Soviet Message Unit

Early History

In the summer of 1948 Elizabeth Bentley disclosed to a federal grand jury that during the war an aide to President Roosevelt had learned that American intelligence was close to breaking "the Russian secret code," and that the aide had passed this secret to Soviet intelligence. The “aide” was Lauchlin Currie, a member of the Silvermaster spy network; "American intelligence" was the U. S. Army Signals Security Agency (SSA), part of Army Military Intelligence (G2); the "secret" was a SSA project begun in February 1943 at Arlington Hall to collect and examine enciphered Soviet telegrams that had been transmitted over public telegraph lines. This program would later receive the top secret codename Venona to signify and control access to the cryptanalytic breakthrough that had been achieved. [1]

After the war, the SSA added important resources to the Soviet code breaking operation, referred to as “the Russian Section." One resource was the talented linguist Meredith Gardner who had worked on German and Japanese decryption projects. Another resource was a partially burned, incomplete Russian codebook (cryptographic dictionary) recovered in April 1945 by the U.S. Army in Germany. Late in 1946, “Gardner broke the codebook's 'spell table' for encoding English letters. Rapid progress ensued at the SSA, which had been renamed the Army Security Agency (ASA). By the middle of 1947, "it became apparent to Gardner that he was reading KGB messages showing massive Soviet espionage in the United States," and he drafted a report, Special Report #1, on the results of his work. [2]

In September 1947, Gardner's report was the catalyst for General Carter W. Clark, Deputy G2, to inform the FBI's Liaison to Military Intelligence, S. Wesley Reynolds, that the Army had begun to break Soviet espionage messages. Over the next year ASA began providing the Bureau with a number of translations. One of the Special Agents who developed cases from the decryptions was Robert J. Lamphere in the Bureau's Espionage Section. Lamphere would later become FBI liaison directly to the ASA’s Russian code breaking group: "In October 1948 Wes Reynolds officially introduced Robert J. Lamphere, from FBI Headquarters, to Meredith Gardner and the Arlington Hall leadership. From then till he left the FBI in 1955, Lamphere was in constant touch with Gardner and his associates, receiving Venona translations as soon as they were made." [3]

At the end of 1948, working closely with Gardner, Lamphere provided a critical accelerant to the cryptanalytic process. He requested and obtained from the New York field office plain text Russian documents that had been enciphered and telegraphed to Moscow. With these in hand, Gardner was better able to match enciphered number code groups with their corresponding Russian words in the KGB codebook. From Lamphere's 1986 book, The FBI-KGB War: "This was the beginning of an important new phase in the breakthrough, for in a short while Meredith began to give me some completely deciphered messages, and portions of others that he was deciphering at a more rapid rate than had heretofore been possible." [4]


Bureau Source Five

In April 1949 an important meeting was held at Arlington Hall, one attended by senior personnel from the ASA, FBI and British Intelligence services. At this meeting, the FBI learned that rapid progress was being made and it could expect to receive a major increase in Soviet decrypts for investigation. At this time, the Headquarter's Espionage Section was led by Lish Whitson and his assistant William Branigan. Earlier in his career Branigan had been the lead investigator in the San Frrancisco CINRADCASE, a counter-intelligence operation against Soviet penetration of the Radiation Lab at Berkeley. Intercourse with the Los Angeles field office was extensive, as many of the CINRAD subjects (e.g. Gregory Kheifetz, Steve Nelson) traveled to and from Los Angeles. After San Francisco, Branigan was transferred to Los Angeles where he took over the Russian Squad. In considering adding resources to the ASA-FBI Soviet message effort, Branigan recommended Ernest J. Van Loon, who had followed him as head of the Russian squad, and currently was supervising the Boris Morros case. Van Loon was transferred to FBI Headquarters in May 1949 and arrived in Washington in the first week of July. [5]

In August 1949, the ASA forwarded a large quantity of Soviet decrypts to the Bureau, perhaps as many as 50 or more. Lamphere brought them to the space he shared with Van Loon and, for want of a better description, split the booty with his new associate. This was the effective beginning of the FBI’s Soviet Message Unit (SOVME). These message decrypts and their source, ASA, were synonymously referred to as Bureau Source Five (BS5). Both names, Soviet Message Unit and Bureau Source Five, were classified Top Secret. Van Loon's half of the material contained eight translations indicating atomic espionage by two Soviet agents with codenames REST (later, CHARLES) and GUS (later, ARNO). As decrypted and received by the FBI in mid-summer 1949, the REST/GUS translations examined by Van Loon are abstracted below:

On May 8, 1944, New York [MGB residency] advised Moscow that REST had reported that the work of the British Mission in the U.S. was not meeting with success due to misunderstandings. Moscow was further advised that REST might return to Great Britain or be posted to a special laboratory.

On June 15, 1944, New York reported to Moscow that materials described as "the third part of the report MSN-1 (one digit missing) ... Efferent Fluctuation in a Stream" had been received from REST. In this connection, the words "diffusion method" and "work on his specialty" are mentioned. REST had expressed doubt about the possibility of staying in the US without arousing suspicion. REST reported that the Americans had told the British representative that construction of a plant in Great Britain would directly contradict the spirit of the agreement on Atomic Energy signed together with the Atlantic Charter; a representative of Great Britain in Washington was looking into the details of the transfer of the work to Great Britain; REST thought he would have to leave in four to six weeks.

On July 25, 1944, New York advised Moscow that "almost half a year of contact with REST" had demonstrated the value of his work. The residentura proposed to pay him a reward of $500.

On August 29, 1944, New York advised Moscow that REST might be returning to Great Britain. The names ALEKSEY and GUS were mentioned in connection with REST's status. GUS had advised on something related to REST, and apparently GUS was sent to see REST's sister. The date of 20 September was mentioned as somebody's possible departure or arrival date. The $500. for REST had been authorized by Moscow.

On October 1, 1944, New York passed to Moscow detailed information received from GUS about a Soviet agent with the covername CONSTRUCTOR.

On October 4, 1944, Moscow was advised that REST's sister had already returned home and that GUS's next trip to see her was planned for October 12.

On October 5, 1944, New York changed REST's cover name to CHARLES, and GUS' cover name to ARNO.

On November 16, 1944, reference was made to ARNO's "last" trip to see REST's sister. [6]

The two most actionable leads among the BS5 decrypts were those regarding covername CONSTRUCTOR and the fragmentary description of atomic report “MSN-1 (one digit missing)." The October 1, 1944, decrypt linked CONSTRUCTOR with Henry Golwinne, Art Weber, the Chemurgy Design Company and a substance known as BUNA-5. These names were all exhibited in the FBI's file on Abraham Brothman, a principal in the Elizabeth Bentley case. This decrypt therefore allowed the quick identification of CONSTRUCTOR as Brothman. On August 15, 1949, Van Loon directed a memorandum to the New York field office to further investigate Brothman in an attempt to identify unknown subject GUS. On August 25, 1949, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was contacted for assistance in identifying the 1944 report indicated as MSN-1 with a digit missing. This request and later ones were delivered by Special Agent Charles W. Bates, FBI liaison to the AEC. His principal point of contact at the Commission was Security Officer Charles A. Rolander, Jr. [7]


HQ 65-58805

By early September 1949, the Bureau had received two replies from the AEC regarding the obscure MSN report. In summary, the AEC acknowledged that it possessed "reports designated MSN followed by a numeral," the MS was borrowed from the British and stood for Mission, and the N was added to indicate the New York Office of the Manhattan Engineering District. Further, the MSN series reports were dated in chronological order: MSN-12 was dated June 6, 1944, and MSN-13 was dated June 21, 1944—respectively, before and after the date of the Soviet decrypt (June 15, 1944). Thus MSN-1? was not MSN-13, whose date of record was June 21, 1944. Moreover, the Bureau learned that the title of MSN-12 was, “Fluctuations and the Efficiency of a Diffusion Plant, Part III, The Effect of Fluctuations in the flow of N2," and its author was "K. Fuchs." The MSN series documents were obtained from the AEC and through a process of elimination on the basis of dates, Van Loon was able to show that MSN-12 was the report mentioned in the Soviet decrypt dated 15 June 1944. [8]

With the name "K. Fuchs" in hand, a search of the FBI indices, or name registry, was made. The following items were returned:

In March 1944 the Bureau received a letter from the Manhattan Engineering District (MED) containing a list of British scientists who had entered the U.S. on December 3, 1943, for the purpose of work on the Manhattan Project. The name "K. Fuchs" was listed as employed in New York.

In August 1944 the Bureau received a letter from the MED advising that "Dr. K. Fuchs" had been transferred to "Y" (Los Alamos) on August 14, 1944.

In June 1945 FBI Headquarters received a captured list of thousands of German citizens whom the Gestapo suspected of Communist activity. The list contained the following entry: "Klaus Fuchs, student of philosophy, December 29, 1911, Russelsheim, RSHA-IVA2, Gestapo Field Office Kiel." (It is not presently known when this information was translated and indexed in FBI files, but available documents suggest that it was subsequent to March 1946. See below)

In March 1946 the Bureau received information from Canadian authority that an address book in the possession of Israel Halperin at the time of his apprehension in February 1946 (in connection with the Gouzenko defection) contained the following entry: "Klaus Fuchs, Asst. to M. Born, 84 Grange Lane, University of Edinburgh, Scotland Camp N. —Camp L., Internment Operations — Kristel Heineman, 55 Carvel Road, Watertown."

In July 1946 the Bureau received a letter from the U.S. War Department advising that "Dr. K. Fuchs" had returned to England on June 28, 1946, by bomber departing from Montreal, Canada.

The Halperin information prompted a registry search on the name Kristel Heineman. This yielded the fact of a 1946 FBI security investigation of Robert Block Heineman and his wife, Kristel Fuchs Heineman. The Bureau file showed that the Heinemans had lived in Watertown, MA, that Robert Heineman had been a member of the Communist Party and that Mrs. Heineman was the sister of "Dr. Karl Fuchs." [9]

Having established that document MSN-12 was originated by the British Mission in New York, and in view of the fact that Britain was a full partner in the Venona program, the FBI advised British intelligence of its BS5 investigation into unsub REST, and requested identification of British scientists who had engaged in work related to the MSN series reports. The British reply, dated September 7, 1949, identified four scientists, Rudolph Ernest Peierls, C. F. Kearton, Tony Hilton Royle Skyrme and Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs. Almost concurrent with these events, on September 13 and 19, the Bureau received memoranda from the AEC concluding that "Dr. K. Fuchs" was identical to Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs. [10]

Among the four identified candidates for REST, only Klaus Fuchs was shown to have a sister in America, a specific attribute in BS5 for REST. Thus, on September 22, 1949, Van Loon originated an eight-page memorandum to his superiors opening a formal investigation of stated purpose, "an identification of the Soviet agent known to Bureau Source Five under the covernames Rest and Charles." This opening memorandum was approved by Howard B. Fletcher, Head of the Domestic Intelligence Division, and forwarded to Assistant Director D. M. (Mickey) Ladd. The investigation was captioned:

EMIL JULIUS KLAUS FUCHS, was;
Dr. Karl Fuchs, Klaus Fuchs,
Klaus Emil Fuchs
ESPIONAGE — R

KRISTEL KLAUS HEINEMAN
(Mrs. ROBERT BLOCK HEINEMAN), was;
Kristel Klaus, Kristbl Klaus,
Kristel Fuchs, Mrs. Bob Klaus
Alma Anna Dorothe Ida Christel Fuchs
ESPIONAGE — R

Appended to Van Loon’s memo were two additional documents as recommended actions. The first was a memo to British Intelligence advising them of the formal investigation of Klaus Fuchs for espionage. The second was a letter to six FBI field offices directing that same captioned investigations be opened. The Headquarters Fuchs case was assigned file No. 65-58805. [11]


British Response

As previously mentioned, the British were full partners in the Soviet code breaking project at ASA. Accordingly, British intelligence was contacted early in the unsub REST phase of the investigation and they supplied the Bureau with data on Peierls, Kearton, Skyrme and Fuchs. However, the information on Fuchs was not accurate, in fact it was totally inaccurate. Fuchs' name was given as Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, his place of birth as "Ruesselhtenm, country unknown," his occupation as "medical physicist," his August 1944 transfer as, “Oak Ridge on August 14, 1944,” and his current status as, “a senior research worker at the Atomic Energy Project at Harwell, England.” This incorrect (bogus) information was included in the opening Memorandum of 22 September 1949. [12]

On September 22, 1949, the memorandum prepared by Van Loon for British intelligence, captioned Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, was forwarded to MI5. The first matter addressed was the MSN report that REST had provided to Soviet intelligence. The Bureau advised, "this document has been identified with a fair degree of certainty as being a report designated MSN-12 by the MED and entitled, 'Fluctuations and the Efficiency of a Diffusion Plant, Part III, The effect of Fluctuations in the flow on N2.' This report which is dated June 6, 1944 was authored by K. Fuchs, who is identical with the above captioned individual." The greater part of the memo, however, dealt with information in Bureau files on Robert Heineman and Kristel Fuchs Heineman. In this regard, it was brought to British attention that an entry for Fuchs and his sister was found in the address book of Israel Halperin, a subject in the Gouzenko espionage case in Canada. [13]

The British response to the Bureau memo was received on October 29, 1949. It confirmed that, among the 4 scientists under suspicion, Fuchs alone had a sister, and concluded that, "in the light of information supplied by you [FBI] Fuchs has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt to be identical with the Soviet agent REST." [14]


Crime of the Century

It is a remarkable and ironic coincidence that the day after the Fuchs case was opened, September 23, 1949, President Truman announced to the American public that the Soviet Union, for the first time, had detonated an atomic bomb. As much as the general public was surprised, the shock to the U.S. Government and U.S. Military was that much greater: The CIA was on record that the earliest Russia would be able to execute an atomic bomb was 1953. Was it any comfort, however, to the very few U.S. officials who could be briefed on Venona that an explanation for the unanticipated Soviet triumph was at hand: the espionage of Klaus Fuchs, uncovered by the Soviet Message Unit, an ASA-FBI collaboration? [15]

The full damage to U.S. national security became known on November 1, 1949. The FBI received a comprehensive review of Fuchs' work at Los Alamos from the Atomic Energy Commission. The AEC’s secret memorandum concluded that, "Fuchs and Peierls made up 'two thirds of the team which handled the hydrodynamics in the Theoretical Division which made the implosion developments possible. They both contributed to all phases of the weapon development including implosion and super.” Because of the enormous consequences of the loss of America's highest military secret, J. Edgar Hoover would later frame the Fuchs-Gold investigation as the FBI’s ”toughest case,” and the theft of the 'atomic bomb' as “The Crime of the Century.” From “The Crime of the Century,” Reader’s Digest:

“The case history of Klaus Emil Julius Fuchs and Harry Gold—condensed here from the confidential files of the FBI—is a staggering revelation of how a foreign power, espousing a doctrine of hate, frightfulness and slavery, can unfasten the loyalties of free men and women and turn them into traitors. The lives of these two men, now brought to justice, testify to the utter darkness of the Communist way. In them we see the tragic horror of Communism: it blights the moral strength of man, leaving him only a puppet to be manipulated at will.”  — J. Edgar Hoover [16]

Uncovering atomic spy Klaus Fuchs was the most important counter-intelligence success resulting from the Venona program. From Venona, Soviet Espionage and the American Response:

“The courage and wisdom of General Carter W. Clark of G-2 and Robert J. Lamphere contributed to the Venona success story as did the leadership of Frank B. Rowlett and Oliver Kirby at Arlington Hall. But it all rested on the skills, patience, and determination of Arlington Hall analysts who made it possible.” [17]

Notes, Sources, References

1.   Venona, Soviet Espionage and the American Response, CIA/NSA Cryptographic Series, Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner, Editors, 1996, p. vii, xiv, xxiv.
Note   Throughout its life, the SSA Russian cryptanalytic program had a succession of codenames, in chron order, Jade, Drug, Bride and Venona. The reason for these covername changes is not reported. It is possible they coincide with sucessive presidential administrations, e.g. Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy/Johnson, respectively.


2.   “Late in 1946, “Gardner broke the codebook's 'spell table' … he drafted a report (Special Report #1) on these results.”: Ibid., p. xxi.


3.   "In October 1948 Wes Reynolds officially introduced ... as soon as they were made.": Ibid., p. xxii-xxiv, 476.


4.   "This was the beginning of an important new phase... heretofore been possible.": The FBI- KGB War, Robert J. Lamphere and Tom Shachtman, 1986, p. 84-6.
Note   It is virtually certain that the “plain text Russian documents” were obtained in a FBI search of Amtorg offices in the early 1940’s related to the activities of Gaik Ovakimian. Employment at Amtorg was the cover of numerous Soviet intelligence agents who undoubtedly used the comm-crypto resources of the NY consulate to communicate with Moscow. From Nigel West's 1999 book, Venona: "The issue of the FBI's 'black bag' jobs, the illicit entries which were mounted against target Eastern Bloc diplomatic premises, remains extremely sensitive, even after the demise of the Cold War, and very little has been published about this intriguing aspect of US counter-intelligence activities, although Lamphere himself has referred to the theft of Amtorg messages in his memoirs, and a VENONA text from New York dated 25 July 1944 complains about the FBI entering Soviet property masquerading as certification engineers inspectting lift shafts." (Venona, West, p.24-5)
R. J. Lamphere   Entered the FBI July 1941;  First Office (probationary), Birmingham, Alabama, assigned Criminal Division, Selective Service Act violations;  1942, transfer to New York field office, assigned Criminal Division, Selective Service Act violations;  1945, assigned to NY Russian espionage squad;  September 1947, transfer to Washington Headquarters, Supervisor, Espionage Section;  October 1948 assigned as FBI Liaison to Army Security Agency, Soviet code breaking group;  July 1949, Supervisor, Soviet Message Unit;  July 1950, Administrative Head, Soviet Message Unit;  resigned from FBI 1955.


5.   "In April 1949 an important meeting ... ASA, FBI and British GCHQ.": FBI, HQ 65-58805- serial 1201, P.3. See Bureau Source Five at Note 13.

"Earlier in his career, Branigan ... traveled to and from Los Angeles.": Brotherhood of the Bomb, Greg Herken, 2002, p. 96-8, 180.
E. J. Van Loon   Entered FBI December 1940;  Special Agent, January 1941, First Office (probationary), Butte, Montana (detailed to surveillance of German espionage agent Kurt Ludwig, Joe K case); November 1941, transfer to Honolulu field office (closed in early 1942 when marlial law declared in Hawaii);  April 1942, transfer to Los Angeles field office, assigned to German espionage squad;  1945, assigned to LA Special Case (Russian) squad;  1947, supervisor, Russian squad; 1948, supervisor, Boris Morros case (MOCASE);  July 7, 1949, transfer to Washington HQS, assigned as Supervisor, Soviet Message Unit;  March 1953, transfer to Cleveland field office, ASAC; December 1954, transfer to Phoenix field office, ASAC; retired from FBI December 1977.


6.   "the REST/GUS translations": Memorandum, H.B. Flletcher to D. M. Ladd, September 22, 1949, captioned Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, EVL originator, HQ 65-58805-7 P.1-2
Note   Following are the eight decrypts with hyperlink to the NSA Venona website. It should be noted that the decrypts today are more complete than when first forwarded to the FBI in summer 1949. For example, the MSN-1? report is now shown as MSN-12.
On May 8, 1944 > NY to M, #645, 08054;
On June 15, 1944 > NY to M, #850, 15064;
On July 25, 1944 > NY to M, #1049, 25074;
On August 29, 1944 > NY to M, #1233, 29084;
On October 4, 1944 > NY to M, #1397, 04104;
On October 5, 1944 > NY to M, #1403, 05104;
On November 16, 1944 > NY to M, #902, 16114;
October 1, 1944 > NY to M, #1390, 01104.


7.   HQ 65-58805-1202 P.3; HQ 65-58805-7 P.1-2
Note   In setting forth BS5 data on REST in the September 22 opening memorandum Van Loon did not mention the information in the 16 November 1944 decrypt that REST "flew to Chicago and telephoned his sister." As not every significant item in the BS5 material was included in the memorandum, there may or may not have been a reason for this. Nonetheless on September 22, the Chicago field office was directed to open an Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs investigation. Presumably this detailed the REST-Chicago lead, and also the information that Robert Hieineman had lived in Chicago. From Nigel West's book, Venona: "Investigation of Fuchs' travel in the United States, conducted by Special Agent Van Loon, culminated in October 1949 when he showed that the scientist had made the visit to Chicago mentioned in VENONA, and to his sister and brother-in-law, Kristel and Robert Heineman, who lived in Cambridge, MA." (N. West, Venona, p.152-3)


8.   Re August 1949 enquiry to Atomic Energy Commission (AEC): HQ 65-58805- serial 1202 P.3; Re September 1949 data from AEC: Memorandum from C. A. Rolander, Jr, to C. W. Bates, dated September 7, 1949 (HQ 65-58805- serial 4)


9.   Opening Memorandum, HQ 65-58805- serial 7 P. 4-5.


10.   "The British reply, dated September 7, 1949, identified four scientists": HQ 65-58805- serial 10; Letter, E. J. Van Loon to J. P. Mohr, February 14, 1950.

“On September 13 and 19, 1949, the Bureau received memoranda from the AEC … but had cancelled due to illness.”: Memorandum from C. A. Rolander, Jr, to C. W. Bates, dated September 19, 1949 .


11.   HQ 65-58805- serial 7, P.8; HQ 6-558805- ser 5 (Headquarters letter outgoing, British intelligence service, cc Legal Attache, London, England, cc Foreign Service Desk), September 22, 1949; HQ 65-558805- ser 3, Director FBI to SACs New York, Boston, Chicago, El Paso, Knoxville, Washington Field, September 22, 1949.
MI5   Reference to "British Intelligence" is frequent in FBI FOIA File 65-58805. Specific reference to MI5, however, is not observed because of redaction. This essay's rendering of three letter redacted entities in 65-58805 as MI5 is warranted due to context, logic and correspondence with Lamphere’s references to MI5 in FBI-KGB War.
The Invisible Harry Gold, Allen M. Hornblum, 2010  In view of current extensive scholarship on Soviet wartime espionage—occasioned by the declassification of Venona and the publication of the Vassiliev notebooks—a definitive treatment of Harry Gold was probably warranted. However, the book The Invisible Harry Gold by Allen Hornblum, falls short of that goal, chiefly in the areas of accuracy and documentation. As detailed in this essay, the Gold atomic espionage case began in mid-September 1949 with a memorandum prepared by SA E. Van Loon, approved by H. Fletcher and forwarded to M. Ladd. This 8-page memorandum is Serial 7 in the Klaus Fuchs investigative file, HQS 65-58805. Although captioned on Soviet agent Klaus Fuchs, the memorandum also concerned a second Soviet agent: "[Bureau Source Five] furnished information set forth hereafter concerning two Soviet Agents, one of whom was known under the cover names Rest and Charles, and the other one who was known under the cover names of Goose (Gus) and Arnaud (apparently pronounced Arno)."  The memorandum later stated, "It should be noted that according to [Bureau Source Five] Goose furnished the M.G.B. representative in New York with information concerning a Soviet Agent using the cover name of Constructor, who has been identified as Abraham Brothman, who was a prominent subject in the Gregory Case [E. Bentley Case]. An effort to identify Goose is now being carried out in the Brothman Case." From this point until February 1950, when the FBI received Fuchs's confession from MI5 (roughly five months), the Gold case was a separate Unknown Subject Gus investigation. These investigative origins are not detailed by Hornblum. The ostensible reason for this is found in Hornblum's Archives bibliography. The FBI files consulted by Hornblum are given as Julius Rosenberg and Harry Gold, without mention of specific file numbers. It is apparent that Hornblum either skipped completely or gave short shrift to the most germane FBI archive file, HQS- 65-58805. Particularly useful to Hornblum should have been that file's most important serial, a 1951 Case Summary, specifically, Section 7 titled Investigation of Harry Gold as "Goose", Confession and Prosecution; and also Section 8 titled Gold's Espionage Associates. (Ser 1494, EJVL, 160 pages). Due diligence in the Fuchs file would have precluded the following Hornblum statement: "Lamphere prepared a secret letter to British Intelligence saying that a deciphered message and two additional pieces of information pointed to Fuchs as the prime suspect" (p. 181).  The letter in question was actually a document attached to the original Opening Memorandum of the Fuchs case. It is Serial 5 in the Fuchs file, and its author was E. J. Van Loon. Certainly a fact central to Hornblum's project is the identity of the FBI Supervisor who was responsible for the Gold investigation. It was not Robert Lamphere. As Hornblum noted, Fuchs stated to his British confessors that he had known Gold only as "Raymond." A primary reference for Invisible Harry Gold is Lanphere's FBI-KGB War, in which Lamphere stated that, "Van Loon was directing the investigation into Raymond." Had Hornblum pushed his research to a higher level he also might have come across a letter by J. Edgar Hoover, dated June 19, 1950, addressed to Van Loon containing the following sentence: "My personal attention has been directed to your excellent supervision of the Harold Gold case and to the splendid manner in which you handled the research and analysis of investigative material [Venona] received by the Bureau which ultimately resulted in his identification." Such unscholarly regard for accuracy by Hornblum is indicative of junk history not to be relied upon or referenced by other authors without due dilligence. Thus, whether historian or general reader of  Hornblums's 'Saint Harry' book, Caveat Lector. (More on Harry Gold at essay A Curious Character, Note 13.)

Opening Memorandum, EMIL JULIUS KLAUS FUCHS

12.   “the British were full partners in the Soviet code breaking project at ASA.”: Venona, Soviet Espionage and the American Response, p. xl (“20 September 1945 US-UK signals intelligence Continuation Agreement extends wartime cooperation in this field.”)

"British intelligence was contacted early ... they supplied the Bureau with data ... the information on Fuchs was not accurate.": British Intelligence memorandum No. 9710, dated September 7, 1949; Opening Memorandum, HQ 65-58805- serial 7, P. 3-4.

"information on Fuchs not accurate ... at the Atomic Energy Project at Harwell England."
Note   Fuchs' correct birth name is Klaus Emil Julius Fuchs, he was born in Russelsheim, Germany; he was a mathmatical physicist; he was transferred to Los Alamos on August 14, 1944; in 1949 Fuchs was Head of the Theoretical Division of Britain's atomic weapons program.
Bureau Source Five   From FBI file HQ 65-58805- serial 1201, P.3: “Our [FBI] collaboration with British intelligence in connection with this case [Fuchs], developed in the following manner. British Intelligence, for a considerable period of time, has had a technical representative working with Bureau Source Five [ASA]. Certain information dealing with the MGB [KGB] activities in Australia [member of the Commonwealth], had been furnished to British Intelligence. After certain conferences with General Carter Clark and the British Intelligence representatives [G. Patterson, P. Dwyer], a discussion of the information available to us from Bureau Source Five which would be of interest to British Intelligence, was conducted on April 4, 1949. One of the matters brought to the attention of the British Intelligence representatives was material dealing with REST who had furnished his espionage superior [courier/contact] a document identified in the MSN series. It is to be noted that the information concerning REST and the document was very fragmentary at that time, not having been completed to any extent by Bureau Source Five [ASA].”


13.   HQ 65-58805- serial 5.


14.   HQ 65-58805- serial 33.  Note: More probably than not, this British reply to the Bureau was written by Kim Philby, the ranking British intelligence official in Washington, D.C., at the time. (The FUCASE refers)


15. "The CIA was on record ... atomic bomb was 1953.": The Perfect English Spy, Tom Bower, 1995, p.92.
Truman and Venona   It is interesting to read that there is controversy about whether or not President Truman was briefed on Venona. See 2003 column by Robert Novak with response by John Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Did Truman know about Venona? From inception in 1943 to 1952, the owner of Venona was the U.S. Army and the Defense Department. If the President was briefed on Venona that briefing should have come from either the Secretary of Defense (G. C. Marshall) or possibly the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (O. Bradley). The Fuchs case is a good lens with which to look at this issue. First of all, the way Washington works is that, if a government agency can prove its worth/mettle to the politician that has authority over it, there is strong incentive to do so. (This drives the complementary strategy of protecting its turf and secrets from any other govenrnment entity.) On this basis, after Joe 1, the Army would have the authority and responsibility for explaining to the President why and how (espionage and Fuchs) the Soviet Union was able to achieve an atomic weapon in 1949, and not 1953 as estimated by the CIA. Another consideration: would the Army/DoD risk having Truman meet Clement Attlee, UK Prime Minister, after the arrest of Fuchs and have the President learn about the joint US-UK Soviet message decryption program in that manner? Even though there apparently is no official record of it, this writer believes Truman had been fully briefed on Venona, particularly as regards Klaus Fuchs, if not before. Certainly the Fuchs case must have finally disabused the President of his notion that the Army crypto program was a "fairy story." (See FBI Memo, Belmont to Boardman, February 1, 1956, Subject BS5)


16.   “The secret AEC memorandum concluded … including implosion and super.”: Klaus Fuchs, Atom Spy, Robert Chadwell Williams, 1987. p. 115.
Implosion and Super   “The Soviet hydrogen bomb generally attributed to Andrei Sakharov was, just like Teller’s H-bomb, as big as a hotel room. The fact is that, because of information provided by Klaus Fuchs, we were able to reduce its size and easily deliver it to the target.” (A. Feklisov, Man Behind the Rosenbergs, p.201.)

“toughest case”:   This Week Magazine, February 20, 1955.

“Crime of the Century”: The FBI- KGB War, Robert J. Lamphere and Tom Shachtman, 1995, p. 161; Reader’s Digest, May 1951, p.149.
Note   Some authors and historians let personal bias corrupt their judgment about the FBI’s Fuchs case. One example is when they incorrectly impute Hoover’s “Crime of the Century” designation to the Rosenberg case. True, that case flowed from the Fuchs investigation, but, as the actual article shows, it was not the object of Hoover’s characterization. One historian who is remiss in this regard is Professor Emeritus of History at Marquette University, Athan G. Theoharis. (See Declaration Athan G. Theoharis, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, December 7, 2007, p. 6.)
Oppenheimer   In 1951, when Hoover branded the Fuchs' case the “Crime of the Century,” that was accurate and legitimate. However, in so far as the Fuchs case (and other cases) might be derivative of treason by J. Robert Oppehemier, Hoover's declaration should be considered qualified or suspended. In his memoir Special Tasks, Pavel Sudoplatov wrote that Soviet intelligence influenced Oppenheimer to have Fuchs included in the British Mission in 1943 and later brought to Los Alamos. In fact, according to Sudoplatov, Fuchs was given a "code sentence" to establish his bona fides with Oppenheimer. ("My escape from Germany was similar to the escape of Lise Meitner." Special Tasks, p.190) This plan was supported by Fuchs' case officer, Alexander Feklisov, in his 2001 memoir, Man Behind the Rosenbergs: "This was the main reason Oppenhiemer asked Fuchs to join the Manhattan Project." (p.196-7) More evidence of an Oppenheimer-Fuchs conspiracy is found in Fuchs' confession to Lamphere and Clegg in Britain. Fuchs claimed that he was transferred to Los Alamos by James Chadwick in a meeting in Washington, D.C. on July 14, 1944. Existing Chadwick correspondence shows this to be absolutely false. The opposite is true—Fuchs was told on that date that he would be returning to Britain. The exact circumstances of how Fuchs got to Los Alamos remain a mystery. But he would not have joined the Theoretical Division there without the prior knowledge and consent of Oppenheimer and Groves. (A. From the Chadwick letter: "I come now to the point of this letter. It would put me in a very awkward position if a request for Fuchs' services in Y were to be sent to Groves." The clear inference is that Groves' approval had to be sought for such personnel transfer.   B. Another example of Oppenheimer justifying and clearing personnel moves with Groves is his letter to Groves dated 30 September 1944, captioned, “Statement by Dr. Oppenheimer re transfer of Philip Morrison to Site Y”; National Archives document NWD921104, NARA Date 5/2/97.)


17.   “The courage and wisdom of General Carter W. Clark of G-2 and Robert J. Lamphere … Arlington Hall analysts who made it possible.” Venona, Soviet Espionage and the American Response, p.485.
Note   In addition to Lamphere and Van Loon, FBI Special Agents who were assigned to the SOVME Unit as Supervisors were Elmer Linberg, Don Roney, Joe Kelley, Elmer Emerich, Frank Plant, Jim Lee, Tony Littrento and Bill Welke.