From Robert Chadwell Williams's still definitive Klaus Fuchs history, Klaus Fuchs, Atom Spy:
"Within the FBI ‘all hell broke loose’ because agents Lamphere and Van Loon had failed to run an earlier name check on Fuchs." [1]
This is not an accurate statement. The turmoil in question began on February 6, 1950, the Monday following the Saturday announcement in the press of Fuchs's arrest in Britain. That Monday, Director Hoover was called to testify before the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE). Over the weekend, Robert Lamphere, Ernest Van Loon and several other agents prepared a 30-page Summary Brief for the Director’s uptake and reference before the Committee. During his testimony Hoover was asked if the Bureau had been advised by the Army of Fuchs's entry into the U.S. to work on the Manhattan Project. The Summary Brief did not reflect such notification. On the question of Fuchs' entry into the U.S., the Brief stated that Fuchs entered the United States on December 3, 1943, and that this information was provided by British Intelligence in September 1949 (the beginning of the Bureau's Fuchs investigation). In consequence, Hoover said no to the query on Army notification. But General Groves, who was present, corrected him. [2]
As described in the essay Soviet Message Unit, Supervisor Van Loon had run an indices check on Fuchs as soon as he received Fuchs' name from the AEC, in early September 1949. One of the items returned was a letter from Lt. Col. John Lansdale dated March 28, 1944, which listed 23 British personnel who had entered the country on December 3, 1943, to work for the MED. One of the names listed was "K. Fuchs." There had been nearly a four-month delay in the Army's advisory to the FBI on the British arrivals, but Groves was right. According to Lamphere in his book The FBI-KGB War, when Hoover returned to the Justice Building, “all hell broke loose” due to the Director's embarrassment. With justification, the Director demanded to know why his brief did not reflect the fact that the Bureau had been notified by the Army of Fuchs' entry to the U.S. during the war, a not insignificant fact in light of Fuchs' espionage. According to Lamphere, Hoover was much displeased about the failure, and he set a whole building of Special Agents to the task of uncovering the malefactor “who had misled him.” [3]
Chain of Events
On Tuesday, January 24, 1950, at Harwell, England, Klaus Fuchs confessed to espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. He made this confession to MI5 officer James Skardon. Two days later, Fuchs went to London and dictated a short formal confession to Skardon. Fuchs was allowed to return to Harwell, but agreed to come back to London on Monday, January 30. On this date, Skardon picked Fuchs up at the London train station and drove him to the War Office, where MI6 factotum Michael Perrin was waiting. Fuchs dictated a second confession, written down long hand by Perrin. Fuchs again returned to Harwell on his own recognizance. The following day, January 31, the British advised the FBI of Fuchs’ confession admitting continuous espionage from 1941 to February 1949. On Thursday, February 2, Fuchs received a telephone call from Perrin asking him if he could return to London and meet him at his office in the Shell-Mex House. When Fuchs arrived, he was arrested by Commander Leonard Burt of Scotland Yard. This was a surprise to Fuchs and he was miffed that he hadn’t been told he would be 'staying over'. Also on February 2, the British Embassy notified the U.S. State Department of the arrest of Dr. K. Fuchs. [4]
When Hoover was first told of Fuchs’s confession, he asked for a written summary of the investigative file on Fuchs. The arraignment of Fuchs in London on Friday, February 3, resulted in a front page story in the afternoon London newspaper. This was picked up by the U.S. press in time for the Saturday morning editions of the The New York Times and The Washington Post. The NYT headline was, “BRITISH JAIL ATOM SCIENTIST AS A SPY AFTER A TIP BY FBI, HE KNEW OF HYDROGEN BOMB.” Predictably, Hoover was requested to testify on Monday, February 6, before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The short notice time constraint required a team of supervisors to work the weekend to put together a Director’s Summary Brief. Individual supervisors were assigned specific sections (subject areas). The file sources used were Lamphere’s Army Security Agency file on Bureau Source Five (aka Venona) and Van Loon’s Fuchs-Heineman case file (HQ 65-58805). [5]
The supervisor who did the section pertaining to Fuchs’s entry to the U.S. relied on the September 1949 memorandum which opened the Fuchs investigation. That memorandum, authored by Van Loon, credited the fact and particulars of Fuchs's arrival in the U.S. as having been first received from British Intelligence. Although, several other sources had provided the same information, only the British source was mentioned in the Opening Memorandum. In the ensuing internal investigation into the defective Director’s Brief, Van Loon stated the matter as follows:
As described in the essay Soviet Message Unit, Supervisor Van Loon had run an indices check on Fuchs as soon as he received Fuchs' name from the AEC, in early September 1949. One of the items returned was a letter from Lt. Col. John Lansdale dated March 28, 1944, which listed 23 British personnel who had entered the country on December 3, 1943, to work for the MED. One of the names listed was "K. Fuchs." There had been nearly a four-month delay in the Army's advisory to the FBI on the British arrivals, but Groves was right. According to Lamphere in his book The FBI-KGB War, when Hoover returned to the Justice Building, “all hell broke loose” due to the Director's embarrassment. With justification, the Director demanded to know why his brief did not reflect the fact that the Bureau had been notified by the Army of Fuchs' entry to the U.S. during the war, a not insignificant fact in light of Fuchs' espionage. According to Lamphere, Hoover was much displeased about the failure, and he set a whole building of Special Agents to the task of uncovering the malefactor “who had misled him.” [3]
Chain of Events
On Tuesday, January 24, 1950, at Harwell, England, Klaus Fuchs confessed to espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. He made this confession to MI5 officer James Skardon. Two days later, Fuchs went to London and dictated a short formal confession to Skardon. Fuchs was allowed to return to Harwell, but agreed to come back to London on Monday, January 30. On this date, Skardon picked Fuchs up at the London train station and drove him to the War Office, where MI6 factotum Michael Perrin was waiting. Fuchs dictated a second confession, written down long hand by Perrin. Fuchs again returned to Harwell on his own recognizance. The following day, January 31, the British advised the FBI of Fuchs’ confession admitting continuous espionage from 1941 to February 1949. On Thursday, February 2, Fuchs received a telephone call from Perrin asking him if he could return to London and meet him at his office in the Shell-Mex House. When Fuchs arrived, he was arrested by Commander Leonard Burt of Scotland Yard. This was a surprise to Fuchs and he was miffed that he hadn’t been told he would be 'staying over'. Also on February 2, the British Embassy notified the U.S. State Department of the arrest of Dr. K. Fuchs. [4]
When Hoover was first told of Fuchs’s confession, he asked for a written summary of the investigative file on Fuchs. The arraignment of Fuchs in London on Friday, February 3, resulted in a front page story in the afternoon London newspaper. This was picked up by the U.S. press in time for the Saturday morning editions of the The New York Times and The Washington Post. The NYT headline was, “BRITISH JAIL ATOM SCIENTIST AS A SPY AFTER A TIP BY FBI, HE KNEW OF HYDROGEN BOMB.” Predictably, Hoover was requested to testify on Monday, February 6, before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The short notice time constraint required a team of supervisors to work the weekend to put together a Director’s Summary Brief. Individual supervisors were assigned specific sections (subject areas). The file sources used were Lamphere’s Army Security Agency file on Bureau Source Five (aka Venona) and Van Loon’s Fuchs-Heineman case file (HQ 65-58805). [5]
The supervisor who did the section pertaining to Fuchs’s entry to the U.S. relied on the September 1949 memorandum which opened the Fuchs investigation. That memorandum, authored by Van Loon, credited the fact and particulars of Fuchs's arrival in the U.S. as having been first received from British Intelligence. Although, several other sources had provided the same information, only the British source was mentioned in the Opening Memorandum. In the ensuing internal investigation into the defective Director’s Brief, Van Loon stated the matter as follows:
“The Army source was not shown because the same substantive information had already been furnished to the Bureau by the British in its memorandum dated September 7, 1949. Likewise, some of this same information already had been received from the Atomic Energy Commission in a memorandum for its files prepared by C. A. Holander, Jr., dated September 13, 1949, a copy of which was furnished to the Bureau via liaison. These items of information concerning Fuchs’ activities in the United States were not repeated in the original memorandum each time they had been received from a different source. Instead, this knowledge of Fuchs’ activities was attributed to the British, who actually had furnished the same information.” [6]
When all was said and done, as the supervisor responsible for the Fuchs investigation, Van Loon was deemed culpable for Hoover's embarrassment before the JCAE, and accordingly faced disciplinary action—probation and a transfer from Headquarters. He made an appointment with the Director in which he reviewed the preparation of the Summary Brief and took full responsibility for the error. He also, wisely, took the opportunity to update the Director on the unsub GUS investigation, which happened to be heating up due to a tidbit in Fuchs's confession. The waters thus calmed, along with the exigency of the GUS investgation, Van Loon's disciplinary transfer was rescinded by Hoover. At this time, Harry Gold was among Van Loon's ten leading suspects for GUS. It would take another three months to eliminate all the others, leaving Gold the remainder man and primary focus. [7]
Name Checks
In reality, Professor Chadwell’s “all hell broke loose” statement refers, not to what Van Loon did in the summer of 1949, but what the Bureau did in 1944 when the Army forwarded the names of the British Mission. It is still somewhat of an unsettled question as to whether or not the Bureau performed name checks on the list of British personnel received from the Army on March 28, 1944. In his book, Lamphere suggested that the MED had requested name checks. However, there are factors that cast doubt on such request by the MED, or performance of same by the Bureau. John Lansdale’s letter of 28 March 1944 (2 pages) is Serial 852 of FBI HQS File 100-190625, the CINRADCASE (Communist Infiltration Radiation Lab). This letter forwarded the names of British personnel who had arrived (or were scheduled to arrive) to work on the Manhattan Project in the United States. The Heading, Address, Salutation and opening paragraphs are excerpted below:
Name Checks
In reality, Professor Chadwell’s “all hell broke loose” statement refers, not to what Van Loon did in the summer of 1949, but what the Bureau did in 1944 when the Army forwarded the names of the British Mission. It is still somewhat of an unsettled question as to whether or not the Bureau performed name checks on the list of British personnel received from the Army on March 28, 1944. In his book, Lamphere suggested that the MED had requested name checks. However, there are factors that cast doubt on such request by the MED, or performance of same by the Bureau. John Lansdale’s letter of 28 March 1944 (2 pages) is Serial 852 of FBI HQS File 100-190625, the CINRADCASE (Communist Infiltration Radiation Lab). This letter forwarded the names of British personnel who had arrived (or were scheduled to arrive) to work on the Manhattan Project in the United States. The Heading, Address, Salutation and opening paragraphs are excerpted below:
War Department
Office of the Chief of Engineers
Washington
28 March 1944
Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
Attention: Mr. L. Whitson
Dear Mr. Hoover:
Inquiry has been made by your office concerning the British Scientists who are in this country engaged upon work in connection with the Manhattan Engineer District. Your office has indicated that similar information is desired concerning Canadian Scientists in this country. Information has not yet been received by this office concerning the Canadian Scientists.
The following information has been received by this office [from the British Government] concerning British Scientists who are in this country and engaged in work of interest to the Manhattan Engineer District: …
There followed the surname and initials of 39 British personnel, along with their work locations. The work locations were Site Y (Los Alamos), Site X (Oak Ridge), Berkeley (University of California), Washington D.C. and New York. Klaus Fuchs was listed as K. Fuchs, assigned to New York (Diffusion Group). Most notable is the fact that the names were provided at the request of the Bureau, not on the initiative of the MED. Further, the notification on Fuchs in March 1944 of his arrival in December 1943 was four months after the fact. Finally and importantly, name checks were not requested or mentioned by Lansdale. [8]
The MED notification was directed to the attention of Special Agent Lish Whitson, ostensibly the Washington supervisor of the CINRADCASE. However, for all intents and purposes, the CINRADCASE was an inactive investigation at this time. From the Jurisdiction Section of the February 6, 1950, Director’s Summary Brief: “In April 1943 agreement was reached that the Bureau would not take any action in this matter [KGB penetration of the Radiation Lab] unless military intelligence specifically requested it. At this time, the War Department stated they took complete responsibility for protective activities in connection with the MED project. Specifically, the Bureau was not to initiate any investigative activities except on request of the War Department. This agreement, which was continued in effect during the entire life of the MED, fixed complete responsibility for clearance procedures and investigations on the War Department.” It is to be noted that in not requesting name checks on the British scientists, Lansdale was adhering to the letter of the War Department (Army) policy of no FBI involvement in Manhattan Project security.
The Lansdale letter ended with the statement, “Representatives of the British Government in this country have assured this office that all of the individuals who are in this country were cleared by British Security prior to their departure from the United Kingdom.” Given this statement and the policy in place it seems unlikely that SA Whitson would have name-checked the 39 members of the British Mission against the FBI indices. Another factor in such decision might have been the omission of full names by the British. This was an intentional obfuscation by the British. A registry name search using only surname and given name initial/s is highly problematic. In this regard, the British ‘double-downed’ on Fuchs. He was listed as K. Fuchs, instead of K. E. J. Fuchs, whereas, for example, Tony Skyrme was given as T. H. R. Skyrme. Also, while in the U.S., a number of the British scientists used alias first names: Rudolf Peierls was Richard Peierls, Klaus Fuchs was Karl Fuchs. [9]
Who misled the Director?
As to actions taken or not taken by the Bureau, this episode, Who misled the Director?, is now known to be academic: The MED letter of March 1944 containing the name “K. Fuchs” would be the first ‘of record’ occurrence of atomic spy Klaus Fuchs in the FBI’s files. Thus, a March 1944 name search by the Bureau would have produced a null result. That does not mean, however, that this episode is without significance. Even the caption/subject line of the September 22, 1949, Fuchs case Opening Memorandum, "EMIL JULIUS KLAUS FUCHS," was inaccurate and misleading —as was the British fervent hope and intent. [10]
The MED notification was directed to the attention of Special Agent Lish Whitson, ostensibly the Washington supervisor of the CINRADCASE. However, for all intents and purposes, the CINRADCASE was an inactive investigation at this time. From the Jurisdiction Section of the February 6, 1950, Director’s Summary Brief: “In April 1943 agreement was reached that the Bureau would not take any action in this matter [KGB penetration of the Radiation Lab] unless military intelligence specifically requested it. At this time, the War Department stated they took complete responsibility for protective activities in connection with the MED project. Specifically, the Bureau was not to initiate any investigative activities except on request of the War Department. This agreement, which was continued in effect during the entire life of the MED, fixed complete responsibility for clearance procedures and investigations on the War Department.” It is to be noted that in not requesting name checks on the British scientists, Lansdale was adhering to the letter of the War Department (Army) policy of no FBI involvement in Manhattan Project security.
The Lansdale letter ended with the statement, “Representatives of the British Government in this country have assured this office that all of the individuals who are in this country were cleared by British Security prior to their departure from the United Kingdom.” Given this statement and the policy in place it seems unlikely that SA Whitson would have name-checked the 39 members of the British Mission against the FBI indices. Another factor in such decision might have been the omission of full names by the British. This was an intentional obfuscation by the British. A registry name search using only surname and given name initial/s is highly problematic. In this regard, the British ‘double-downed’ on Fuchs. He was listed as K. Fuchs, instead of K. E. J. Fuchs, whereas, for example, Tony Skyrme was given as T. H. R. Skyrme. Also, while in the U.S., a number of the British scientists used alias first names: Rudolf Peierls was Richard Peierls, Klaus Fuchs was Karl Fuchs. [9]
Who misled the Director?
As to actions taken or not taken by the Bureau, this episode, Who misled the Director?, is now known to be academic: The MED letter of March 1944 containing the name “K. Fuchs” would be the first ‘of record’ occurrence of atomic spy Klaus Fuchs in the FBI’s files. Thus, a March 1944 name search by the Bureau would have produced a null result. That does not mean, however, that this episode is without significance. Even the caption/subject line of the September 22, 1949, Fuchs case Opening Memorandum, "EMIL JULIUS KLAUS FUCHS," was inaccurate and misleading —as was the British fervent hope and intent. [10]
Notes, Sources, References
1. Klaus Fuchs, Atom Spy, Robert Chadwell Williams, 1987, p. 163.
2. The FBI-KGB War, Robert J. Lamphere and Tom Shachtman, 1986, 1995, p. 132-9.
“Over the weekend … before the Committee.”: Ibid.
“30-page, multi-sectioned Summary Brief for the Director’s uptake and use before the Committee”: Was. Hqs. 65- 58805, Serial 1202.
3. FBI, was. hqs. 65-58805.
“According to Lamphere … all hell broke loose.”: The FBI-KGB War, p. 137-9.
Note Lamphere’s phrase “all hell broke loose” refers in the main to the fact that the Fuchs espionage bombshell put the FBI under the public and political gun to find Fuchs' American accomplice. The JCAE embarrassment made that search, the unsub GUS investigation, all the more intense.
4. Klaus Fuchs, Atom Spy, Robert Chadwell Williams, 1987; Klaus Fuchs, A Biography, Norman Moss, 1987
5. The FBI-KGB War, pp. 132-9; New York Times, February 4, 1950, p.1.
"Van Loon’s Fuchs-Heineman case file", HQ 65-58805, Serial 1202.
6. “The supervisor who … the Fuchs investigation.”: The FBI-KGB War, p. 137.
“ascribed the particulars … from British Intelligence”: HQS 65-58805- serial 7, p. 4-5 (Subject: EMIL JULIUS KLAUS FUCHS, was.)
“The Army source … who actually had furnished the same information.”: Memo, E. J. Van Loon to J. P. Mohr, February 14, 1950.
7. The FBI-KGB War, pp. 137-9.
"Harry Gold was among ... leaving Gold the remainder man.": HQS 65-58805-Ser 1091.
Note On April 26, 1950, Van Loon requested authority to have seven assoiciates of Abraham Brothman interviewed by Special Agents in the field for the purpose of identifying unknown subject GUS in the Venona decrypts. Gold was number two on this list, behind Brothman himself. The more Gold was interviewed against information from Fuchs and Fuchs's sister and brother-in-law, the greater the correlation and interest became. When Gold was confronted with proof that he had lied about travel to New Mexico, he confessed. The Philadelphia Special Agents assigned to Gold were T. S. Miller, Jr. and Richard E. Brennan.
8. “Lamphere suggested that the MED had requested name checks.”: The FBI-KGB War, p. 137.
“Lansdale letter … a serial in the Headquarters CINRADCASE file.”: Memo, E. J. Van Loon to J. P. Mohr, February 14, 1950; FBI File Number HQS 100-190625, Serial 852.
9. “From the Jurisdiction Section … fixed complete responsibility for clearance procedures and investigations on the War Department.”: HQS 65-58805-serial 1202, p. 14.
Note It is indisputable that the Soviet Union's intelligence success against the U. S. Army's Manhattan Project is the greatest espionage coup in history—Russia obtained both the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb. The prime mover of this success was J. Robert Oppenheimer. Not only had he been a KGB source prior to going to Los Alamos, but he wittingly facilitated the hiring of individuals whom he knew to be Soviet agents. (E.g., Klaus Fuchs. Soviet Message Unit, Note 16 refers.) Moreover, Oppenheimer engendered a decision that protected the whole Soviet espionage operation. He was the reason the Army sidelined the FBI from its statutory responsibility (jurisdiction) for counter-intelligence within the United States. From FBI HQS 65-58805, Serial 1202: "With reference to jurisdiction for investigation of persons connected with the Atomic Bomb Project (MED), on March 6, 1943, after we furnished information to Major General George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department, that Steve Nelson, Communist Party functionary and known Soviet agent, was in close contact with Dr. Julius Robert Oppenheimer, G2 requested that we discontinue investigation of Oppenheimer. After furnishing additional data to G2, on April 5, 1943, 1943, General Strong conferred with Mr. Tamm [Assistant Director E. A. Tamm] and an agreement was reached that the Bureau would not take any action in this matter unless military intelligence specifically requested it." In other words, the San Francisco CINRAD investigation was shut down, instead of being expanded to a national operation encompassing the atomic labs at Los Alamos, Chicago, Oak Ridge, etc. It so happens there is a recently revealed espionage case that perfectly albeit painfully makes the point: the Iowa-born, soviet-trained atomic spy, George Koval. The story can be found in the May 2009 issue of Smithsonian Magazine. Koval was an Army engineer who went to work on the Manhattan Project in 1944. Army Counter-Intelligence (CI) was completely responsible for his background investigation (BI) and top secret clearance. They obviously did not send a CI investigator to his home town in Iowa where it would have been quickly developed that the whole Koval family returned to the Soviet Union in 1932. If Koval completed a Personnel Security Questionaire (PSQ), he obviously would have lied about his whereabouts and activities over ten years. The FBI would have performed name checks off the PSQ to include his parents names, and would have invested some shoe leather in Koval's home town and elsewhere. The unavoidable truth is, if the FBI had been responsible for the background investigation, it would have uncovered Koval, a spy who did extreme damage to the United States.
[Update 5 Oct 2009: The FBI opened an Espionage-R investigation of George Koval in 1954. In 1955, through interviews in Sioux City, Iowa, the Bureau established that the whole Koval family moved to Russia in 1932. Koval had completed a background questionaire in the Army. In it he falsely stated that his parents had died in the early 1930's. For the 10 years (+) period that he had actually been in Russia, he falsely stated his employment in the U.S. as that of "farmer," without giving specifics such as location.]
10. “who misled the Director”: The FBI-KGB War, p. 138.
"Even the opening title (Subject) ... the British fervent intent.": FBI File, Was. Hqs. 65- 58805, Serial 7; Also see essay, The FUCASE.
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