasonable doubt about security risk. In truth, the security risk case against Oppenheimer was massive. If the doctrine of personnel security, as codified in statutes and implemented by government institutions such as the AEC, did not apply to J. Robert Oppenheimer, it did not apply to anyone. By all accounts it was not a difficult decision for the President and he didn’t mince words about his expectation: “I don’t care how it is done, Eisenhower said, but it must be done immediately. Anyone responsible for leaking it in any way will answer directly to me.” [3]
"character, associations, and loyalty"
As to loyalty
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 transferred control of the U.S. atomic program from the Army to a new civilian agency, the Atomic Energy Commission. With regard to personnel security, the Act specified that the AEC would evaluate FBI reports into the “character, associations, and loyalty “ of all new AEC applicants. President Truman’s Executive Order 9835 of 1947 established the federal employee program that “made sympathetic association with totalitarian, fascist, Communist, and subversive organizations grounds for dismissal for all federal employees.” [1]
Historian Gregg Herken, in his groundbreaking book Brotherhood of the Bomb, presented credible evidence and analysis for the conclusion that “Robert Oppenheimer was a member of a so-called closed unit of the Communist Party's professional section in Berkeley from 1938 to 1942.” An important piece of new evidence was a newsletter or pamphlet titled Report to Our Colleagues that Haakon Chevalier claimed had been both authored and financed by Oppenheimer. Chevalier’s claim, Herken found, was corroborated by two other sources with firsthand knowledge, Gordon Griffiths and Philip Morrison. [2]
Phillip Morrison was one of Oppenheimer’s closest graduate students at Berkeley. In May 1953, Morrison was called to testify before the Subcommittee on Internal Security chaired by William K. Jenner. At this time Morrison admitted that he had been a member of the Communist Party while at Berkeley. [3] The Subcommittee asked Morrison about “lectures” he had reportedly delivered to the Communist Party section on the Berkeley campus. Morrison admitted to “leading discussion groups” based on a book by Lenin called Imperialism. Tenets of Communism declared by Lenin and proselytized by Morrison include the following:
"American imperialism is the butcher and hangman of the revolution in all countries. … The October revolution broke the chains of Imperialism and hoisted in the sight of the whole world the banner of struggle for the complete overthrow of imperialism. … American workers will not follow the bourgeoisie. They will be on our side, for civil war against the bourgeoisie. … The suppression of the bourgeois state by the proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution. … The proletariat will certainly overthrow the yoke of capital with revolutionary ruthlessness." V. I. Lenin, On Imperialism, 1920
Communist orthodoxy, as is known, was to export the Revolution and protect Russia, the “cradle of the Revolution.” A February 1940 Report to Our Colleagues reflects the latter sentiment. Russia had attacked Finland, and American foreign policy and public opinion were critical of its aggression. Oppenheimer, however, defended Russia and assailed American reaction: Russia’s war in Finland was, “a necessary measure against a planned offensive. … the total extermination of the Communist Party can only silence some of the clearest voices that oppose a war between the United States and Russia. … but we know that it would be an evil thing for the country [USA] to go to war or to join a war against Russia."
Herken’s conclusion that Oppenheimer had indeed been a member of the Communist Party was challenged by Daniel Kevles in The New York Review of Books. [4] Kevles characterized Herken’s evidence as circumstantial and contemporary. In a Letter to the Editor, Herken rebutted Kevles using the compelling eyewitness of Gordon Griffiths, et al. In a counter-reply, Kevles decamped to the position that Oppenheimer probably did “embrace communism for a time,” but “his commitment appears to have been of the intellectual variety, not that of the Party member or activist.” In point of fact, however, the Report to Our Colleagues pamphlets, as well as the witness of Chevalier, Morrison and Griffiths, are historical in nature. Furthermore, the production and distribution of the Reports was clearly an “activist” undertaking. Mr. Kevles evidently did not take full note of the Report's closing:
Herken’s conclusion that Oppenheimer had indeed been a member of the Communist Party was challenged by Daniel Kevles in The New York Review of Books. [4] Kevles characterized Herken’s evidence as circumstantial and contemporary. In a Letter to the Editor, Herken rebutted Kevles using the compelling eyewitness of Gordon Griffiths, et al. In a counter-reply, Kevles decamped to the position that Oppenheimer probably did “embrace communism for a time,” but “his commitment appears to have been of the intellectual variety, not that of the Party member or activist.” In point of fact, however, the Report to Our Colleagues pamphlets, as well as the witness of Chevalier, Morrison and Griffiths, are historical in nature. Furthermore, the production and distribution of the Reports was clearly an “activist” undertaking. Mr. Kevles evidently did not take full note of the Report's closing:
“College Faculties Committee, Communist Party of California.
Of this, of the possibilities for effective action, you will hear from us again.” [5]
Herken’s evidence that Oppenheimer was member of the Communist Party, of which the Report pamphlets were but one element, is not subject to denial or dispute. As Oppenheimer himself asserted on at least two occasions, "association with the Communist movement is not compatible with a job on a secret war project. It is just that the two loyalties cannot go.”
As to associations
In the second week of August 1943, Lt. Col. John Lansdale, MED Security Officer, traveled from Washington DC to Los Alamos for the purpose of interviewing Oppenheimer about his associations with members of the Communist Party, particularly his former students Rossi Lomanitz and Joseph Weinberg. In his trip report to General Groves, Lansdale wrote the following:
As to associations
In the second week of August 1943, Lt. Col. John Lansdale, MED Security Officer, traveled from Washington DC to Los Alamos for the purpose of interviewing Oppenheimer about his associations with members of the Communist Party, particularly his former students Rossi Lomanitz and Joseph Weinberg. In his trip report to General Groves, Lansdale wrote the following:
“[Oppenheimer] stated that he did not want anybody working for him on the project that was a member of the Communist Party. He stated that the reason for that was that ‘one always had a question of divided loyalty.’ He stated that the discipline of the Communist Party was very severe and was not compatible with complete loyalty to the project. He made it clear he was not referring to people who had been members of the Communist Party, stating that he knew several now at Los Alamos who had been members. He was referring only to present membership in the Communist Party. … The opportunity to secure the names of the former members of the party known to Oppenheimer did not present itself, due to the entrance of a third party.” [6]
Oppenheimer’s anti-Communist pronouncements do not square with the record. FBI and AEC investigative files reflect that Oppenheimer was responsible for the Manhattan Project employment of the following members of the Communist Party: Charlotte Serber, Frank Oppenheimer, Rossi Lomanitz, Joseph Weinberg, David Hawkins, Francis Hawkins, Bernard Peters, Philip Morrison, Emily Morrison, David Bohm, and Al Friedman. On top of these associations, FBI files show Oppenheimer was acquainted with innumerable other Communists in the Bay Area, such as Bernadette Doyle, Louise Bransten, Issac Folkoff, Dr. Thomas Addis, William Schneiderman, and others.
As to character
In 1941, Steve Nelson was the senior CPUSA official in the Bay Area. He resided in San Francisco and was Chairman of the Party’s San Francisco District, which included the Oakland sub-district or section. Early in 1942 Nelson moved across the Bay to take over the Oakland Section—an unexplained demotion from District Chairman to Section Organizer. The real reason behind the move, however, lay in Nelson’s real and primary persona as a KGB officer. The move to Oakland was designed to leverage his personal relationship with Kitty Oppenheimer in order to gain access to Robert Oppenheimer. Soviet intelligence’s most urgent collection requirement in America had become the U.S. atomic program. And it was at this exact time, December 1941-January 1942, that Oppenheimer, consulting for Arthur Compton at the Met Lab, was given to understand that he would be appointed head of the Rapid Rupture (atomic bomb) project. From Nelson’s memoir, Steve Nelson- American Radical:
As to character
In 1941, Steve Nelson was the senior CPUSA official in the Bay Area. He resided in San Francisco and was Chairman of the Party’s San Francisco District, which included the Oakland sub-district or section. Early in 1942 Nelson moved across the Bay to take over the Oakland Section—an unexplained demotion from District Chairman to Section Organizer. The real reason behind the move, however, lay in Nelson’s real and primary persona as a KGB officer. The move to Oakland was designed to leverage his personal relationship with Kitty Oppenheimer in order to gain access to Robert Oppenheimer. Soviet intelligence’s most urgent collection requirement in America had become the U.S. atomic program. And it was at this exact time, December 1941-January 1942, that Oppenheimer, consulting for Arthur Compton at the Met Lab, was given to understand that he would be appointed head of the Rapid Rupture (atomic bomb) project. From Nelson’s memoir, Steve Nelson- American Radical:
“After we moved to Frisco and Oakland, I also saw Robert [Oppenheimer] at Berkeley now and then because I was responsible for working with people from the university, getting them to conduct classes and discussions. A number of Oppenheimer's graduate students in the field of physics were quite active [in the Party]." [7]
The principal student of Oppenheimer that Nelson was referring to was Philip Morrison. Morrison’s association with the Communist Party went back to YCL membership as an undergrad in Pittsburgh at the Carnegie Institute of Technology. An affinity existed between Nelson and Morrison due to the fact that Nelson had been a Party organizer in Pittsburgh in the late 1920’s and had met and married his wife there. The Oppenheimer-Morrison relationship was that of teacher-disciple and patron-suitor. After getting his PhD from Oppenheimer, Morrison had difficulty finding employment. Oppenheimer recommended him to the Physics Department at the University of Illinois, Urbana. The University balked due to Morrison’s radical activities at Berkeley. Oppenheimer interceded with a two-page letter to the Physics Chair at Urbana, assuring him that Morrison would behave himself. Morrison received a one-year probationary appointment to teach at Urbana due to Oppenheimer’s efforts.
On April 22, 1942, Oppenheimer completed an employment reference for Morrison at the Met Lab in Chicago. The personnel reference form had 6 short questions, which Oppenheimer completed as follows:
On April 22, 1942, Oppenheimer completed an employment reference for Morrison at the Met Lab in Chicago. The personnel reference form had 6 short questions, which Oppenheimer completed as follows:
“1. How long and how well have you known him? ‘6 - 7 years; student, scientific work’
2. If employed by you, was his service record while under your supervision entirely satisfactory? ‘Yes, in every way’
3. Do you know of anything which would tend to reflect unfavorably on his honesty, moral character, personal habits or class of associates? ‘No’
4. Has [the applicant] expressed or shown sympathy toward any un-American organization? ‘No’
5. Any question of loyalty to the United States? ‘No’
6. Is there any reason you know of why [the applicant] should not be assigned to confidential work? 'No'” [8]
The Hatch Act of 1939 barred members of communist or fascist organizations from federal employment; the Smith Act of 1940 forbade the teaching, advocacy, or association with groups advocating the forceful overthrow of the American government. Oppenheimer knew Morrison was a Communist and understood the fraudulent reference he gave on Morrison for DSM work.
In 1949, Oppenheimer had been instrumental in crafting and then endorsing the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) position on loyalty-security cases, a key provision of which was: “Because of the importance of national security, the state’s judgment about individuals when the evidence was unclear had to be resolved in favor of the American state, not the individual.” [9] During his Personnel Security Board (PSB) in 1954, Oppenheimer again stated that membership or association with the Communist movement was not compatible with employment on a secret war project. [10] The Board thus questioned him about Morrison who the previous year had admitted at a Congressional hearing that he had been a member of the Communist Party while a graduate student at Berkeley. The following is part of the exchange between the Board and Oppenheimer re Morrison:
In 1949, Oppenheimer had been instrumental in crafting and then endorsing the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) position on loyalty-security cases, a key provision of which was: “Because of the importance of national security, the state’s judgment about individuals when the evidence was unclear had to be resolved in favor of the American state, not the individual.” [9] During his Personnel Security Board (PSB) in 1954, Oppenheimer again stated that membership or association with the Communist movement was not compatible with employment on a secret war project. [10] The Board thus questioned him about Morrison who the previous year had admitted at a Congressional hearing that he had been a member of the Communist Party while a graduate student at Berkeley. The following is part of the exchange between the Board and Oppenheimer re Morrison:
Board: Was Morrison a Communist?
Oppenheimer: "I think it probable."
Board: Did he go to work on the project?
Oppenheimer: "He did."
Board: With your approval?
Oppenheimer: "With no relation to me." [11]
This was yet another lie regarding Morrison. Not only was Oppenheimer responsible for Morrison’s initial employment on the Manhattan Project, he later campaigned to have Morrison transferred to Los Alamos. In a two-page memo to General Groves dated 30 September 1944 Oppenheimer convinced Groves to over-ride the concerns of MED Security over the proposed transfer of Morrison to Los Alamos. Oppenheimer wanted Morrison to come immediately, even though it would be “necessary for [Morrison] to return to finish up things in Chicago and to move [his] family.” [12]
Wholesale falsifications such as these never impacted Oppenheimer. However, one colossal falsehood would prove disastrous ten years after the fact. This was the Eltenton-Chevalier incident first told by Oppenheimer to Col. Boris Pash in August 1943. [13] Subsequent to Pash, Oppenheimer told General Groves a second, false version. In 1946, he gave the FBI a third account. The PSB made a considerable effort to get to the bottom of this episode and Oppenheimer's inconsistencies: The primary sticking point was, why had Oppenheimer waited for over half a year to report an espionage attempt by an official of the Soviet government? Oppenheimer’s final comment on the affair was itself a false statement: “I wish I could explain to you better why I falsified and fabricated.” This was a final opportunity for Oppenheimer to tell the truth. However, this was a door he dare not open, for it led to his own illicit contacts with Soviet intelligence officers Peter Ivanov and Gregori Kheifetz. [14] Oppenheimer’s failure to satisfy the Board on the Eltenton-Chevalier affair can be considered the tipping factor in the loss of his security clearance:
Wholesale falsifications such as these never impacted Oppenheimer. However, one colossal falsehood would prove disastrous ten years after the fact. This was the Eltenton-Chevalier incident first told by Oppenheimer to Col. Boris Pash in August 1943. [13] Subsequent to Pash, Oppenheimer told General Groves a second, false version. In 1946, he gave the FBI a third account. The PSB made a considerable effort to get to the bottom of this episode and Oppenheimer's inconsistencies: The primary sticking point was, why had Oppenheimer waited for over half a year to report an espionage attempt by an official of the Soviet government? Oppenheimer’s final comment on the affair was itself a false statement: “I wish I could explain to you better why I falsified and fabricated.” This was a final opportunity for Oppenheimer to tell the truth. However, this was a door he dare not open, for it led to his own illicit contacts with Soviet intelligence officers Peter Ivanov and Gregori Kheifetz. [14] Oppenheimer’s failure to satisfy the Board on the Eltenton-Chevalier affair can be considered the tipping factor in the loss of his security clearance:
“It is not clear today whether the account Dr. Oppenheimer gave to Colonel Pash in 1943 concerning the Chevalier incident or the story he told the Gray Board last month is the true version." June 29, 1954 [15]
More lies: In addition to Eltenton-Chevalier, after the war FBI agents asked Oppenheimer if he had ever been approached by Steve Nelson about the atomic bomb project. Oppenheimer denied such an approach by Nelson. This denial contradicted a telephone conversation between Nelson and Joseph Weinberg recorded by the FBI in 1943. [16] ~ After Oppenheimer’s death in 1967, Hans Bethe became a spokesman for those scientists in America concerned about the arms race. Edward Teller represented a different policy view, as he had with Oppenheimer. In 1987, Teller published an Open Letter to Hans Bethe in which he said the following:
“The one regret I have about the atomic bomb is that we missed the opportunity to attempt to end the war by a demonstration of the bomb to the Japanese. ... Oppenheimer persuaded me on that occasion that it was not the business of a physicist to give advice on such matters of policy. I was too easily persuaded. Later I learned that Oppenheimer gave advice on that very question, recommending that the atomic bomb should indeed be dropped.” [17]
Julius Robert Oppenheimer was a congenital, serial liar. Such moral turpitude, by definition, is an egregious character flaw. [18]
General Leslie Groves
At the end of 1945, Robert Oppenheimer left the Manhattan Project and returned to CALTECH and Berkeley. The following January, 1946, President Truman appointed a special committee to advise on the issue of international control of nuclear weapons. Secretary of State Dean Acheson was the head of this committee, and General Groves was one of its appointees. Having no expertise in atomic science, the Acheson committee requested the formation of a 5-member Board of Consultants to assist them. David Lilienthal, a lawyer and then Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, was picked to chair the Board of Consultants. Oppenheimer was chosen as the Board’s Chief Scientist. At the Board’s first meeting in Washington, D.C., Lilienthal and Oppenheimer met for the first time. Lilienthal was immediately enthralled: “He [Oppenheimer] is worth living a lifetime just to know that mankind has been able to produce such a being ....” Over the next weeks and months, by virtue of his command of atomic science and his personal charisma, Oppenheimer dominated the deliberations of both the Board of Consultants and the Acheson committee. Attending these meetings, General Groves witnessed the deference paid to Oppenheimer, as he would later pithily record: “Everybody genuflected. Lilienthal got so bad he would consult Oppie on what tie to wear in the morning.” [1]
In accordance with the Atomic Energy Act, also known as the McMahon Bill, the civilian controlled Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) assumed full responsibility for America’s atomic program on January 1, 1947. Subject to Senate confirmation, Truman appointed David Lilienthal to be the first Chairman of the AEC. In the area of personnel security, the Atomic Energy Act required that the AEC obtain and evaluate FBI investigative reports on all AEC employees for the purposes of issuing security clearances allowing access to restricted data. In the case of persons who were employed by the Manhattan Engineer District, the Act granted an indeterminate grace period wherein the employment of these persons could continue until the AEC was able to reclear them. Further, using the criteria of “character, associations, and loyalty” the law charged the Commission with developing a personnel security program to determine whether employment of an individual would “endanger the common defense or security.” In the run-up to January 1, Lilienthal consulted General Groves on the subject of the MED’s security clearances. In November, 1946, mindful of the security risks he had accepted during the war, Groves sent Chairman-designate Lilienthal a letter on the issue:
General Leslie Groves
At the end of 1945, Robert Oppenheimer left the Manhattan Project and returned to CALTECH and Berkeley. The following January, 1946, President Truman appointed a special committee to advise on the issue of international control of nuclear weapons. Secretary of State Dean Acheson was the head of this committee, and General Groves was one of its appointees. Having no expertise in atomic science, the Acheson committee requested the formation of a 5-member Board of Consultants to assist them. David Lilienthal, a lawyer and then Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, was picked to chair the Board of Consultants. Oppenheimer was chosen as the Board’s Chief Scientist. At the Board’s first meeting in Washington, D.C., Lilienthal and Oppenheimer met for the first time. Lilienthal was immediately enthralled: “He [Oppenheimer] is worth living a lifetime just to know that mankind has been able to produce such a being ....” Over the next weeks and months, by virtue of his command of atomic science and his personal charisma, Oppenheimer dominated the deliberations of both the Board of Consultants and the Acheson committee. Attending these meetings, General Groves witnessed the deference paid to Oppenheimer, as he would later pithily record: “Everybody genuflected. Lilienthal got so bad he would consult Oppie on what tie to wear in the morning.” [1]
In accordance with the Atomic Energy Act, also known as the McMahon Bill, the civilian controlled Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) assumed full responsibility for America’s atomic program on January 1, 1947. Subject to Senate confirmation, Truman appointed David Lilienthal to be the first Chairman of the AEC. In the area of personnel security, the Atomic Energy Act required that the AEC obtain and evaluate FBI investigative reports on all AEC employees for the purposes of issuing security clearances allowing access to restricted data. In the case of persons who were employed by the Manhattan Engineer District, the Act granted an indeterminate grace period wherein the employment of these persons could continue until the AEC was able to reclear them. Further, using the criteria of “character, associations, and loyalty” the law charged the Commission with developing a personnel security program to determine whether employment of an individual would “endanger the common defense or security.” In the run-up to January 1, Lilienthal consulted General Groves on the subject of the MED’s security clearances. In November, 1946, mindful of the security risks he had accepted during the war, Groves sent Chairman-designate Lilienthal a letter on the issue:
"Dear Mr. Lilienthal: I desire to bring to your attention that in the past I have considered it in the best interests of the United States to clear certain individuals for work on the Manhattan project despite evidence indicating considerable doubt as to their character, associations, and absolute reliability. … With the appointment of the Commission and the legal provisions for investigation of personnel by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, I see no reason why those persons on whom derogatory information exists cannot be eliminated. I unhesitatingly recommend that you give the most careful consideration to the problem. The FBI is cognizant of all individuals now employed on the Manhattan project on whom derogatory information exists." [2]
Notwithstanding that Groves did not name any persons to whom his recommendation would or would not apply, the MED employee (former) with the most egregious security file was Robert Oppenheimer. In fact, the book on Oppenheimer had only worsened since 1945 when he left government employment. His FBI file now reflected that he had lied to Groves in December 1943 when he stated that it was his brother Frank who had been approached by Chevalier. In fact, it had been himself, an even more serious security violation. In addition, he had denied to FBI agents that he had been approached by Steve Nelson about DSM work at the Rad Lab, when a 1943 FBI wiretap showed such contact had occurred. At the end of 1946, the FBI’s file on Oppenheimer was so derogatory that Hoover forwarded the case to Attorney General Thomas Clark for prosecutorial consideration. The Justice Department would not authorize charges against Oppenheimer. [3]
In clearing Oppenheimer for the Manhattan Project in 1943, Groves’ bargain with the devil was predicated on the overarching necessity of America being first possessor of a weapon that would decide the war in Europe. This was not the situation in 1947 when the AEC became responsible for personnel security. The clearance guidelines of the Atomic Energy Act, as well as Groves’ informed counsel, were fully relevant when Oppenheimer was considered anew for government service. As with his Army clearance for Director of Los Alamos, Oppenheimer’s clearance for the GAC did not go smoothly or quickly. Unencumbered by war priorties, Groves now took a contrary position. Perceiving that Lilienthal was going to clear Oppenheimer, in effect, by accession, Groves reinforced his first letter with a second one. This time he was most blunt—he suggested that Lilienthal resolve the Oppenheimer problem by simply firing him, removing him from the GAC. [4]
The Terrible Responsibility
On Saturday, March 8, 1947, J. Edgar Hoover forwarded a new 12-page Summary Report on Oppenheimer to Lilienthal, and also to the White House. This report, coupled with Groves’ stance, ensured that Lilienthal would not be able to simply throw holy water on Oppenheimer. Hoover, who had always been concerned about Oppenheimer’s Communist associations, had now become personally engaged as the details and import of the Eltenton-Chevalier incident became known. The sticking point for Hoover, as he emphasized to Lielienthal, and others, was Oppenheimer’s “failure to report promptly and accurately what must have seemed to him an attempt at espionage at Berkeley.” [1] The FBI report certainly raised the stakes, not to mention the eyebrows of the uninitiated, such as Commissioner Strauss:
In clearing Oppenheimer for the Manhattan Project in 1943, Groves’ bargain with the devil was predicated on the overarching necessity of America being first possessor of a weapon that would decide the war in Europe. This was not the situation in 1947 when the AEC became responsible for personnel security. The clearance guidelines of the Atomic Energy Act, as well as Groves’ informed counsel, were fully relevant when Oppenheimer was considered anew for government service. As with his Army clearance for Director of Los Alamos, Oppenheimer’s clearance for the GAC did not go smoothly or quickly. Unencumbered by war priorties, Groves now took a contrary position. Perceiving that Lilienthal was going to clear Oppenheimer, in effect, by accession, Groves reinforced his first letter with a second one. This time he was most blunt—he suggested that Lilienthal resolve the Oppenheimer problem by simply firing him, removing him from the GAC. [4]
The Terrible Responsibility
On Saturday, March 8, 1947, J. Edgar Hoover forwarded a new 12-page Summary Report on Oppenheimer to Lilienthal, and also to the White House. This report, coupled with Groves’ stance, ensured that Lilienthal would not be able to simply throw holy water on Oppenheimer. Hoover, who had always been concerned about Oppenheimer’s Communist associations, had now become personally engaged as the details and import of the Eltenton-Chevalier incident became known. The sticking point for Hoover, as he emphasized to Lielienthal, and others, was Oppenheimer’s “failure to report promptly and accurately what must have seemed to him an attempt at espionage at Berkeley.” [1] The FBI report certainly raised the stakes, not to mention the eyebrows of the uninitiated, such as Commissioner Strauss:
“Over the weekend Lilienthal received from the FBI a shocking report which at first glance seemed to throw a heavy shadow of suspicion over Robert Oppenheimer, the wartime director of the Los Alamos weapon laboratory and a member of the board of consultants which had prepared the Acheson-Lilienthal report; he had recently been appointed on the Commission’s recommendation to be chairman of its General Advisory Committee. … Even as the committee was meeting on Monday morning to cast its vote, the Commissioners were closeted in secret session trying to evaluate the dismaying information in the FBI file. Conant and Bush assured Lilienthal that General Groves had known these facts when he had selected Oppenheimer to head the weapon project in 1942 … Even if the Commission could exonerate Oppenheimer and keep the contents of the file from becoming public knowledge, the chances for confirmation were not clear. Bricker and Taft promised a long, hard fight in the Senate. And even if they emerged victorious, the Commissioners would still face what Lilienthal, with some accuracy as well as exaggeration, had called the terrible responsibility.” [2]
In its first year, the AEC had no program—comprehensive, documented policies, responsibilities and procedures—for issuing or denying security clearances. In this regard, the GAC, in June 1947, suggested to the Commission that it “appoint a personnel security review board consisting of distinguished jurists to review the more difficult cases in a judicial manner.” Lilienthal submitted this idea along with the Commission’s present practices to two respected lawyers for study and comment. They reported back on June 13 that the AEC security office’s performance showed concern for protecting the national security and assuring that “no individual should be denied employment on vague hearsay evidence or gossip, but only for facts, reasonably well documented and indicating a security risk.” They also supported the idea of “appellate review for cases in which derogatory information seemed sufficient to justify denying or revoking a clearance.” In this regard, they suggested that the Commission itself could perform the appellate review or establish a review board. [3]
On this advice, Lileienthal decided that the Commissioners would act as an appellate review body on Oppenheimer’s clearance. Reviewing the FBI’s current report on Oppenheimer, the AEC Security Office concluded that the Bureau’s case was not strong enough to deny clearance. James Conant and Vannevar Bush continued to campaign for clearance. At a final meeting on the issue, the commissioners heard from John Lansdale, who had been Groves’ MED Security Officer. Lansdale assured the commissioners that he had no reservations about clearing Oppenheimer. This ostensibly carried the day. On August 11, 1947, the commissioners, including Lewis Strauss, voted to grant Oppenheimer a top-secret Q clearance. [4]
Oppenheimer Mystique
The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) authorized establishment of a General Advisory Committee (GAC) with the following language: “There shall be a General Advisory Committee to advise the Commission on scientific and technical matters relating to materials, production and research and development, to be composed of nine members, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President.” The GAC appointees served a 6 year term and were not subject to Congressional confirmation. David Lilienthal, in consultation with James Conant and Vannevar Bush, submitted a list of proposed nominees to the White House. Oppenheimer was on the list, as was Conant, who had rejected a Commissioner seat in favor of serving on the GAC. The first meeting of the GAC was Friday morning, January 3, 1947. Lilienthal attended and opened the meeting by distributing Presidential “commissions” to the appointees who were present. Oppenheimer was delayed and would arrive on Saturday. Then, Conant, by prearrangement with Lilienthal, nominated Oppenheimer as Chairman of the GAC. There were no nay votes on Oppenheimer. [1]
The AEC had worked arduously in its first years to develop a rigorous, legitimate personnel security system. This issue was also of major importance to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and it undertook to advise President Truman on its position. Oppenheimer and Conant, members of the Academy, were the principal drafters of the NAS policy paper to Truman, which read in part:
On this advice, Lileienthal decided that the Commissioners would act as an appellate review body on Oppenheimer’s clearance. Reviewing the FBI’s current report on Oppenheimer, the AEC Security Office concluded that the Bureau’s case was not strong enough to deny clearance. James Conant and Vannevar Bush continued to campaign for clearance. At a final meeting on the issue, the commissioners heard from John Lansdale, who had been Groves’ MED Security Officer. Lansdale assured the commissioners that he had no reservations about clearing Oppenheimer. This ostensibly carried the day. On August 11, 1947, the commissioners, including Lewis Strauss, voted to grant Oppenheimer a top-secret Q clearance. [4]
Oppenheimer Mystique
The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) authorized establishment of a General Advisory Committee (GAC) with the following language: “There shall be a General Advisory Committee to advise the Commission on scientific and technical matters relating to materials, production and research and development, to be composed of nine members, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President.” The GAC appointees served a 6 year term and were not subject to Congressional confirmation. David Lilienthal, in consultation with James Conant and Vannevar Bush, submitted a list of proposed nominees to the White House. Oppenheimer was on the list, as was Conant, who had rejected a Commissioner seat in favor of serving on the GAC. The first meeting of the GAC was Friday morning, January 3, 1947. Lilienthal attended and opened the meeting by distributing Presidential “commissions” to the appointees who were present. Oppenheimer was delayed and would arrive on Saturday. Then, Conant, by prearrangement with Lilienthal, nominated Oppenheimer as Chairman of the GAC. There were no nay votes on Oppenheimer. [1]
The AEC had worked arduously in its first years to develop a rigorous, legitimate personnel security system. This issue was also of major importance to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and it undertook to advise President Truman on its position. Oppenheimer and Conant, members of the Academy, were the principal drafters of the NAS policy paper to Truman, which read in part:
"Positions involving responsibility for, or access to, matters which should remain secret, need to be filled by men who can be trusted whether they are scientists or not. In assessing trustworthiness, considerations of loyalty and conviction are obviously pertinent; but considerations of character, experience and temperament are more frequently involved and are equally important. The measures involved in such assessment are not, as the experience of the last years has shown, easily perfected. Neither the secret investigations of the employee’s record, nor the act of judgment itself, which must resolve doubt not in favor of the individual but in favor of security, can be subject to our traditional juridical safeguards." [2]
Robert Oppenheimer was a physicist—he had absolutely no credentials in government, politics, national defense or international relations. What he did bring, however, was his Communist world view. Disregarding the "terrible responsibility" they shouldered in clearing him, Lilienthal, Bush and Conant permitted, if not encouraged, Oppenheimer to inject himself into matters that were outside both his expertise and his brief. Time and again, Lilienthal, Bush and Conant allowed the GAC, utterly dominated by Oppenheimer, to co-op policy issues that were the responsibility and prerogative of the Commission. In this regard, Oppenheimer’s record was atrocious:
He was wrong on the international control of atomic weapons;
He was wrong on thermonuclear deterrence;
He was wrong on public disclosure of the size and rate of increase of the U.S. atomic arsenal;
He was wrong on the progress of the Soviet nuclear program (twice);
He was wrong on national defense based primarily on tactical nuclear weapons;
He was wrong on nuclear reactors for the Navy. [3]
Given his high security risk profile, and his naïve and dangerous policy positions, why was Oppenheimer allowed to function for eight years outside the dictates of national security and national interest? The only rational explanation for the suspension of objectivity by Lilienthal, Conant and Bush is the irrationality of the cult of personality, otherwise known as hero worship. All the centennial authors note, to one degree or another, Oppenheimer's propensity to attract and cultivate worshipers.
History has proven that America was well served by two Presidents who were smart enough to hire Lewis Strauss as a counterweight to the Oppenheimer mystique.
Groupthink
The following quote from Bird and Sherwin exemplifies the groupthink of Oppenheimer historians: "At the apex of the McCarthyite hysteria, Oppenheimer had become its most prominent victim. President Eisenhower appeared satisfied with the outcome—but unaware of the tactics Strauss had used to obtain it.” [1]
This is a nonsensical statement. When Eisenhower read the Borden letter and the FBI Report he suspended Oppenheimer’s clearance. In making that decision, he was advised in the affirmative by his National Security Adviser, his Attorney General and his Secretary of Defense. According to Oppenheimer apologists, then, these four men were duped by Strauss and his instruments Borden and Hoover, who had trumped up “scurrilous” McCarthyite charges against Oppenheimer. This flies in the face of Eisenhower’s record as a savvy, tough-minded President who had no time for McCarthyism: “Even with the Borden letter and FBI report on his desk, Eisenhower declared he would not “get in the gutter” with McCarthy. Six months later, during the Oppenheimer security hearing, the President again steered clear of McCarthyism when he stated that the AEC “must act decent on this and must show the people of the country that we are more interested in trying to find out the facts than to get headlines like McCarthy does.” [2]
Clearly, Eisenhower played the key role in removing Oppenheimer from U.S. government operations. The nature of his decision is revealed in his own words to his diary: “This letter [from Borden] presents little new evidence …. there is no evidence that implies disloyalty on the part of Dr. Oppenheimer. However, this does not mean that he might not be a security risk.” [3] Whether Eisenhower was a patsy, snookered by the Strauss “cabal” or whether he made a responsible decision based on the merits, it is incumbent on historians to examine the proposition without playing the always safe and convenient McCarthy card.
The mindset of modern day Oppenheimer authors is akin to that of James B. Conant, who, under the sway of the Oppenheimer mystique, stated:
History has proven that America was well served by two Presidents who were smart enough to hire Lewis Strauss as a counterweight to the Oppenheimer mystique.
Groupthink
The following quote from Bird and Sherwin exemplifies the groupthink of Oppenheimer historians: "At the apex of the McCarthyite hysteria, Oppenheimer had become its most prominent victim. President Eisenhower appeared satisfied with the outcome—but unaware of the tactics Strauss had used to obtain it.” [1]
This is a nonsensical statement. When Eisenhower read the Borden letter and the FBI Report he suspended Oppenheimer’s clearance. In making that decision, he was advised in the affirmative by his National Security Adviser, his Attorney General and his Secretary of Defense. According to Oppenheimer apologists, then, these four men were duped by Strauss and his instruments Borden and Hoover, who had trumped up “scurrilous” McCarthyite charges against Oppenheimer. This flies in the face of Eisenhower’s record as a savvy, tough-minded President who had no time for McCarthyism: “Even with the Borden letter and FBI report on his desk, Eisenhower declared he would not “get in the gutter” with McCarthy. Six months later, during the Oppenheimer security hearing, the President again steered clear of McCarthyism when he stated that the AEC “must act decent on this and must show the people of the country that we are more interested in trying to find out the facts than to get headlines like McCarthy does.” [2]
Clearly, Eisenhower played the key role in removing Oppenheimer from U.S. government operations. The nature of his decision is revealed in his own words to his diary: “This letter [from Borden] presents little new evidence …. there is no evidence that implies disloyalty on the part of Dr. Oppenheimer. However, this does not mean that he might not be a security risk.” [3] Whether Eisenhower was a patsy, snookered by the Strauss “cabal” or whether he made a responsible decision based on the merits, it is incumbent on historians to examine the proposition without playing the always safe and convenient McCarthy card.
The mindset of modern day Oppenheimer authors is akin to that of James B. Conant, who, under the sway of the Oppenheimer mystique, stated:
“I can say without hesitation that there can be absolutely no question of Dr. Oppenheimer’s loyalty. Furthermore, I can state categorically that, in my opinion, his attitude about the future course of the United States government in matters of high policy is in accordance with the soundest American tradition. He is not sympathetic with the totalitarian regime in Russia and his attitude towards that nation is from my point of view, thoroughly sound and hard headed. Therefore, any rumor that Dr. Oppenheimer is a Communist or toward Russia is an absurdity. As I wrote above, I base this statement on what I consider intimate knowledge of the workings of his mind.” [4]
Presumably, Conant would be flabbergasted, and chagrined, to read CPUSA member Robert Oppenheimer’s sentiments toward Russia in Report to Our Colleagues.
Brotherhood of the Bomb, published in 2002, was the first of the centennial Oppenheimer books. At that time, the book concluded “that Robert Oppenheimer was a member of a so-called closed unit of the Communist Party's professional section in Berkeley, from 1938 to 1942.” After 2004, Professor Herken developed additional evidence conferring historical fact status to his original finding. Then, in 2005, Professor Herken contributed to the centennial book, Reappraising Oppenheimer. In a fantastic bit of reasoning Herken wrote that the fact that Oppenheimer had been a member of the Communist Party was actually “proof” that J. Edgar Hoover “and his ilk” were wrong in their belief that a Communist Party member could not also be an American patriot—Oppenheimer apologists should therefore “rejoice.” Thus, for Herken, it is simply a priori that Oppenheimer was a Communist and a patriot. Hardly a scholarly position from a proven scholar. [5]
Inexplicably, Professor Herken forgets that Oppenheimer himself asserted that loyalty to the Party and loyalty to the United States “could not go.” Moreover, Herken somehow forgets that this was Hoover’s exact point: An American patriot would have reported the Russian espionage approach through Eltenton and Chevalier; an American patriot would have told Army security about the activities of Steve Nelson; an American patriot would have revealed his own personal contacts with Soviet officials Peter Ivanov and Gregory Kheifetz; etc.
Also inexplicable, is the failure of Oppenheimer historians to re-interpret the Borden letter and the Oppenheimer Security Hearing in relation to the fact that he was a Communist, indeed a self-described "intense" one. Evidently it is very unpalatable for Professor Herken (and his ilk) to acknowledge that his own rock solid result provides new, contemporary relevance to William Borden’s closing statement to J. Edgar Hoover:
Brotherhood of the Bomb, published in 2002, was the first of the centennial Oppenheimer books. At that time, the book concluded “that Robert Oppenheimer was a member of a so-called closed unit of the Communist Party's professional section in Berkeley, from 1938 to 1942.” After 2004, Professor Herken developed additional evidence conferring historical fact status to his original finding. Then, in 2005, Professor Herken contributed to the centennial book, Reappraising Oppenheimer. In a fantastic bit of reasoning Herken wrote that the fact that Oppenheimer had been a member of the Communist Party was actually “proof” that J. Edgar Hoover “and his ilk” were wrong in their belief that a Communist Party member could not also be an American patriot—Oppenheimer apologists should therefore “rejoice.” Thus, for Herken, it is simply a priori that Oppenheimer was a Communist and a patriot. Hardly a scholarly position from a proven scholar. [5]
Inexplicably, Professor Herken forgets that Oppenheimer himself asserted that loyalty to the Party and loyalty to the United States “could not go.” Moreover, Herken somehow forgets that this was Hoover’s exact point: An American patriot would have reported the Russian espionage approach through Eltenton and Chevalier; an American patriot would have told Army security about the activities of Steve Nelson; an American patriot would have revealed his own personal contacts with Soviet officials Peter Ivanov and Gregory Kheifetz; etc.
Also inexplicable, is the failure of Oppenheimer historians to re-interpret the Borden letter and the Oppenheimer Security Hearing in relation to the fact that he was a Communist, indeed a self-described "intense" one. Evidently it is very unpalatable for Professor Herken (and his ilk) to acknowledge that his own rock solid result provides new, contemporary relevance to William Borden’s closing statement to J. Edgar Hoover:
“The central problem is not whether J. Robert Oppenheimer was ever a Communist; for the existing evidence makes abundantly clear that he was. Even an Atomic Energy Commission analysis prepared in early 1947 reflects this conclusion, although some of the most significant derogatory data had yet to become available. The central problem is assessing the degree of likelihood that he in fact did what a Communist in his circumstances, at Berkeley, would logically have done during the crucial 1939 - 1942 period...that is, whether he became an actual espionage and policy instrument of the Soviets. Thus, as to this central problem, my opinion is that, more probably than not, the worst is in fact the truth.” [6]
Inconvenient Truth
To a significant extent, the matter of Julius Robert Oppenheimer can be condensed into 2 sets of questions and answers. The first set reflects the questions that accountable officers of the United States Government, including the President, had to confront in the 1940’s and 50’s. The second set consists of questions that present day historians must now confront, along with the answers that current literature provides:
Set I
Was Oppenheimer a member of the Communist Party?
~ Yes. In fact, he was a leader and organizer.
Was Oppenheimer a security risk?
~ Yes, de jure and de facto.
Was Oppenheimer a Soviet agent?
~ Robert Oppenheimer had treasonous contacts with Soviet intelligence officers Steve Nelson and Gregory Kheifetz. In addition, Oppenheimer had mortal knowledge of persons on the Manhattan Project whom he knew to be spies for Russia. [1]
Set II
Why was the accusation of William Borden taken seriously by Eisenhower? (B. Bernstein)
~ Because, in addition to a mass of derogatory material, a Venona message available to Eisenhower and his Administration in 1952 suggested that Oppenheimer had a KGB codename.
Why is it that Oppenheimer failed to defend himself at his loyalty hearing, which in effect was a political show trial? (G. Herken)
~ Oppenheimer knew too well the legitimacy of his Personnel Security Board and that, after the execution of the Rosenbergs, the prudent strategy was to let sleeping dogs lie.
Why is it that Oppenheimer biographers shun the witness of KGB General Pavel Sudoplatov? (H.B. Laes)
~ It is an inconvenient truth for them that Borden’s grave accusation in 1953 channeled Sudoplatov’s unwanted witness in 1994.
Update, February 2012
Essay by John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr: J. Robert Oppenheimer: A Spy? No. But a Communist Once? Yes. Erudite treatise that establishes beyond all reasonable doubt that Robert Oppenheimer had been an active, important member of the Communist Party USA. Bird and Sherwin’s sycophantic deification of Oppenheimer and bogus demonization of Borden, Strauss and Hoover in American Prometheus tarnishes the prestige of the Pulitzer Prize. See Washington Decoded website.
Oppenheimer Centennial
1. Julius R. Oppenheimer: Born April 22, 1904 – Died, February 18, 1967
2. American Prometheus, The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin, Alfred a Knopf, 2005. Page 474.
3. Reappraising Oppenheimer, Centennial Studies and Reflections, Edited by Cathryn Carson and David A. Hollinger, Regents of the University of California, 2005. Pages 78, 89.
4. J. Robert Oppenheimer and the American Century, David C. Cassidy, Pi Press, 2005. Page 306.
5. The Ruin of J. Robert Oppenheimer, and the Birth of the Modern Arms Race, Priscilla J. McMillan, Penguin Books, 2005. Page 171.
6. 109 East Palace, Robert Oppenheimer and the Secret City of Los Alamos, Jennet Conant, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2005. Page xviii.
7. Brotherhood of the Bomb, The Tangled Lives and Loyalties of Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, and Edward Teller, Gregg Herken, Henry Holt and Company, 2002. Page 265.
8. Oppenheimer, Portrait of an Enigma, Jeremy Bernstein, Ivan R. Dee, 2004. Page 142.
9. J. Robert Oppenheimer, A Life, Abraham Pais with Robert P. Crease, Oxford Universtiy Press, 2006. Page 255.
10. Note The current vogue terms in the writing of history seem to be narrative and interpretation. This is worrisome as the word history--from histor, one who knows, sees or records--has the connotation of truth, what is real, whereas the word narrative can mean story, something true or fictitious, and the word interpretation connotes something construed or presented in a particular way. To the degree that narrative and interpretive technique in historiography introduce ambiguity and subjectivity, they should not be used.
11. Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961, Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission, Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, University of California Press, 1989.
“Testimony of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover RE Dr. Klaus Fuchs”
1. "position of physicist Edward Teller": Atoms for Peace and War, Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Page 35.
2. Summary Brief on Dr. Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, Top Secret, February 6, 1950. FBI FOIA File, HQ 65-58805-1202 (27 pages).
3. Testimony of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover re Dr. Klaus Fuchs, CIS-NO: 81 JAto-T.76, Source: Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, DOC-TYPE: House Unpublished Hearings Collection, Date: Feb 6, 1950, SESSION-Date: 1950, CIS/Historical Index (a classified CONFIDENTIAL report of Hoover’s testimony, declassified in 1989).
“Nelson … close contact with Oppenheimer”: Ibid.
Note In addition to the Nelson-Oppenheimer association, the Bureau also informed the Army of the contacts between Nelson and Joseph Weinberg, who was then working on DSM at the Radiation Lab. As a consequence of these actions by the FBI, the Army advised the Bureau of the classified atom bomb project.
“General Groves did not want any FBI activity”: Ibid.
Note During March-April 1943 there were several contacts between the Army and the FBI. These ended in an agreement stipulating that the FBI would not initiate any investigative activities associated with DSM unless specifically requested by the War Department. Ibid.
“the FBI talked with [Oppenheimer] at length”: Ibid.
Note The FBI interview with Oppenheimer was confirmatory of information already in Bureau files. See Brotherhood of the Bomb, pages 160-1.
4. “no unilateral authority”: Summary Brief on Dr. Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, February 6, 1950. Jurisdiction Section, page 14.
Note This point conflicts with a number of the centennial books. From American Prometheus: “In mid-October, the FBI informed [Strauss] that decrypted Soviet cable traffic indicated that a Soviet spy had been operating out of Los Alamos.” (Page 434) AP is well-referenced but contains no source for this specific detail (italicized). From Brotherhood of the Bomb: “Some two weeks before the GAC meeting, Strauss had learned from Charles Bates, the FBI agent whom Hoover had assigned as liaison with the AEC, that decrypted Soviet messages revealed the presence of a spy at wartime Los Alamos. Bates informed Strauss and AEC security chief John Gingrich that “Bureau Source 5” pointed to British physicist Klaus Fuchs.” (Page 213) Special Agent Bates was a member of the Bureau’s Liaison Office, and the AEC may have been his principal, if not sole, assignment. With regard to the Fuchs’ investigation and Bureau requests to the AEC for information, he was directed by the Espionage Section, more specifically the Soviet Message Unit, aka Bureau Source 5, or simply Five. However, it is not axiomatic that Bates was privy to the true nature of Bureau Source 5. (He did not need to know the investigative original source to do his job.) Brotherhood author Herken gives an informative footnote generally, but no specific source/evidence for the claim that Strauss or anybody else at the AEC was in effect read-in to the Venona Program. Certainly, the Bureau had no authority to reveal the true nature or basis of its investigation. (Essay Truman and Venona refers.) It is a reasonable guess that Bird and Sherwin repeated this particular item, decrypted Soviet messages, from Brotherhood.
William Borden and Lewis Strauss
1. “Borden sent him a cordial …”: American Prometheus, page 436.
2. “Strauss resigned from the AEC … in April 1950”: Men and Decisions, Lewis L. Strauss, 1962, page 250.
3. "Both Borden and Strauss were able ... personal judgements about Oppenheimer's loyalty": Atoms for Peace and War, page 46.
“Along with others, he worked to prevent …”: Ibid.
Note Other officials opposed to Oppenheimer’s reappointment were physicist Edward Teller, AEC commissioner Thomas Murray, Nuclear Studies Institute professor Walter F. Libby, Secretary of the Air Force, et al;
“Borden initiated two investigations …”: Ibid., pages 37 and 46.
“an accurate compilation of Oppenheimer’s record …”: Ibid., page 47.
4. “damage assessment … what Fuchs had known”: Atoms for Peace and War, pages 37-39.
Note Physicist John A. Wheeler: In January 1942, Wheeler took a leave of absence from Princeton University to work on the DSM project at the Met Lab at the University of Chicago. In 1943, Wheeler transferred from the Met Lab to the Hanford, WA, plutonium production facility. After the war, he returned to Princeton. He was a top rank physicist. John Wheeler died on April 13, 2008 at the age of 96.
“a week or so before Dwight Eisenhower’s inauguration … seriousness of the loss”: Brotherhood of the Bomb, pages 259-60;
“a Borden-Walker working paper … summary of the U.S. H-bomb effort”: Ibid., page 259.
“A subsequent assessment done for the AEC by Bethe, Teller … of Mike”: Ibid., page 397, Note 61; Atoms for Peace and War, pages 37-39.
Note The Borden-Walker paper on Mike was never recovered. Whether it was really lost without effect to national security, or missing due to an act of espionage has never been resolved.
5. “Strauss … assisted with the Walker project”: Atoms for Peace and War, page 45
“breakthrough ideas of radiation implosion”: Brotherhood of the Bomb, page 259.
“I think it would be extremely unwise …”: No Sacrifice Too Great, The Life of Lewis L. Strauss, Richard Pfau, 1984, page 136.
Note After the war, the AEC continued the Roosevelt administration policy (stemming from the Quebec Agreement) of accepting British atomic security clearances. Thus, until he was uncovered by virtue of the Venona decrypts, Klaus Fuchs had never been the subject of even a FBI file check, which would have turned up several Communist associations (as it did in 1949).
6. “profound … Durham … raised serious questions”: Atoms for Peace and War, page 34.
“January 29, 1953”: Ibid., Note #21, page 599.
“first two weeks in February”: Ibid., Notes 16 & 17, page 599.
7. "Strauss declined on the grounds …”: Atoms for Peace and War, pages 20-21.
8. “could not do the job”: Ibid., page 52.
Note Realizing that AEC Chariman Gordon Dean was leaving at the end of June 1953, Oppenheimer prevailed on Dean to renew his contract for another year. Dean was certainly aware of the Oppenheimer controversy that had been building for years. On June 5, 1953, without consulting his fellow commissioners, the White House or Strauss, Dean extended Oppenheimer’s AEC employment for another year, until June 30, 1954. Within six months, this bit of gamesmanship by Oppenheimer would have most severe unintended consequences.
“he was going to approach Cutler … concerning Oppenheimer”: Brotherhood of the Bomb, pages 265, 399 (Notes).
Note Robert Cutler served with Oppenheimer on the board of the Harvard Corporation, and was generally disposed towards him.
“White House announced Lewis Strauss’ appointment”: Atoms for Peace and War, pages 20-21, 52.
Note Example of yellow journalism by Bird and Sherwin: “For a time, it seemed Oppenheimer’s view might influence the new president [Eisenhower]. But Louis Strauss, who had contributed generously to Eisenhower’s campaign, was appointed the president’s atomic energy adviser in January 1953; and then in July, he was elevated to the job he had bought—chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.” (American Prometheus, p.466) Compare this account to the one from Hewlett and Holl: “Strauss had no desires or expectations to return to federal service even after Eisenhower’s election. He had scarcely known Eisenhower and had not supported Eisenhower’s drive for the Republican nomination. Strauss was therefore surprised when the President called him home from a Caribbean vacation in late February 1953 and asked him to make an independent study of the atomic energy program. Within a few weeks Eisenhower suggested that Strauss take over the chairmanship of the Commission from [Gordon] Dean, who had announced on February 10 that he would retire within three months. Strauss refused the offer on the grounds that the Commisssion’s chairman was necessarily involved in a large number of routine matters that prevented him from giving full attention to larger policy issues."
The Borden Letter
1. “Borden provided a copy …”: Atoms for Peace and War, page 47.
“a single document”: Ibid., page 51.
“It had became Borden’s view that the Oppenheimer case called for a study”: Ibid., page 51.
“On May 14, 1953, Borden called the Security Officer at the AEC, and asked for the Commission’s security file”: Ibid., page 50; (also Brotherhood of the Bomb, page 264)
“no evidence that Borden …”: Ibid., page 62.
2. “On August 7, 1953, Lewis Strauss … on a Soviet H-bomb to President Eisenhower”: No Sacrifice too Great, page 146.
Note Several days subsequent, in a meeting on Joe 4, Eisenhower said to Strauss, “You must have a pipeline into the Kremlin.”
“Oppenheimer had publicly … that the Russians were four years behind”: Atoms for Peace and War, page 54.
Note As previously noted, William Borden’s apprehension about Oppenheimer dated to 1950. From that point, at various times and stages, he had been immersed in the question of JRO’s fitness to hold a security clearance. The record shows that he “buried himself in the Oppenheimer case” during the last months of his employment at the JCAE, which ended on May 30, 1953 (Ibid., page 50). The result was 15 pages of over 400 questions on Oppenheimer’s background that he left for the JCAE and ostensibly also Strauss at the White House. The fact that he took the AEC's Oppenheimer file after he left Washington suggests that he intended to complete the single study project. It is not reported, however, that he did so. What he did do is send Director Hoover a 3 page letter in November 1953, 6 months after leaving the JCAE. Certainly such a letter could have been sent months earlier if that had been his intention. It is thus believed that Joe 4, the Soviet H-bomb test in August, years before expected, was actually the specific cause/reason for his letter to the Director of the FBI.
"blank wall"
1. “interpretations and conclusions”: Atoms for Peace and War, page 67.
“a mass of additional data assembled from numerous other sources”: William L. Borden letter, November 7, 1953.
2. “On Friday, November 27, Hoover sent …”: Atoms for Peace and War, page 68.
Note November 27 was the day after Thanksgiving, with a holiday weekend following. Hence, the Eisenhower response to the Hoover memorandum on Oppenheimer didn’t happen until Wednesday, Dec 3.
“I stated so far as the FBI is concerned …”:
Note In 1942 the San Francisco FBI field office opened an investigation into espionage at the Radiation Laboratory at the University of California, Berkeley. At the center of the CINRADCASE were Steve Nelson and two Soviet intelligence officers attached to the San Francisco Consulate, Peter Ivanov and Grigory Kheifetz. The CINRAD investigation would snare two Oppenheimer students who were members of the Communist Party, Joseph Weinberg and Giovanni Lomanitz. Both investigations were eventually relinquished to Army Intelligence (G2).
3. “Strauss received a phone call from Charles Wilson …”: No Sacrifice too Great, Page 150; also Atoms for Peace and War, page 69.
“Wilson … wanted Oppenheimer cut off …”: Atoms for Peace and War, page 69.
“Cutler advised immediate action”: American Prometheus, Page 479; also No Sacrifice too Great, page, 151.
4. Memorandum for the Attorney Gerneral: Courtesy of Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. Copies of the presidential memo were furnished to: the Secretary of State, Chairman of the AEC, Secretary of Defense, Director of the CIA, Director of Defensee Mobilization (ODM), Chairman of the JCS (Omar Bradley), General Cutler, Mr. Shanley, Murray Snyder.
5. Oppenheimer was traveling in Europe … but withheld notifying the atomic energy establishment until [he] returned”: Atoms for Peace and War, pages 69-71.
Eisenhower: "security risk"
"The central problem is ... is in fact the truth.":
1. “dominated the formulation”: Atoms for Peace and War, page xxi.
“subordinates such as”: Ibid., page xv.
2. “appalled by such an incredible security lapse”: Ibid., page 39.
3. "there is no evidence that implies disloyalty on the part of Dr. Oppenheimer. However, this does not mean that he might not be as security risk.": Eisenhower personal diary, December, 3, 1953.
“I don’t care how it is done”: No Sacrifice Too Great, Richard Pfau, page 151.
"character, associations, and loyalty"
1. “sympathetic association with totalitarian”: Reappraising Oppenheimer, pages 218-9.
2. Brotherhood of the Bomb, pages 31, 341-2; See New Evidence at book website, especially Herken letter response to Daniel Kevles re Morrison. Morrison distinctly remembered a particular 1939 pamphlet, “because he delivered it to the printers for Oppenheimer, who also paid for its distribution.”
3. “member of the Communist Party in Berkeley”: Philip Morrison testimony before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, May 7, 1953, page 899.
4. The New York Review of Books, (December, 2003). Kevles Herken-Kevles, 2004. (See Brotherhood of the Bomb website)
5. Report to our Colleagues: I, February 20, 1940, College Faculties Committee, J. Robert Oppenheimer, Haakon Chevalier and Arthur Brodeur, Communist Party of California.
Note That the Report to Our Colleagues was an undertaking of a unit, closed or otherwise, of the American Communist Party is further confirmed by of co-author, Haakon Chevalier: “The spread of the war in Europe and the gathering of war clouds over the United States, were now coming to be reflected more an more in our thoughts and in our everyday lives. In the face of the momentous events that were shaping up, we in our group, because of our smallness, because of the limited nature of our activities, were prey to a sense of frustration. Opje, in particular, betrayed a growing impatience. … It was at one of our last meetings in 1939, or at one of the first in 1940, that Opje came up with an idea. Why not write, print and distribute to our colleagues a periodic letter, or pamphlet, in which we could present our views on he most crucial and difficult issues with which the people of America were being confronted. … Our group thought it a good idea. Opje himself undertook to finance the project.” Story of a Friendship, pages 35-6.
6. “did not want anybody working for him”: Lansdale testimony at Oppenheimer PSB Hearing: Ibid., page 276.
Note Oppenheimer stated that this did not apply to persons who had been Communists, knowing full well that he and others who were closed-unit or secret members of the Party, had falsified their employment applications by swearing they had never been members of the Party. This sham tactic was subterfuge for the sole purpose of gaining federal government employment. The instances of Weinberg and Lomanitz are particularly absurd. Oppenheimer was responsible for the their employment on the Manhattan Project (DSM). In this regard, he told Lansdale he had secured from them, as a condition of such employment, a promise that they would cease and desist all political activity. Oppenheimer knew full well they were Communists, like himself. It made him “mad” when he found out they had been indiscrete (Party speak for espionage). Of course to cover his own tracks, as advised by the Party in 1942, he cancelled his subscritption to Daily Worker, stopped making contributions (dues), etc.
7. “Early in 1942 … to Oakland”: Steve Nelson, American Radical, pages 261-2.
"it was at this exact time, December 1941-January 1942": From War and Peace, Robert Serber with Robert P. Crease: "About Christmastime in 1941, just a few weeks after Pearl Harbor, I received a phone call from Oppie. He said he was in Chicago and wanted to come down and talk to me about something. He came, and we took a walk out to the cornfields beyond the edge of town. There, alone in that rural setting, he told me that he was going to be appointed to head the weapons end of the atomic bomb project, to replace Gregory Breit in that position. He wanted me to come to Berkeley and be his assistant in the project." (WAP, p. 65)
“a number of Oppenheimer students were quite active”: Steve Nelson, American Radical, page 268.
8. University of Chicago, Metallurgical Laboratory, P. O. Box 5434, Chicago, Illinois (letterhead). Personnel reference form for Philip Morrison dated April 22 [1942] signed by Robert Oppenheimer, National Archives NWD921104, 5/2/1997.
9. “Hatch Act of 1939 … communist organizations … Smith Act of 1940 … forceful overthrow”: Reappraising Oppenheimer, Something Resembling Justice, Stephanie Young, page 219;
“Oppenheimer … instsrumental in crafting and then endorsing”: Ibid., Barton J. Bernstien, page 82;
“Because of the importance of national security, the state’s judgment”: Ibid., page 77.
Note The NAS statement written by Robert Oppenheimer, Harvard president James Conant, and Bell Laboratories head Oliver Buckley: “Positions involving responsibility for, or access to, matters which should remain secret, need to be filled by men who can be trusted whether they are scientists or not. In assessing trustworthiness, considerations of loyalty and conviction are obviously pertinent; but considerations of character, experience and temperament are more frequently involved and are equally important. The measures involved in such assessment are not, as the experience of the last years has shown, easily perfected. Neither the secret investigations of the employee’s record, not the act of judgment itself, which must resolve doubt not in favor of the individual but in favor of security, can be subject to our traditional juridical safeguards.” NAS to President Harry S. Truman, 3 February 1949. Reapprasing Oppenheimer, Barton, page 77.
10. “Oppenheimer again stated”: In The Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Atomic Energy Commission (1954), page 147.
11. “Morrison … with no relation to me”: In The Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Atomic Energy Commission (1954), page 196.
12. “Statement by Dr. Oppenheimer re transfer of Philip Morrisson to Site Y”, dated 30 September 1944: National Archives document NWD921104, NARA Date 5/2/97.
Note Lt Col John Lansdale had interviewed Morrison in connection with Oppenheimer’s plan to bring him to Los Alamos. In a memo dated 27 September 1944 he documented the results of his interview with Morrison in which he discussed Morrison’s Communist background, to wit: "I had a lengthy interview with Morrison on 20 September 1944, in which his whole past history and record of Communist activity were discussed. Morrison states that he is not a member of the Communist Party and never has been, although he worked very closely with them and believes in the principal tenets of Communism." (NWD921104, NARA Date 5/2/97)
13. The Eltenton-Chevalier incident, Oppenheimer to Pash, 26 August 1943: In The Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Atomic Energy Commission, 1954, pages 845 – 853.
14. “I wish I could explain to you”: 109 East Palace, Page 386; “his own contacts with Peter Ivanov and KGB resident Gregori Kheifetz”: Brotherhood of the Bomb, page 91 and Story of a Friendship, Haakon Chevalier, pages 50-1.
Note At his Security Hearing, Oppenheimer avowed that he did not know the name of Eltenton’s Soviet contact: “I don’t know the name of the man attached to the consulate—I think I may have been told or I may not have been told and I have at least not purposely, but actually forgotten.” (ITMOJRO, page 846; classic Oppenheimer dissembling) If Oppenheimer had wanted to be truthful and candid on this subject, he would have admitted that he had met two Soviet Consulate officials, along with George Eltenton, at a social gathering hosted by Haakon Chevalier. In his book Story of a Friendship, Chevalier discussed this social event: “[The Russian War Relief party] was the best-attended and most successful, as well as the last, of all the parties we gave in Berkeley. … And of course the Soviet consulate was represented. Opje and Kitty, too, were able to come on this occasion.” It turns out that the two representatives of the Soviet consulate at the Chevalier affair were Peter Ivanov (alias)and "Mr. Brown" (alias of Gregory Kheifetz). From Brotherhood of the Bomb (p.91): “[Eltenton] said that he and Dolly ran into [Ivanov and Kheifetz] during a benefit for Russian war relief held at the Chevalier’s house.” In addition, two senior KGB officers (P. Sudoplatov and A. Feklisov) wrote in their memoirs that Oppenheimer had lunch with Kheifetz after meeting him at a party hosted by Louise Bransten, a Communist Party member.
GRU alias "Peter Ivanov" Possible real name, Pavel Ivanovich Baraev (Baraeb, bah-ray-yeff). Official biography: "Born 1906. From peasant background. Major (Nov.28. 1939). In the Red Army since 1928. Member of the Communist Party since 1929. Graduated from the course of the group of one-year students (1929), and the engineering command faculty of the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (1939). Knew English. Assistant to the head of the chief of staff. Adjunct of the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization. In the intelligence division of the staff of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (September-October 1939). Assistant to the military attache at the USSR Embassy in the USA (October 1939-May 1943)." End of verbatim entry. [a] Readers should note the very unusual fact that Baraev's GRU career ends in May 1943, at age 37, coincident with his recall from America to Russia in May 1943. It is known that "Peter Ivanov", following several contacts with Steve Nelson, departed the U.S. at virtually this exact same time. If Mr. Baraev was "Peter Ivanov," as is most probably the case, it would appear he may have been summarily executed ("Lubyanka Breakfast, a cigarette and a bullet") for fouling the KGB's range on atomic espionage at Berkeley (Ivanov was the proximate cause of the Eltenton-Chevalier incident). Whoever Ivanov is, it should not be expected that his official bio would be specific to his posting to the San Francisco consulate.
[a. Baraev Source: GRU: Dela i liudi; Authors Lur’e, V. M. Kochik, V. IA. Publication: Moskva, Olma-Press, 2002 (Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff: The People and the Deeds)]
15. “It is not clear today”: Decision and Opinions of the United States Atomic Energy Commission in the Matter of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, June 29, 1954, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/abomb/opp06.htm
16. “if he had ever been approached by Steve Nelson … recorded by FBI”: American Prometheus, pages 188-190.
17. “Oppenheimer persuaded me”: Brotherhood of the Bomb, page 334 and Page 416, Note 41.
18. “Oppenheimer a congenital liar": An early life indication of Oppenheimer’s psychoneurotic nature was his habit of lying about his name. From Reappraising Oppenheimer, Page 83: "There are also the issues of his very name and his relationship to being Jewish. He normally insisted, falsely, the the initial 'J.' in 'J. Robert Oppenheimer' stood for nothing, but actually it was for his first name, Julius."
Note As regards “character,” never mentioned by Oppenheimer apologists is the immorality of his destruction of Haakon Chevalier. The story: Haakon Chevalier was born in New Jersey. He was an American citizen. In 1943, on sabbatical from Berkeley, he went to New York for work with the Office of War Information. The job required a security clearance, so his start was delayed until his clearance came through. Months of waiting ensued. He reported to the OWI office every 2 or 3 weeks, but no clearance and no explanation. In January 1944 he was called to the OWI office and was informed by his contact that his FBI file contained “utterly unbelievable allegations.” Of course, it would. Oppenheimer had told Groves in early December 1943 that Chevalier had acted as an emissary of Soviet intelligence. Chevalier and his wife returned to California and in 1945 he resumed teaching at Berkeley. But not for long. For reasons unexplained to Chevalier, Berkeley denied him tenure and he resigned to concentrate on writing a novel. In the summer of 1946, against the advice of his wife, he consented to an interview with the FBI. The agents, of course, wanted to know about Eltenton and “three scientists on the atomic bomb project.” Months after this the Chevaliers attended a party at Oppenheimer’s Eagle Hill home. Chevalier told Oppenheimer about the FBI interview. Oppenheimer grilled Chevalier at length about the episode and admitted that he had advised Army security about their long ago conversation pertaining to Eltenton’s request for project information. Chevalier asked Oppenheimer about the three scientists angle but Oppenheimer, “extremely nervous and tense” gave no answer. In late October 1947, an ex-FBI agent testifying before House Un-American Actifities Committee, informed it of Eltenton-Chevalier incident. The San Francisco chronicle picked up the story and Chevalier quickly received a subpoena to appear before the Tenney Committee, a California state committee on Un-American Activities. Chevalier’s wife had just given birth and was contacted by the press while she was in the hospital. It was a very upsetting experience. Chevalier’s book, For Us the Living, was published in January 1949, but it was a dud. It was at this time that Chevalier started to realize that the FBI investigation of him had “become a virtually insuperable stumbling block to my chances of earning a livelihood and pursuing a career.” Chevalier, still mystified at what he considered the heart of the matter, the three scientists that his name was associated with, wrote Oppenheimer asking him what he had told the House sub-committee on Un-American Activities. Oppenheimer responded with dissembling, to wit, “I told them that I would like as far as possible to clear the record with regard to your alleged involvement in the atom business. … that most certainly you had never mentioned it or anything that could be connected with it to me. I said that you had never asked me to transmit any kind of information, nor suggested that I could do so, or that I consider doing so. I said that you had told me of a discussion of providing technical information to the USSR which disturbed you considerably, and which you thought I ought to know about. … As you know, I have been deeply disturbed by the threat to your career which these ugly stories could constitute. If I can help you in that, you may call on me. Sincerely yours, Robert Oppenheimer.” Left unsaid, of course, was the key that Chevalier was trying to fathom, the source for the three scientists. At this time, 1950, Chevalier’s marriage broke up. Chevalier traced the beginning of its end to 1944 when he could not be cleared for the OWI job. Chevalier decided to go to Europe to make a new start: “I was in a pretty shaken state. I had lost practically everything in life that held any meaning for me.” Of course, Oppenheimer expressed his sympathy: “I share in your sorrow; so does Kitty. Yours was one of the families we knew first and best.” Going to Europe turned out to be problematic—not inexplicably, he couldn’t get a passport out of the U.S. Government. He eventually surmounted this obstacle by getting a French passport to which he was entitled by virtue of having French parents. Chevallier settled in Paris and remarried after a couple of years. Correspondence with the Oppenheimers was maintained. Out of the blue, in December 1953, he was contacted by Robert and Kitty who were in Paris, traveling after the Reith lectures in England. The two couples got together for dinner and a long evening at Chevalier’s apartment. It was a joyous reunion for Haakon: “We had drinks, and a fine dinner, and I prepared a salad in the mahogany bowl [a wedding present from the Oppenheimers]. With the dessert I opened a bottle of champagne and we drank many a toast: to the health and well-being of all of us, to our long friendship, to the future—but not, to the best of my recollection, ‘to the confusion of our enemies’ [their toast as Communists at Berkeley]”. Chevalier did not know, of course, that during the evening with the Openheimers, the FBI was in place outside of his apartment, or that five months hence his name would appear in the New York Times signaling the raising of the curtain on the final act of his personal hell: “I did not realize that a canker had been eating into the heart of our friendship for exactly the past ten years.” (It was in December 1943 that Oppenheimer had given Chevalier’s name to Groves). Chevalier remained in the dark about what had happened to him until July 1954 when he received and read the official documents of the Security Hearing. After reading them he sent Oppenheimer a letter which read in part: “The heart of the matter … is this. You concocted an elaborately detailed story ‘most damaging to me’ in 1943. Today you claim that this story was a lie. Your judges say: You admit today that you were a liar in 1943. But we think your 1943 story is more plausible than your 1954 story. Therefore we shall believe the 1943 story. The burden of this lie, in other words, still hangs over me. Nichols believes it, a large percentage of the public will necessarily believe it. For the subjective observer—myself—the picture is this: I have regarded you as my very dear friend for upward of fifteen years. I have loved you as I have loved no other man. I placed in you an absolute trust. I would have defended you to the death against malice or slander. Now I learn that eleven years ago, according to your own admission, you wove an elaborate fabric of lies about me of the most gravely compromising nature. During all these years you continued to show me the signs of an unaltered friendship. In 1946, after my interview with the FBI, I told you, in the garden on Eagle Hill, of my being grilled about those three scientists I was supposed to have approached. You gave me no indication that you knew of what was involved. During all these years that story, without my knowing it, has hounded me, plagued and blocked me and played untold havoc with my career and my life.” Author’s comment: It is complete intellectual hypocrisy that an Oppenheimer biographer would write a panegyric book with the title, The Ruin of J. Robert Oppenheimer, without acknowledging therein the absolute destruction her subject perpetrated on a person whom he called friend. The Story of a Friendship, Haakon Chevalier, 1966.
General Leslie Groves
1. “President Truman appointed a special committee …Board of Consultants”: BOB, page 162-3.
“able to produce such a being … enthralled Lilienthal”: American Prometheus, page 340.
2. “In the area of personnel security … all new applicants”: Reappraising Oppenheimer, Stephanie Young, Page 218; Atomic Energy Act, Section 10. (b) Restrictions. (5) (B) (ii), 1946.
“Using the criteria … employment of the individual on atomic energy projects”: Ibid., page 218-9.
“Groves … sent AEC Chairman-designate”: Men and Decisions, Lewis Strauss, Pages 272-4.
3. “Hoover forwarded the case …”: Brotherhood of the Bomb, page 162.
4. “Groves' bargain with the devil … necessity of America being first possessor."
Note It was German scientists who first discovered nuclear fission in 1938, and it was known that Germany had a research program on its military uses. By the end of 1944, however, General Groves’ Alsos project indicated that Germany did not have a viable atomic weapons program. Also, by the end of 1944, victory over Germany was all but a certainty. Germany surrendered May 7, 1945.
“Groves’ informed counsel … fully relevant”: Men and Decisions, Lewis Strauss, Pages 273; Now It Can Be Told, Leslie Groves, 1962, pages 396-7.
“in which he was most blunt … by simply firing him”: Brotherhood of the Bomb, pages 177.
Note Groves testified at Oppenheimer’s Security Board in 1954. When queried on this issue he told the Gray Board that if Oppenheimer had still been employed on the Manhattan Project in 1946, when he advised Lilienthal on security clearances, Oppenheimer would have been one of those to be considered for elimination. (Hearing Transcript, page 170.)
The Terrible Responsibility
1. “Hoover … failure to report promptly”: Brotherhood of the Bomb, page 179.
2. “Over the weekend”: Hoover to Lilienthal, Saturday, March 8, 1947. (Brotherhood of the Bomb, page 376, note 9)
“the terrible responsibility”: Atomic Shield, R. Hewlett and F. Duncan, pages 13-14.
3. “two respected lawyers … no individual should be denied employment … appellate review”: Ibid., page 92 (“two outstanding lawyers, Archibald S. Alexander and Robert L. Finley”, etc.)
4. “final meeting … John Lansdale”: Brotherhood of the Bomb, page 180.
Oppenheimer Mystique
1. Atomic Energy Act, 1946, Section 2. (b)
2. NAS to President Harry S. Truman, 3 February 1949. Reapprasing Oppenheimer, page 77.
3. Note Was Oppenheimer right about anything? In so far as Project Lexington envisioned atomic power for airplanes, Oppenheimer was right about the concept’s technical feasibility.
Groupthink
1. “At the apex of the McCarthyite hysteria …”: American Prometheus, page 548.
2. “Eisenhower declared he would not …”: Atoms for Peace and War, page 104.
3. 3. “This letter [from Borden] presents little new evidence …”: Eisenhower diary, dated December 3, 1953 (courtesy
4. “I can say without hesitation … what I consider intimate knowledge of the workings of his mind”: 109 East Palace, page 367; also, Transcript of Hearing, In the Matter of J. Robrert Oppenheimer, 1954, pages 387-8.
5. “Hoover “and his ilk” were wrong in their belief that a Communist Party member could not also …”: Reappraising Oppenheimer, page 54.
6. "Oppenheimer Security Hearing in ... self-described "intense" one.": In The Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Atomic Energy Commission, 1954, pp. (JRO, "brief and intense")
"The central problem is ... is in fact the truth.":
William L. Borden letter to FBI Director - J. Edgar Hoover, November 7, 1953.
Inconvenient Truth
1. Note Oppenheimer was not a recruited Soviet agent as defined by KGB dogma. He was purposely not asked to sign doctrinally required obligation/allegiance documents: "Oppenheimer...jewel of a source...could not be run as a traditional agent" ... "In developing Oppenheimer as a source, Vassili Zarubin's wife, Elizgeth, was essential." (Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, p.175-6, 189).
Samplar It is an extraodinary fact that just days before leaving Berkeley for Los Alamos, Robert Oppenheimer had a private lunch with Steve Nelson. This was not a meeting predicated on Nelson's relationship with Kitty, but on Nelson's personal relationship with Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer initiated the meeting and revealed to Nelson that he was leaving Berkeley to do war work at a secret location. (SNAR, p.269)
~ Another inexplicable, incriminating fact is that Robert Oppenheimer was listed in Gregory Kheifetz' personal address book.
~ In the matter of Klaus Fuchs, Sudoplatov stated that Oppenheimer was influenced, not only to have Fuchs included in the British Mission to America, but to later have him sent to Los Alamos, Site Y. (Special Tasks, p.193-4) Indeed, only Oppenheimer had the authority to prevail over James Chadwick, head of the British Mission, who was adament that Fuchs would not go to Site Y but return to Britain (Chadwick to Peierls, 14 July 1944). As understood by Chadwick, Fuchs could only be transferred to Los Alamos if Site Y (Oppenheimer) made a request for him to General Groves. Only the Army MED office (Groves) could approve the transfer of a civilian physicst to Site Y, let alone the assignment of a native German to the Theoretical Division. But that is exactly what happened—and at the very last moment. (More at essay FUCASE, segment Tripple-cross). Fuchs had to call his sister from Chicago, enroute to New Mexico, to advise her that he was not going home to England as he had told her just days before on a visit to Boston. The truth of this subterfuge is evidenced by the fact that Fuchs lied in his confession about the circumstances of his transfer to Los Alamos when he said that he first learned that he was being sent to Los Alamos in the July 14 meeting in Washington with Chadwick. The Chadwick letter shows this to be patently false. And a Venona message (No.1233, 29084) is corroborative: "In July when it became known that REST [Fuchs] might be leaving for the ISLAND [Great Britain] instructions were given... ." This is not the only example of Fuchs lying in his several confessions in order to conceal the most important secrets.
~ Another inexplicable, incriminating fact is that Robert Oppenheimer was listed in Gregory Kheifetz' personal address book.
~ In the matter of Klaus Fuchs, Sudoplatov stated that Oppenheimer was influenced, not only to have Fuchs included in the British Mission to America, but to later have him sent to Los Alamos, Site Y. (Special Tasks, p.193-4) Indeed, only Oppenheimer had the authority to prevail over James Chadwick, head of the British Mission, who was adament that Fuchs would not go to Site Y but return to Britain (Chadwick to Peierls, 14 July 1944). As understood by Chadwick, Fuchs could only be transferred to Los Alamos if Site Y (Oppenheimer) made a request for him to General Groves. Only the Army MED office (Groves) could approve the transfer of a civilian physicst to Site Y, let alone the assignment of a native German to the Theoretical Division. But that is exactly what happened—and at the very last moment. (More at essay FUCASE, segment Tripple-cross). Fuchs had to call his sister from Chicago, enroute to New Mexico, to advise her that he was not going home to England as he had told her just days before on a visit to Boston. The truth of this subterfuge is evidenced by the fact that Fuchs lied in his confession about the circumstances of his transfer to Los Alamos when he said that he first learned that he was being sent to Los Alamos in the July 14 meeting in Washington with Chadwick. The Chadwick letter shows this to be patently false. And a Venona message (No.1233, 29084) is corroborative: "In July when it became known that REST [Fuchs] might be leaving for the ISLAND [Great Britain] instructions were given... ." This is not the only example of Fuchs lying in his several confessions in order to conceal the most important secrets.
Chessplayer See essay Chessplayer for more case that Oppenheimer spied for the Soviet Union.